Science and technology

Among the insights that arise from this review of the history of technology is the light it throws on the distinction between science and technology. The history of technology is longer than and distinct from the history of science. Technology is the systematic study of techniques for making and doing things; science is the systematic attempt to understand and interpret the world. While technology is concerned with the fabrication and use of artifacts, science is devoted to the more conceptual enterprise of understanding the environment, and it depends upon the comparatively sophisticated skills of literacy and numeracy. Such skills became available only with the emergence of the great world civilizations, so it is possible to say that science began with those civilizations, some 3,000 years bce, whereas technology is as old as humanlike life. Science and technology developed as different and separate activities, the former being for several millennia a field of fairly abstruse speculation practiced by a class of aristocratic philosophers, while the latter remained a matter of essentially practical concern to craftsmen of many types. There were points of intersection, such as the use of mathematical concepts in building and irrigation work, but for the most part the functions of scientist and technologist (to use these modern terms retrospectively) remained distinct in the ancient cultures.

The situation began to change during the medieval period of development in the West (500–1500 ce), when both technical innovation and scientific understanding interacted with the stimuli of commercial expansion and a flourishing urban culture. The robust growth of technology in these centuries could not fail to attract the interest of educated men. Early in the 17th century the natural philosopher Francis Bacon recognized three great technological innovations—the magnetic compass, the printing press, and gunpowder—as the distinguishing achievements of modern man, and he advocated experimental science as a means of enlarging man’s dominion over nature. By emphasizing a practical role for science in this way, Bacon implied a harmonization of science and technology, and he made his intention explicit by urging scientists to study the methods of craftsmen and urging craftsmen to learn more science. Bacon, with Descartes and other contemporaries, for the first time saw man becoming the master of nature, and a convergence between the traditional pursuits of science and technology was to be the way by which such mastery could be achieved.

Yet the wedding of science and technology proposed by Bacon was not soon consummated. Over the next 200 years, carpenters and mechanics—practical men of long standing—built iron bridges, steam engines, and textile machinery without much reference to scientific principles, while scientists—still amateurs—pursued their investigations in a haphazard manner. But the body of men, inspired by Baconian principles, who formed the Royal Society in London in 1660 represented a determined effort to direct scientific research toward useful ends, first by improving navigation and cartography, and ultimately by stimulating industrial innovation and the search for mineral resources. Similar bodies of scholars developed in other European countries, and by the 19th century scientists were moving toward a professionalism in which many of the goals were clearly the same as those of the technologists. Thus, Justus von Liebig of Germany, one of the fathers of organic chemistry and the first proponent of mineral fertilizer, provided the scientific impulse that led to the development of synthetic dyes, high explosives, artificial fibres, and plastics, and Michael Faraday, the brilliant British experimental scientist in the field of electromagnetism, prepared the ground that was exploited by Thomas A. Edison and many others.

The role of Edison is particularly significant in the deepening relationship between science and technology, because the prodigious trial-and-error process by which he selected the carbon filament for his electric lightbulb in 1879 resulted in the creation at Menlo Park, New Jersey, of what may be regarded as the world’s first genuine industrial research laboratory. From this achievement the application of scientific principles to technology grew rapidly. It led easily to the engineering rationalism applied by Frederick W. Taylor to the organization of workers in mass production, and to the time-and-motion studies of Frank and Lillian Gilbreth at the beginning of the 20th century. It provided a model that was applied rigorously by Henry Ford in his automobile assembly plant and that was followed by every modern mass-production process. It pointed the way to the development of systems engineering, operations research, simulation studies, mathematical modeling, and technological assessment in industrial processes. This was not just a one-way influence of science on technology, because technology created new tools and machines with which the scientists were able to achieve an ever-increasing insight into the natural world. Taken together, these developments brought technology to its modern highly efficient level of performance.

Criticisms of technology

Judged entirely on its own traditional grounds of evaluation—that is, in terms of efficiency—the achievement of modern technology has been admirable. Voices from other fields, however, began to raise disturbing questions, grounded in other modes of evaluation, as technology became a dominant influence in society. In the mid-19th century the non-technologists were almost unanimously enchanted by the wonders of the new man-made environment growing up around them. London’s Great Exhibition of 1851, with its arrays of machinery housed in the truly innovative Crystal Palace, seemed to be the culmination of Francis Bacon’s prophetic forecast of man’s increasing dominion over nature. The new technology seemed to fit the prevailing laissez-faire economics precisely and to guarantee the rapid realization of the Utilitarian philosophers’ ideal of “the greatest good for the greatest number.” Even Marx and Engels, espousing a radically different political orientation, welcomed technological progress because in their eyes it produced an imperative need for socialist ownership and control of industry. Similarly, early exponents of science fiction such as Jules Verne and H.G. Wells explored with zest the future possibilities opened up to the optimistic imagination by modern technology, and the American utopian Edward Bellamy, in his novel Looking Backward (1888), envisioned a planned society in the year 2000 in which technology would play a conspicuously beneficial role. Even such late Victorian literary figures as Lord Tennyson and Rudyard Kipling acknowledged the fascination of technology in some of their images and rhythms.

