Meek v. Pittenger

Meek v. Pittenger, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on May 19, 1975, ruled (6–3) that two Pennsylvania laws violated the First Amendment’s establishment clause by authorizing the use of state-purchased materials and equipment in nonpublic schools and by providing auxiliary services to children in those schools. However, the court ruled that loaning textbooks to those same students was not unconstitutional. The court’s decision was partially invalidated by subsequent rulings.

The case centred on two Pennsylvania statutes that were enacted in 1972. Under Act 194 the state was authorized to provide auxiliary services to nonpublic schoolchildren. In addition to counseling and testing, the services included speech and hearing therapy, psychological services, and “related services for exceptional, remedial, or educationally disadvantaged students.” Act 195 permitted the loaning of textbooks to nonpublic schoolchildren, with instructional equipment and materials—such as films, maps, and charts—being loaned to the nonpublic schools. Neither act required financial compensation from the schools. Since the majority of the nonpublic schools in Pennsylvania were religiously affiliated, several people—including Sylvia Meek, a Pennsylvania taxpayer—and organizations argued that the laws violated the establishment clause, which generally prohibits the government from establishing, advancing, or giving favour to any religion. They filed suit, and John C. Pittenger, the state’s secretary of education, was named as a respondent.

In its review, a federal district court used the three-part test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), which requires (a) a “statute must have a secular legislative purpose”; (b) “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion”; and (c) the statute cannot promote “an excessive government entanglement with religion.” Applying those standards, the court ruled that loaning textbooks and instructional materials and providing auxiliary services were all constitutional. However, it held that the state could not loan equipment “which from its nature can be diverted to religious purposes.” Such equipment included film projectors and recording devices, both of which could be used to play religious material.

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On May 19, 1975, the case was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court. It held that Act 195’s textbook-loan provision did not violate the establishment clause. Citing Board of Education v. Allen (1968), the court observed that loans of textbooks were constitutionally acceptable because they went to the students, not to their nonpublic schools. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the provision’s purpose was to ensure that all children received the benefits of education. The court then turned to the loaning of instructional materials and equipment, which it held resulted in religiously affiliated nonpublic schools receiving “massive aid” that was “neither indirect or incidental.” Although the court conceded that the provision was secular in purpose, it believed that the religious instruction was so omnipresent that the aid would have inevitably been used to further the religious missions of the schools in violation of the establishment clause.

The court next addressed Act 194, which concerned auxiliary services. In applying the so-called Lemon test, the court concluded that the provision violated the excessive entanglement prong. More specifically, insofar as the services were to be provided by public employees in the setting of nonpublic schools, the court was concerned about the possible advancement of religion using public resources.

On the basis of those findings, it affirmed the lower court’s decision in part and reversed in part. However, in subsequent cases the Supreme Court overturned various sections of its Meek ruling. Notably, in Agostini v. Felton (1997) the court ruled that state-funded teachers could provide on-site remedial instruction to students in parochial schools, and in Mitchell v. Helms (2000) it held that governmental funds could be used for the purchase of instructional and educational materials in sectarian schools.