Harold K. Johnson (born February 22, 1912, Bowesmont, North Dakota, U.S.—died September 24, 1983, Washington, D.C.) was a U.S. Army officer who fought in World War II and the Korean War and who served as army chief of staff (1964–68) during the Vietnam War.
Johnson graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, in 1933. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the infantry and joined the 3rd Infantry Regiment at Fort Snelling, Minnesota. The U.S. Army in the interwar years was small, scattered, and seriously underfunded, but Johnson was detailed to the Civilian Conservation Corps, which proved to be a fine leadership laboratory for him. He attended Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, where his studies included horsemanship, before serving in the 28th Infantry at Fort Niagara, New York.
As World War II approached, Johnson was assigned to the 57th Infantry, an element of the Philippine Scouts, at Fort McKinley near Manila. He began as a company commander, the fourth time he had held such an assignment, and was soon promoted to captain. With war imminent, military families were evacuated to the United States, and Johnson took over the key post of regimental operations officer. As the Japanese advanced, he briefly commanded a battalion before surrender was ordered. He endured the Bataan Death March and internment at Camp O’Donnell and Cabanatuan prison camp, risking serious punishment by manipulating food supplies to keep his fellow prisoners alive. He then survived evacuation on a series of “Hell ships”—dangerously overcrowded cargo vessels that were used by the Japanese to keep their captives from being recovered by advancing Allied forces—including one that was attacked and sunk by U.S. fighter planes, killing 300 prisoners of war.
Johnson was transferred again by the Japanese, this time to a prison camp in Inchon, Korea. He was finally liberated, after 41 months in captivity, on September 7, 1945. He had dwindled to a mere 92 pounds (42 kg), down from his customary 180 (82 kg). An American medical officer and fellow prisoner said about Johnson, “There was no medical reason he should have been alive.” After the war Johnson attended and taught for two years at the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He then attended the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, graduating in 1949.
Frantic scrambling ensued when in June 1950 South Korea was invaded by the communist North. By then the huge American war machine of World War II had been largely dismantled, and what remained was in a reduced state of readiness. Johnson was given command of a provisional battalion of hastily pulled together infantry that in early August shipped from San Francisco. Within days of reaching Korea, they were in heavy combat, with Johnson leading so gallantly that he was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. He was promoted to full colonel and commanded two cavalry regiments, units that he led with distinction during the drive north to the Yalu River and the subsequent withdrawal after China’s entry into war. He finished 14 months in Korea as a corps operations officer.
After attending and graduating from the National War College, Johnson served as executive officer to the army’s deputy chief of staff for operations at the Pentagon. In 1956 he was promoted to brigadier general and became assistant division commander of the 8th Infantry Division, managing the movement of that unit to Germany. There he subsequently served as operations officer of Central Army Group, a NATO headquarters, and then as its chief of staff.
Johnson was promoted to major general in 1959, and the following year he was made commandant of the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. By that time he was known throughout the army as a man of determination, deep religious faith, unlimited appetite for work, and exemplary character. He urged students to “challenge the assertion,” a catchphrase that would resonate with a generation of young officers. During that assignment he also delved deeply into counterinsurgency warfare, a critical topic as the war in Vietnam began to grow in importance. By that time there were foreign students at Leavenworth, including Japanese officers. Bearing them no animus as a result of his wartime ordeal, Johnson treated them like everyone else.
In early 1963 Johnson returned to the Pentagon, where he was soon named army deputy chief of staff for operations, the same fast-paced staff element where he had served earlier as a colonel. Now, with Vietnam to contend with, it was an even more challenging place to be. Compounding the challenge further was the fact that Johnson fundamentally disagreed with the way Gen. William Westmoreland was conducting the war in Vietnam, emphasizing large operations in the deep jungles and using enemy body count as the sole measure of merit while neglecting pacification efforts and the improvement of South Vietnamese forces. Westmoreland’s obsession with fighting a war of attrition—believing that if enough of the enemy were killed, they would lose heart and cease their aggression—was doomed to failure, as communist forces refused to engage in large-scale battles and limited casualties by withdrawing into sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam.
Just over a year later, and to his great surprise, Johnson was moved up to become chief of staff, the top position in the army hierarchy. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara explained that he had reached far down in the ranks of army lieutenant generals to select Johnson, calling him a man with “an iron will, extraordinary toughness of mind and spirit, and a fierce integrity.”
Johnson held that post for four very difficult years (1964–68), with the war in Vietnam and the army’s commitment to it dominating his concerns. Matters were made more difficult by U.S. Pres. Lyndon B. Johnson’s refusal to call up reserve forces, meaning that the army had to create from scratch the multitude of new units needed for deployment to Vietnam. A study commissioned by Johnson, “A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam” (which came to be known as PROVN), was published by the army staff in 1966, and it denounced the Westmoreland way of war. The heart of its concerns was security for the people living in the rural hamlets and villages of South Vietnam. “All other military aspects of the war,” it proclaimed, “are secondary.” The military operations of allied forces were not to endanger the lives and property of the people they were intended to protect.
To Johnson’s great disappointment, this was not Westmoreland’s strategy, and Johnson was unable to override the general on those central issues. At time of Johnson’s retirement in mid-1968, Westmoreland was recalled from Vietnam and succeeded by Gen. Creighton Abrams, who promptly set about implementing PROVN. The American will to fight on was dwindling, however, and the antiwar movement was picking up steam. In retirement Johnson headed the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge, an educational nonprofit organization promoting civic responsibility, and then went into banking. He died at Walter Reed Army Medical Center and was buried at Arlington National Cemetery.