Yet even in the midst of this Victorian optimism, a few voices of dissent were heard, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson’s ominous warning that “Things are in the saddle and ride mankind.” For the first time it began to seem as if “things”—the artifacts made by man in his campaign of conquest over nature—might get out of control and come to dominate him. Samuel Butler, in his satirical novel Erewhon (1872), drew the radical conclusion that all machines should be consigned to the scrap heap. And others such as William Morris, with his vision of a reversion to a craft society without modern technology, and Henry James, with his disturbing sensations of being overwhelmed in the presence of modern machinery, began to develop a profound moral critique of the apparent achievements of technologically dominated progress. Even H.G. Wells, despite all the ingenious and prophetic technological gadgetry of his earlier novels, lived to become disillusioned about the progressive character of Western civilization: his last book was titled Mind at the End of Its Tether (1945). Another novelist, Aldous Huxley, expressed disenchantment with technology in a forceful manner in Brave New World (1932). Huxley pictured a society of the near future in which technology was firmly enthroned, keeping human beings in bodily comfort without knowledge of want or pain, but also without freedom, beauty, or creativity, and robbed at every turn of a unique personal existence. An echo of the same view found poignant artistic expression in the film Modern Times (1936), in which Charlie Chaplin depicted the depersonalizing effect of the mass-production assembly line. Such images were given special potency by the international political and economic conditions of the 1930s, when the Western world was plunged in the Great Depression and seemed to have forfeited the chance to remold the world order shattered by World War I. In these conditions, technology suffered by association with the tarnished idea of inevitable progress.

Paradoxically, the escape from a decade of economic depression and the successful defense of Western democracy in World War II did not bring a return of confident notions about progress and faith in technology. The horrific potentialities of nuclear war were revealed in 1945, and the division of the world into hostile power blocs prevented any such euphoria and served to stimulate criticisms of technological aspirations even more searching than those that have already been mentioned. J. Robert Oppenheimer, who directed the design and assembly of the atomic bombs at Los Alamos, New Mexico, later opposed the decision to build the thermonuclear (fusion) bomb and described the accelerating pace of technological change with foreboding:

One thing that is new is the prevalence of newness, the changing scale and scope of change itself, so that the world alters as we walk in it, so that the years of man’s life measure not some small growth or rearrangement or moderation of what he learned in childhood, but a great upheaval.

The theme of technological tyranny over individuality and traditional patterns of life was expressed by Jacques Ellul, of the University of Bordeaux, in his book The Technological Society (1964, first published as La Technique in 1954). Ellul asserted that technology had become so pervasive that man now lived in a milieu of technology rather than of nature. He characterized this new milieu as artificial, autonomous, self-determining, nihilistic (that is, not directed to ends, though proceeding by cause and effect), and, in fact, with means enjoying primacy over ends. Technology, Ellul held, had become so powerful and ubiquitous that other social phenomena such as politics and economics had become situated in it rather than influenced by it. The individual, in short, had come to be adapted to the technical milieu rather than the other way round.

While views such as those of Ellul have enjoyed a considerable vogue since World War II—and spawned a remarkable subculture of hippies and others who sought, in a variety of ways, to reject participation in technological society—it is appropriate to make two observations on them. The first is that these views are, in a sense, a luxury enjoyed only by advanced societies, which have benefited from modern technology. Few voices critical of technology can be heard in developing countries that are hungry for the advantages of greater productivity and the rising standards of living that have been seen to accrue to technological progress in the more fortunate developed countries. Indeed, the antitechnological movement is greeted with complete incomprehension in these parts of the world, so that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that only when the whole world enjoys the benefits of technology can we expect the subtler dangers of technology to be appreciated, and by then, of course, it may be too late to do anything about them.

The second observation about the spate of technological pessimism in the advanced countries is that it has not managed to slow the pace of technological advance, which seems, if anything, to have accelerated. The gap between the first powered flight and the first human steps on the Moon was only 66 years, and that between the disclosure of the fission of uranium and the detonation of the first atomic bomb was a mere six and a half years. The advance of the information revolution based on the electronic computer has been exceedingly swift, so that, despite the denials of the possibility by elderly and distinguished experts, the sombre spectre of sophisticated computers replicating higher human mental functions and even human individuality should not be relegated too hurriedly to the classification of science fantasy. The biotechnic stage of technological innovation is still in its infancy, and, if the recent rate of development is extrapolated forward, many seemingly impossible targets could be achieved in the next century. Not that this will be any consolation to the pessimists, as it only indicates the ineffectiveness to date of attempts to slow down technological progress.