Taiwan became part of the Republic of China on October 25, 1945, which has been celebrated since then as Retrocession Day. However, Taiwan was not made a standard province of China at that time, as most people on the island had expected. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Ch’en Yi (Ch’en I) governor-general of the island, with powers similar to those that had been exercised by the Japanese military governors. Finally, Japanese officials, administrators, and technicians departed, leaving a vacuum that was not easy to fill. Taiwan’s economy, which had become linked to Japan’s, had to be reorganized. Japanese law, customs, and much more were to be replaced.

Ch’en, like many others in his administration and many of the Nationalist Chinese soldiers sent to Taiwan at the time, regarded the Taiwanese as traitors tainted by inferior Japanese culture. Ch’en hailed from Fujian (Fukien) province and could speak both Minnan (Taiwanese) and Japanese. He refused to do so, however, believing that the Taiwanese should learn Mandarin, which many of them found difficult. Ch’en took few Taiwanese into his government, especially in jobs of importance. He hoped that he and his administration could govern by moral example, but many of his subordinates were incompetent or corrupt.

Just as Ch’en and his people espoused condescending views toward the Taiwanese, the latter viewed the newly arrived mainland Chinese as dirty, dishonest, and technologically backward. The Taiwanese could see that the new government lacked the technical expertise to run public services. They did not like the new legal system imposed on them, especially the provision that allowed the forced occupation of property to lead to legal claims on it. Thus, the Taiwanese came to view the government as a carpetbagger to be despised. Meanwhile, Chiang was preoccupied with the civil war against the communists and felt that the residents of Taiwan should understand his situation and be willing to sacrifice. Most Taiwanese did not understand, and they were dismayed by economic deterioration in Taiwan as well as a return of eradicated diseases, falling educational standards, and ill treatment of citizens by the government.

Ill feelings came to a head in February 1947 when a government agent knocked to the ground a woman who was selling black-market cigarettes and agents then fired into the angry crowd that had assembled, killing a bystander. Widespread civil disobedience ensued, creating what seemed to be a rebellion. Mainland Chinese were attacked, beaten, and killed in large numbers. Fukien Taiwanese killed people who could not speak to them in Minnan, including many Hakka. The event became known as er-er-ba, or 2-2-8, for the incident’s date (February 28). A memorial park was established in Taipei in the 1990s to commemorate the incident.

In March, Chiang sent troops to Taiwan to end the chaos. The soldiers used their weapons at will, often against unarmed civilians and seemingly in revenge. Punitive actions were taken against anyone thought to be organizing trouble. Order was restored, but not before thousands were killed, including the core of Taiwan’s potential local political and social leadership.

Chiang subsequently relieved Ch’en of his post, rescinded military rule, and appointed a number of Taiwanese to top political jobs. Many government monopoly enterprises were sold, and efforts were made to alleviate unemployment. Those actions helped ameliorate a bad situation, but not before considerable damage had been done, including the creation of hostile feelings toward Ch’en, the government, and mainland China.

In late 1949 Mao Zedong’s communist armies defeated Chiang’s forces on the mainland, and Chiang, his government (the Nationalist Party [Kuomintang, or KMT]), the military, and others were compelled to flee. Most went to Taiwan with Chiang. The influx of some 1.5 million people put strains on Taiwan’s struggling economy and further exacerbated ethnic tensions. Chiang had Ch’en executed in public and took measures to root out corruption from the KMT and the government. However, those actions ingratiated him with the Taiwanese only slightly.

The United States abandoned Chiang at that time, but it reversed this policy with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. U.S. Pres. Harry S. Truman sent the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent an invasion of the island by communist armies from the mainland. At that time, due to the divide between the United States and the Soviet Union, the world split into communist and capitalist-democratic blocs. Chiang stood with the latter group, and the United States and other Western countries supported his government’s bid to represent China diplomatically and in the United Nations (UN) and various other international organizations.

Chiang pledged to invade and retake the mainland and used that goal to justify postponing democracy and perpetuating his minority mainland Chinese government. He also used those policies, and the security of U.S. military protection, to focus on Taiwan’s economic development. Chiang thus won the support of the Taiwanese, and, as he succeeded, he also won their political allegiance to a certain extent. Many Taiwanese came to feel that only by working with the mainland Chinese-controlled government could Taiwan become secure and prosperous.

Taiwan’s economy took off in the mid-1960s and grew rapidly in the following decades, causing Taiwan to become known as an “economic miracle.” Chiang and his team of economic planners, including Lee Kuo-ting (Li Guoding), got the credit, as they engineered growth from which everyone benefited. Consumerism and prosperity were the hallmarks of the time. Meanwhile, mainland China languished economically under Mao, with such ill-advised programs as the Great Leap Forward in 1958–60. Economic growth, which had produced a middle class in Taiwan, coupled with relatively free local elections, served as the basis for establishing more democratic governance in Taiwan, though democratic reforms occurred later than they should have, according to Chiang’s critics.

Meanwhile, Chiang’s dream of taking back the mainland and again ruling there dimmed with time. Two crises in the 1950s over Matsu and Quemoy—islands controlled by Taiwan in waters off Fujian province in China—involved intervention by the U.S. Navy and led the United States and Taiwan to conclude a mutual-defense treaty in 1954. The United States thereby offered Taiwan military protection, but it also sought to constrain Chiang from starting a war with mainland China. By the end of the 1960s, however, Washington was viewing better relations with Beijing as a way to help get itself out of the Vietnam War, and the administration of U.S. Pres. Richard Nixon moved accordingly. Beijing replaced Taipei in the UN in 1971, and the following year Nixon visited mainland China, prompting other countries to seek better and more-formal relations with Beijing. Taiwan became diplomatically isolated.

Chiang died in April 1975. He had made Taiwan prosperous and put it on track to become a democracy, but he had failed in his effort to use Taiwan as a base from which to liberate the mainland from communism. Mao died a year later, thus ending a personal feud that had dominated much of China’s 20th-century history.