Carey v. Piphus, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on March 21, 1978, ruled (8–0) that public school officials can be financially liable for violating a student’s procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment if the student can prove the officials were unjustified in their actions and that an actual injury had occurred. If the student is unable to offer such proof, school officials may be liable only for small damages, not to exceed one dollar.
The case involved two students, one of whom was Jarius Piphus, a freshman at a vocational high school in Chicago. In 1974 he received a 20-day suspension for reportedly smoking marijuana on school grounds. Piphus denied the allegation, but he was never permitted a hearing to challenge the suspension. The second student was Silas Brisco, a sixth grader at a Chicago elementary school. In 1973 he wore an earring to school, in violation of a school rule that sought to limit gang activity. When asked to remove it, Brisco refused, claiming that the earring was “a symbol of black pride, not of gang membership.” Without being granted a hearing or other form of procedural due process, he was suspended for 20 days. The students sued their school board, arguing that their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process had been violated and that they were entitled to monetary damages. Their cases were later consolidated.
A federal district court subsequently ruled that both students had been denied due process. In addressing the issue of damages, the court, citing Wood v. Strickland (1975), rejected school officials’s claims of qualified immunity, because they should have realized “that a lengthy suspension without any adjudicative hearing of any type” was a violation of procedural due process. However, because the students failed to provide evidence of injuries resulting from the suspensions, the court refused to award damages. A court of appeals, however, reversed in part and remanded, holding that the lower court should have reviewed evidence of injury that was received after the judgment. Furthermore, according to the appellate court, if school officials could show that the students would have been suspended regardless of a hearing, then damages “representing the value of missed school time” should not be awarded. However, the court held that Piphus and Brisco were entitled to “substantial non-punitive” damages because their procedural due process rights had been violated.
On December 6, 1977, the case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. The court held that consistent with previous cases such as Wood, school officials can be financially liable for deprivation of students’ protected rights, and the facts of Piphus clearly supported the notion that school officials did indeed violate the two students’ right to due process. Further, in acknowledging the critical importance of citizens’ observing and abiding by federally protected rights, the court ruled that a violation of the due process rights of students per se is sufficient to entitle them to awards for damages.
At the same time, the court decided that a violation of due process, absent actual injury, was not sufficient to award substantial damages. When due process has been violated in the context of student discipline, but without proof of actual injury resulting from that violation, the court explained that students are entitled to only nominal damages. In addition, the court stated that substantial damages may be awarded only when students are able to show that their removal from school was unlawful or unjustified.
The court further addressed the issue of injury. According to the court, it is the student’s responsibility to prove that an injury occurred and that the injury was caused by the violation of due process and not by other, justifiable factors. It is possible, for example, that when a student proves that he or she has suffered harm from being removed from school, such harm may be caused by two factors: the violation of due process or the lawful and justified removal from school. If a student suffers emotional distress because he or she was suspended or expelled for legitimate and justified reasons without procedural due process, substantial damages will not be awarded, because the cause of the distress was a lawful removal from school.
On the basis of those findings, the court was of the opinion that Piphus and Brisco were entitled to damages because their due process rights were violated. However, if the students could not prove that their removal from school was unlawful or unjustified, they were entitled to only one dollar from school officials. The decision of the appellate court was reversed and the case remanded. (Only eight justices reviewed the case; Harry A. Blackmun was not involved in the consideration or decision.)