Renewed interest in eschatology

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Since the exegetical works of Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer at the beginning of the 20th century (the school of "consistent eschatology") and the dialectic theology of Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann in the mid-20th century, eschatology has again become a principal theme of academic Christian theology. Crises in the West have also led to a renewal of eschatological hopes. Within the church there has been a struggle between Christianity as a state religion and congregations with eschatological orientations. Initial attempts to combine eschatology and philosophy, hope, and social practice and thus overcome the differences between the church and the sects—as well as those between the church and the modern age—are found in Ernst Bloch’s philosophy of hope (The Principle of Hope, 1959), the writings of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and the "theology of hope.”

These millennial philosophies spread in the aftermath of World War II, leading in the late 1950s and early ’60s to a new wave of radical progressive reform. This was especially evident in the United States, where the civil rights movement strove to fulfill the millennial promises of equality. This idealism was further fueled by antiwar activism, interest in liberation theologies drawn from both Western psychology and East Asian religion, psychedelic drugs, rock music, and a “back-to-nature” communal movement. Christened “the Age of Aquarius,” this postmillennial movement peaked in 1968–69 with a series of (largely student) uprisings around the world, from Los Angeles to Paris, that culminated in the Woodstock Festival in upstate New York in the summer of 1969. At the same time, the assassinations in the United States during the mid- to late 1960s (Robert F. Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X) brought more violent forces to the fore, including the Weathermen faction of the Students for a Democratic Society and the Black Panthers. The movement rapidly lost its consensual momentum, fragmenting into a wide range of postapocalyptic and premillennial sects (Heaven’s Gate in California, the worldwide Unification Church, Jim Jones’s Peoples Temple in Guyana) and leading to the rise of the Rapture premillennial scenario described in Hal Lindsey’s The Late Great Planet Earth (1970) and reflected in the first of a series of Rapture movies, Thief in the Night (1972). In the 1980s and ’90s other millennial, sometimes violent, sects emerged, including the Order of the Solar Temple in Canada, France, and Switzerland and AUM Shinrikyo (1987–2000; reorganized as Aleph in 2000) in Japan.

Starting in the late 1980s with Edgar Whisenant’s 88 Reasons Why the Rapture Will Happen in 1988 (significantly, 40 years after the creation of the State of Israel), the premillennial dispensationalism became increasingly prominent in the United States and Latin America. Led by such figures as Pat Robertson, Oral Roberts, and Hal Lindsey, premillennial dipsensationalists became more excited about an imminent Rapture. This group created an unprecedented alliance of millennial currents in Judaism and Christianity when it linked up with the messianic religious Zionism that wanted to build a “Third Temple.” This action triggered apocalyptic prophecy among Muslims who saw their Dome of the Rock (the oldest existing Muslim shrine) threatened by such an alliance. The natural tendency for Christian apocalyptic prophecy to intensify with the approach of a millennial date was further stimulated by the Y2K computer problem, which, ironically, created an apocalyptic prophecy for 2000 based not on scripture but on the computer technology on which the entire world had become increasingly dependent in the previous two decades.

Thus, at the approach of 2000 (and 2001—the actual millennial year by the Common Era and anno Domini calendars), millennial expectations intensified around the world, not only in Christianity but in Judaism, Islam, and non-Western religions. The global spread of modernity had created ideal conditions for the emergence of a new wave of millennial movements. Whether these will be radical or reactionary, jubilaic or authoritarian, more akin to a civil rights movement or to the tausandjahriger Reich (“thousand-year empire”) of Nazi ideology—this remains to be seen.

Richard Landes