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physical science

The foregoing discussion should have made clear that progress in physics, as in the other sciences, arises from a close interplay of experiment and theory. In a well-established field like classical mechanics, it may appear that experiment is almost unnecessary and all that is needed is the mathematical or computational skill to discover the solutions of the equations of motion. This view, however, overlooks the role of observation or experiment in setting up the problem in the first place. To discover the conditions under which a bicycle is stable in an upright position or can be made to turn a corner, it is first necessary to invent and observe a bicycle. The equations of motion are so general and serve as the basis for describing so extended a range of phenomena that the mathematician must usually look at the behaviour of real objects in order to select those that are both interesting and soluble. His analysis may indeed suggest the existence of interesting related effects that can be examined in the laboratory; thus, the invention or discovery of new things may be initiated by the experimenter or the theoretician. To employ terms such as this has led, especially in the 20th century, to a common assumption that experimentation and theorizing are distinct activities, rarely performed by the same person. It is true that almost all active physicists pursue their vocation primarily in one mode or the other. Nevertheless, the innovative experimenter can hardly make progress without an informed appreciation of the theoretical structure, even if he is not technically competent to find the solution of particular mathematical problems. By the same token, the innovative theorist must be deeply imbued with the way real objects behave, even if he is not technically competent to put together the apparatus to examine the problem. The fundamental unity of physical science should be borne in mind during the following outline of characteristic examples of experimental and theoretical physics.

Characteristic experimental procedures

Unexpected observation

The discovery of X-rays (1895) by Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen of Germany was certainly serendipitous. It began with his noticing that when an electric current was passed through a discharge tube a nearby fluorescent screen lit up, even though the tube was completely wrapped in black paper.

Ernest Marsden, a student engaged on a project, reported to his professor, Ernest Rutherford (then at the University of Manchester in England), that alpha particles from a radioactive source were occasionally deflected more than 90° when they hit a thin metal foil. Astonished at this observation, Rutherford deliberated on the experimental data to formulate his nuclear model of the atom (1911).

Heike Kamerlingh Onnes of the Netherlands, the first to liquefy helium, cooled a thread of mercury to within 4 K of absolute zero (4 K equals −269 °C) to test his belief that electrical resistance would tend to vanish at zero. This was what the first experiment seemed to verify, but a more careful repetition showed that instead of falling gradually, as he expected, all trace of resistance disappeared abruptly just above 4 K. This phenomenon of superconductivity, which Kamerlingh Onnes discovered in 1911, defied theoretical explanation until 1957.

The not-so-unexpected chance

From 1807 the Danish physicist and chemist Hans Christian Ørsted came to believe that electrical phenomena could influence magnets, but it was not until 1819 that he turned his investigations to the effects produced by an electric current. On the basis of his tentative models he tried on several occasions to see if a current in a wire caused a magnet needle to turn when it was placed transverse to the wire, but without success. Only when it occurred to him, without forethought, to arrange the needle parallel on the wire did the long-sought effect appear.

A second example of this type of experimental situation involves the discovery of electromagnetic induction by the English physicist and chemist Michael Faraday. Aware that an electrically charged body induces a charge in a nearby body, Faraday sought to determine whether a steady current in a coil of wire would induce such a current in another short-circuited coil close to it. He found no effect except in instances where the current in the first coil was switched on or off, at which time a momentary current appeared in the other. He was in effect led to the concept of electromagnetic induction by changing magnetic fields.

Qualitative tests to distinguish alternative theories

At the time that Augustin-Jean Fresnel presented his wave theory of light to the French Academy (1815), the leading physicists were adherents of Newton’s corpuscular theory. It was pointed out by Siméon-Denis Poisson, as a fatal objection, that Fresnel’s theory predicted a bright spot at the very centre of the shadow cast by a circular obstacle. When this was in fact observed by François Arago, Fresnel’s theory was immediately accepted.

Another qualitative difference between the wave and corpuscular theories concerned the speed of light in a transparent medium. To explain the bending of light rays toward the normal to the surface when light entered the medium, the corpuscular theory demanded that light go faster while the wave theory required that it go slower. Jean-Bernard-Léon Foucault showed that the latter was correct (1850).

The three categories of experiments or observations discussed above are those that do not demand high-precision measurement. The following, however, are categories in which measurement at varying degrees of precision is involved.