Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, legal case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on March 30, 2005, held in a 5–3 decision (one justice did not participate) that claims alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) may be brought on the basis of an adverse disparate impact on a legally protected group, in this case the older officers of the police department of the city of Jackson, Mississippi. In so ruling, however, the court adopted an exceedingly narrow interpretation of the circumstances under which disparate-impact claims could be filed under the law, leading some experts to question the future viability of the ADEA as a tool to protect employees.
The dispute in Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi began in 1999 when the city implemented a pay plan for its police officers that assigned them to differing pay grades based on rank, time in service, and current salary. In an attempt to help retain its younger officers, the department offered them proportionately higher raises than their older colleagues. As a result, 30 officers who were over the age of 40 filed suit under the ADEA, alleging both disparate treatment (intentional discrimination) by the department and disparate impact on older officers.
A federal district court in Mississippi granted the city’s motion for summary judgment (dismissal) on both claims. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, whereas the disparate-treatment claim could not be dismissed without further evidence regarding intent, the disparate-impact claim was in error because such claims were not cognizable (could not be brought) under the ADEA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the plaintiffs on March 29, 2004, and oral arguments were heard on November 3.
In a splintered unanimous (8–0) holding, the court found in favour of the city and affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision. A 5–3 majority agreed, contrary to the Fifth Circuit, that disparate-impact claims were cognizable under the ADEA; however, the same majority also concluded that the plaintiffs’ disparate-impact claim was invalid, because the ADEA specifically permits “otherwise prohibited” actions “where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age,” and the department’s reliance on seniority and position to determine raise levels was “unquestionably reasonable given the City’s goal” of retaining younger officers. Moreover, the plaintiffs had not identified “any specific test, requirement, or practice within the pay plan that has an adverse impact on older workers,” as the Supreme Court, in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio (1989), had required of disparate-impact claims filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, whose relevant language was identical to that of the ADEA.
The court’s opinion was written by Justice John Paul Stevens and joined in full by Justices Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and David Souter and in part by Justice Antonin Scalia, who also filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s opinion, also concurring in the judgment (but on the grounds that disparate-impact claims were not cognizable under the ADEA), was joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.