Quick Facts
Born:
March 3, 1989, London, England (age 36)

Lina Khan (born March 3, 1989, London, England) is a British-born American legal scholar who served as commissioner and chair of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) from 2021. Nominated by Pres. Joe Biden in March as one of five commissioners of the FTC, she was confirmed on June 15 by a Senate vote of 69–28. Later that day Biden named her chair of the commission. At 32 years old, she was the youngest chairperson in the history of the FTC.

Khan and her Pakistani parents moved from the United Kingdom to the United States when she was 11 years old. She received a B.A. degree (2010) in political theory at Williams College in Williamstown, Massachusetts, and a J.D. degree (2017) from Yale Law School in New Haven, Connecticut. From 2011 to 2014 she served as a policy analyst for the Open Markets Program (later the independent Open Markets Institute) at the New America Foundation (now New America), a left-leaning think tank focused on the social ramifications of rapid technological change, and from 2017 to 2018 she was legal director of the Open Markets Institute. She was later a legal fellow at the FTC (2018) and a legal counsel for the House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and Administrative Law (2019–20). In 2020 she joined the faculty of Columbia Law School in New York City as an associate professor.

In 2017, while she was still a student at Yale Law School, Khan gained the attention of prominent legislators and government officials with the Yale Law Journal publication of her article “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,” on the ubiquitous Internet retailer (see e-commerce). In that groundbreaking work she argued that current standards for assessing pernicious market dominance and anticompetitive business practices (in place since the 1970s and ’80s), which emphasized short-term effects on consumer prices, were inadequate to understanding the nature of Amazon’s structural power within the digital economy and its potential harm to competition in several lines of business. As she explained, through its long-term strategy of below-cost pricing to increase market share (resulting in regular net losses, especially during its early years) and heavy investment in growth and integrated diversification, Amazon became not only the largest retailer on the Internet but “an essential part of the internet economy”—serving, among other things, as a central venue of e-commerce, “a delivery and logistics network, a payment service, a credit lender…and a leading provider of cloud server space and computing power.” Indeed, according to Khan, as of 2015 more than two million third-party sellers (essentially “middlemen” between manufacturers and consumers), each a rival or potential rival of Amazon itself with respect to a given product line, were using Amazon to market and sell their products and to benefit from essential services and infrastructure.Amazon used its below-cost pricing strategy as a form of aggressive loss-leading (predatory pricing) to cripple other retailers, and its integrated diversification enabled it to leverage its structural power to gain advantage over its competitors. According to Khan, Amazon used data from the transactions of third-party sellers to identify profitable product lines that it could sell at lower prices, thus undermining the third-party seller, or even manufacture itself, thus cutting out the middleman entirely. In view of the fact that Amazon’s anticompetitive conduct and structural power could not be identified or understood through price effects alone (unlike monopolies of the past, Amazon generally did not use its market dominance to artificially inflate prices), Khan recommended two possible remedies: returning to “traditional antitrust and competition principles” through updated and robustly enforced laws against predatory pricing and vertical integration (the control of successive stages of production or distribution by the same company), and regulating Amazon and other “Big Tech” companies as public utilities or common carriers (companies that transport goods, people, or messages for the general public).

Khan’s analysis drew the attention of liberal lawmakers, including U.S. Senators Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, both critics of Big Tech companies such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google, and influenced a 16-month investigation by the House antitrust subcommittee and its eventual report, which Khan helped to write, calling for the effective breaking up of Big Tech companies and drastic reforms in antitrust law. Khan’s work also drew fierce criticism from some Republicans and more-conservative economists and legal scholars, some of whom claimed that it was ill-informed and even incoherent; some also mocked her work with the label “Hipster Antitrust.” Amazon, for its part, filed a formal petition with the FTC requesting that Khan be recused from any decision affecting its businesses on the grounds that her previous criticisms of the company “convey to any reasonable observer the clear impression that she has already made up her mind about many material facts relevant to Amazon’s antitrust culpability.”

With Khan’s appointment as chair of the FTC in June 2021, which also gave Democrats a 3–2 majority on the commission, it was expected that the FTC would vigorously pursue antitrust litigation and more actively exercise its rule-making power in the interests of consumers.

Brian Duignan
Related Topics:
policy

competition policy, public policy aimed at ensuring that competition is not restricted or undermined in ways that are detrimental to the economy and society. It is predicated upon the idea that competitive markets are central to investment, efficiency, innovation, and growth.

Competition policy emerged in the United States in the late 19th century, when it became apparent that competition was prompting larger firms to try to lessen competitive pressures through the formation of cartels, with detrimental effects on smaller firms and consumers. Consequently, in the United States it is more usually referred to as antitrust policy. Since the 1990s, competition policy’s importance has increased, both in its spread to ever more segments of the economy and in its prominence as a policy tool.

There are three main areas traditionally covered by competition policy: restrictive practices, monopolies, and mergers. Restrictive practices—for instance, collusion by competitor firms to fix prices—are generally prohibited under competition policy, though this is not the case with all collaboration. It is increasingly common for even the largest multinational firms to collaborate with competitors in areas such as research and development. With monopolies, it is the abuse of a monopoly position, rather than its existence per se, that is addressed through policy. The regulation of privatized utilities illustrates this point clearly. The transfer of large numbers of state-owned utilities into the private sector necessitated regulatory strategies to maintain the benefits of economies of scale associated with a monopoly network provider, while combining this with the introduction of competition where possible. Mergers have traditionally been the most controversial, and consequently, the most politicized, of the areas of competition policy, not least because the judgment required as to whether a particular merger will result in a damaging reduction in competition that outweighs any potential benefits is, frequently, debatable.

A notable development in competition policy is the trend toward devolving responsibility for its implementation to independent agencies, at arm’s length from government (though the degree of independence varies considerably). This is perhaps best explained as an attempt to “depoliticize” competition policy—to make it, or at least to make it appear, neutral, predictable, and rules-based and not subject to the short-term concerns of elected politicians. However, it has also increased the influence that those agencies have on the development of policy and its implementation as their expertise has grown.

Where once competition policy was contrasted with regulation—the idea of the promotion of competition was diametrically opposed to regulation in the eyes of many—the distinction is now less clear-cut. As the example of the privatized utilities shows, there is no strict boundary between the two. However, competition agencies can be distinguished from industry-specific regulators. The former are responsible for policy throughout the entire economy, setting overall policy, and normally have a reactive role in responding to suspected breaches; industry regulators have a far-narrower scope but greater powers to establish preventive rules. This prompted the distinction between regulation of competition and regulation for competition.

Phillip Larkin