Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), plan developed by U.S. Senators Sam Nunn (Democrat, Georgia) and Richard Lugar (Republican, Indiana) to assist Russia and other former Soviet states in dismantling and disposing of their nuclear weapons during the 1990s.
In August 1991 a military coup nearly overthrew Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. That event brought into focus the possibility that the Soviet Union’s vast nuclear arsenal could fall under the control of an unstable military government. Greatly alarmed, U.S. government officials proposed working with the Soviets to secure their nuclear weapons. Before such an agreement could be accomplished, however, the Soviet Union collapsed, on December 25, 1991.
At that time the Soviet Union possessed approximately 30,000 nuclear missiles, 40,000 tons of chemical weapons, and a large biological-weapons program. When the Soviet Union broke apart, those weapons were spread among four newly independent countries: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. The situation raised two critical concerns. First, could those newly formed governments be trusted to harbour such dangerous weapons? Second, were those new countries capable of safeguarding the weapons?
To ease those concerns, in 1991 Nunn and Lugar cosponsored the National Defense Authorization Act. The act originally provided U.S. funding for either the elimination of Soviet nuclear weapons or their removal to carefully guarded sites, storage of nuclear material obtained from decommissioned missiles, and efforts to prevent the sale or illegal dispersal of destructive weapons. The act proposed that the United States spend roughly $400 million per year to achieve those goals.
By 1994 Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—with the assistance of the United States—had transferred all of their nuclear arsenals to Russia, thereby eliminating fears about the security of weapons in those countries. The focus of U.S. efforts then turned primarily to Russia. In addition to eliminating and storing nuclear material, the United States provided funding to improve communications between the American and Russian militaries, to convert Russian defense industries into peaceful civilian industries, to ensure the environmental safety of former nuclear sites, and to provide new employment for former Russian nuclear scientists and other military personnel. The U.S. Departments of State, Defense, and Energy all worked to attain those objectives.
Overall, the Nunn-Lugar legislation was highly successful. Between 1992 and 1997, all nuclear materials were moved safely to Russia. U.S. officials oversaw the dismantling of a significant portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and subsequently confirmed that the leftover material from those weapons had been either safely stored or disposed of. Furthermore, relations between the former Cold War adversaries, the United States and Russia, were immensely improved.
Nevertheless, some members of Congress denounced the conversion of Russia’s defense industries into civilian industries and the use of funding to employ former employees of the Soviet defense establishment. That funding, they argued, constituted subsidies to the Russian economy and did not actually promote U.S. security. Distrust bred during the Cold War also lingered; some members of Congress feared that Russia was using the funding for military purposes, such as the war against separatist rebels in Chechnya.
Consequently, in 1997 the act was revised to cover only the three original principles formulated in 1991. Still, the Nunn-Lugar Act undeniably contributed to the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the prevention of the unwanted spread of Soviet nuclear and chemical weapons.