Robert J. Aumann

Israeli mathematician
verifiedCite
While every effort has been made to follow citation style rules, there may be some discrepancies. Please refer to the appropriate style manual or other sources if you have any questions.
Select Citation Style
Feedback
Corrections? Updates? Omissions? Let us know if you have suggestions to improve this article (requires login).
Thank you for your feedback

Our editors will review what you’ve submitted and determine whether to revise the article.

Quick Facts
Born:
June 8, 1930, Frankfurt am Main, Ger.
Awards And Honors:
Nobel Prize (2005)
Subjects Of Study:
game theory

Robert J. Aumann (born June 8, 1930, Frankfurt am Main, Ger.) is an Israeli mathematician, who shared the 2005 Nobel Prize for Economics with Thomas C. Schelling. Aumann’s primary contribution to economics involved the analysis of repeated noncooperative encounters, a subject in the mathematical discipline of game theory. The co-winners were cited “for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.”

Aumann emigrated to the United States with his family in 1938. He was educated at the City College of New York (B.S., 1950) and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (S.M., 1952; Ph.D., 1955), followed by postdoctoral work at Princeton University. In 1956 he moved to Israel, where he was a member of the mathematics faculty at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem until his retirement in 2000. Aumann also served on the editorial and advisory boards of several academic journals, notably International Journal of Game Theory, Journal of Mathematical Economics, and Games and Economic Behaviour.

Aumann employed a mathematical approach to show that long-term social interaction could be analyzed using formal noncooperative game theory. Through his methodologies and analyses of so-called infinitely repeated games, he identified the outcomes that could be sustained in long-term relations and demonstrated the prerequisites for cooperation in situations where there are many participants, infrequent interaction, or the potential for a break in relations and when participants’ actions lack transparency.

Equations written on blackboard
Britannica Quiz
Numbers and Mathematics

Aumann also extended game theory with his investigation into its cognitive foundations. He showed that peaceful cooperation is often an equilibrium solution in a repeated game even when the parties have strong short-term conflicting interests. Thus, cooperation is not necessarily dependent on goodwill or an outside arbiter. Aumann named this observation the “folk theorem.”

This article was most recently revised and updated by Encyclopaedia Britannica.