Battle of Kasserine Pass
Battle of Kasserine Pass, the first large-scale encounter in World War II between Italian and German land forces and the U.S. army, fought February 14–24, 1943. The Axis offensive along the Kasserine Pass, in a gap in the Atlas Mountains of west-central Tunisia, resulted in a humiliating setback for the Americans, but they recovered quickly and prevented the Axis forces from exploiting their initial advantage.
On February 14, 1943, armored units from Erwin Rommel’s Panzer Army Africa launched an offensive against the Allies to forestall their advance into Tunisia, a strategic gateway to the oil fields of Libya. The spearhead of the Axis advance was directed against the Kasserine Pass, lightly held by inexperienced American troops with some British and French support. Rommel had several objectives in mind, such as clearing the area east of the pass for a bomber base capable of attacking distant units and keeping them from advancing further, but mostly his intent was to throw the Allies back to the west of the Atlas Mountains and contain them there.
On February 19 a veteran German-Italian assault group smashed into the U.S. troops holding the pass. The German Panzer IV and Tiger tanks were vastly superior to the U.S. M3 light tanks and light antitank guns, and soon the Americans were retreating along the pass in disarray.
Confused responses from Lieutenant General Lloyd Frendendall’s U.S. II Corps only made matters worse: the French and British under his overall direction did not communicate well with his American forces, and Frendenhall had divided his own units into small groups incapable of coordinated actions, often too distant from each other to provide support in case of attack. For a while a sense of panic pervaded the Corps’s command. Once through the pass, the Axis forces continued their advance, but severe winter weather, increasingly mountainous terrain, and stiffening Allied resistance, including a highly effective artillery bombardment, slowed and eventually halted progress. Having advanced rapidly at the start, the Germans struggled to maintain a dangerously thin supply line, and Rommel, considering the consolidated resistance now being mounted against him, decided to break off combat. Simmering disagreements between Rommel and his superiors as to how the advance should proceed now came to a head, but on February 22, Rommel called off the offensive and withdrew to engage the British Eighth Army to the south. Two days later, after an intense U.S. air attack, Allied troops reoccupied the pass.
Rommel, who at first scorned his untested American foe, had a different opinion of them at the end of the clash, later recording in his journal, “The tactical conduct of the enemy’s defense had been first class. They had recovered very quickly after the first shock and had soon succeeded in damming up our advance by grouping their reserves to defend the passes and other suitable points.”
The Battle of Kasserine Pass—more correctly stated, the operation, consisting of a series of battles—was a shock to the Americans, though it had little effect on the continuing advance on Tunis. But one final casualty was General Frendendall, who was replaced on March 6 by the considerably more aggressive Major General George S. Patton. Another outcome was a new combat doctrine promulgated by American commanding general Dwight D. Eisenhower, requiring all future land operations to be strongly supported by the Americans’ superior air forces.
Losses: Allied, 10,000 casualties (6,500 Americans) of 30,000, plus 183 tanks; Axis, 2,000 casualties of 22,000, plus 34 tanks.