Gill v. Whitford, legal case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on June 18, 2018, vacated and remanded a U.S. district court decision that had struck down a redistricting plan of the Wisconsin state legislature as an unconstitutional political, or partisan, gerrymander. The Court found unanimously (9–0) that the plaintiffs, a group of 12 Wisconsin Democratic voters, lacked standing to sue under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which (as traditionally interpreted) requires plaintiffs in federal lawsuits to show that their complaint proceeds from a specific, direct, and significant injury—one that could be remedied or prevented by an appropriate decision of the court—rather than merely from a general grievance or a general interest in promoting a certain legal outcome. The Court then took the unusual step (7–2) of returning the case to the district court for reargument rather than dismissing it outright.
The originating case, concerning the redistricting plan enacted by the Wisconsin state legislature in 2011, was decided in November 2016 by a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. That panel had found that, in drafting the plan, known as Act 43, following the 2010 decennial census, the legislature’s Republican majority intended to significantly dilute the voting strength of Democrats in the state by gathering Democratic voters into relatively few districts designed to have Democratic majorities (“packing”) and by dispersing Democratic voters among districts designed to have Republican majorities (“cracking”). By thus reducing the total number of districts that were likely to elect Democrats, the drafters hoped to limit Democratic representation in the state legislature and to maintain Republican control of the body even following elections in which Democrats won a majority of the statewide vote.
Citing the results of the 2012 and 2014 elections, which were conducted under the new map, the district court agreed with the plaintiffs that Act 43 did have the effects intended by its drafters, producing an excessive and unwarranted partisan advantage for Republicans as compared with the likely results of alternative redistricting plans that, like Act 43, would have met traditional redistricting criteria. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied in part upon the plaintiffs’ proposed standard for measuring discriminatory effect in gerrymandered redistricting, known as the “efficiency gap.” The efficiency gap considers the number of “wasted” votes cast for each party—i.e., votes for a losing candidate or votes for a winning candidate in excess of the number needed to win. In a given two-party election, the efficiency gap is determined by dividing the difference between the number of wasted votes for each party by the total number of votes cast. For example, in a 500-vote election in which party A wastes 70 votes and party B wastes 180 votes, the efficiency gap would be (180−70) ÷ 500, or 22 percent in favour of party A. The plaintiffs suggested that an efficiency gap of 7 percent or more should be considered legally significant, because gaps equal to or greater than that threshold are very likely to persist through the life of a redistricting plan (typically 10 years). In the elections in 2012 and 2014, they noted, the efficiency gap favoured Republicans by 13 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
Finally, the court held that Act 43 could not be justified on the basis of legitimate redistricting goals or the natural political geography of the state. It concluded that Act 43 violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which the U.S. Supreme Court had interpreted since the 1960s as implying the principle of “one person, one vote,” and infringed on the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of association and freedom of speech by disadvantaging Democratic voters on the basis of their political beliefs and association.
Although political gerrymandering has existed since the early days of the republic and has been practiced by all political parties, it has rarely been adjudicated in the courts, which historically have tended to regard it as a political question (an issue that is properly resolved by the legislative or executive branch of government). In Davis v. Bandemer (1986), however, a plurality of Supreme Court justices ruled that challenges to political gerrymandering were justiciable under the equal protection clause, provided that “both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group” were established. Nevertheless, the majority in that case could not agree on what standards the courts should use to determine whether instances of gerrymandered redistricting were unconstitutionally political.
In Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004), another plurality of the Court held that political gerrymandering claims were never justiciable, because “no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged” since the Bandemer decision. In his concurring opinion in Vieth, Justice Anthony Kennedy notably admonished the plurality for prematurely foreclosing “all possibility of judicial relief” against political gerrymandering schemes. Such claims, he argued, might in the future be justiciable if “suitable standards with which to measure the burden a gerrymander imposes on representational rights” were to emerge. The plaintiffs in Gill v. Whitford, foreseeing an appeal to the Supreme Court (by law, challenges to redistricting statutes are heard by three-judge district court panels and are appealable directly to the Supreme Court, which must accept the cases), argued that the efficiency gap was just the kind of suitable standard that Kennedy had hoped would be developed.
As expected, in February 2017 the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which heard oral arguments on October 3. In an opinion written by Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing with respect to their claim that Act 43 as a whole was an unconstitutional political gerrymander. Such concrete harms as the plaintiffs did assert, the Court argued, pertained to the dilution of their individual votes through the packing or cracking of their districts, causing their votes to carry less weight than they would have carried in districts drawn in other ways. Because such injuries were district-specific, however, “remedying the individual voter’s harm…does not necessarily require restructuring all of the State’s legislative districts” but “only such districts as are necessary to reshape the voter’s district—so the voter may be unpacked or uncracked, as the case may be.” Although the plaintiffs also asserted injury to their collective interests in being represented in the state legislature and in influencing its composition and policymaking, which presumably did implicate the validity of Act 43 as a whole, such injuries are not of the “individual and personal…kind required for Article III standing” according to “our cases to date,” the Court held. Finally, while a finding of lack of standing usually results in the dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims, a majority of the Court declined to follow that convention, because the case concerned “an unsettled kind of claim this Court has not agreed upon, the contours and justiciability of which are unresolved.” Instead, the Court directed that the plaintiffs be given an opportunity to demonstrate “concrete and particularized injuries” using “evidence…that would tend to demonstrate a burden on their individual votes.” Notably, the Court declared that it took no view on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim that Act 43 as a whole was an unconstitutional political gerrymander.
Following the retirement of Justice Kennedy in 2018 and his replacement that year with another conservative justice, Brett Kavanaugh, the Court again took up the question of the constitutionality of partisan gerrymanders in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019). In that case Kavanaugh and four other conservative justices embraced the plurality’s view in Vieth in ruling (5–4) that “partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”