Irving Independent School District v. Tatro
- Date:
- July 5, 1984
- Location:
- United States
Irving Independent School District v. Tatro, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on July 5, 1984, ruled (9–0) that, under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA; now known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act), a school board in Texas had to provide catheterization services during class hours to a student with spina bifida. The case stands out as the court’s first attempt to define the distinction between “school health services” and “medical services.”
The case involved Amber Tatro, who was born with spina bifida. The disease caused Tatro various health issues, including a bladder condition that required her to be catheterized every several hours. The procedure, known as clean intermittent catheterization (CIC), was relatively simple and could be taught to a layperson in under an hour. In 1979, when Amber was age three, the Irving Independent School District in Texas created a special education program for her, though it did not include the administration of CIC. Her parents requested that the school provide the service, and it refused. The Tatros subsequently filed suit, claiming a violation of the EAHCA, which requires schools that receive federal funding to provide “related services,” which include school health services, so that a handicapped child can “benefit from special education”; most medical services, however, are not covered. The Tatros also cited the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which bars a handicapped individual from being excluded from or denied the benefits of a program that received federal funds.
A federal district court ultimately ruled in favour of the Tatros, finding that CIC was not a medical service, since a physician did not have to perform the procedure, and was instead a related service. The court further held that the school had violated the Rehabilitation Act, which enabled it to award attorney fees to the Tatros.
The case was argued before the Supreme Court on April 16, 1984. It relied on the U.S. Department of Education to define the disputed terms. Pursuant to the department’s regulations, school health services are those that can be provided by school nurses or qualified laypersons, whereas medical services are those that must be performed by licensed physicians. However, medical services that are for the sole purpose of diagnosis and evaluation are considered related services. The court held that under those definitions, CIC was a school health service. Further, it noted that without CIC, Tatro would be unable to attend school and thus would not “benefit from special education.” The court noted that the category of related services includes such supportive measures as transportation and equipment that makes schools accessible to handicapped students. According to the court, CIC is “no less related to the effort to educate than are services that enable the child to reach, enter, or exit the school.” Thus, the court held that CIC qualified as a related service.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Tatro included general guidelines outlining the scope of a school’s responsibility for providing EAHCA-related services to students. First, the court reiterated that eligible children must be identified as having disabilities in order to receive special education services. Second, the court acknowledged that school officials are required to supply only those services that are necessary to enable children to benefit from special education, regardless of how easily school nurses or laypersons could provide the needed services. Third, the court noted that school nursing services do not have to be provided if they must be performed by a physician.
The Supreme Court thus upheld the lower court’s decision that the school had to provide CIC to Tatro. However, it also found that the school was not liable under the Rehabilitation Act and thereby reversed the ruling that the Tatros could recover attorney fees.