The history of all the branches of learning has always been a part of intellectual history, but the history of science has had a peculiarly tense relationship with it, and with history more generally. Although much history of science has been written by practicing scientists, it is almost never formally taught in science departments. It is now mostly treated as autonomous, but in some cases historians of science have been included in history faculties. Even though their relationships with other historians may be distant (though cordial), the study of the history of science is in many ways analogous to the study of other aspects of the past. The history of science has also produced, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), by Thomas Kuhn (1922–96), one of the most influential books by any American historian in the postwar period. Almost everybody who uses the word paradigm in any of the many senses in which Kuhn used it is indebted to that book.

The tension between the history of ideas and intellectual history reappears in the history of science in a tension between “internalist” and “externalist” approaches to the subject. To the internalist the critical questions are: What problem was the scientist attempting to solve, and how did he solve it? To answer these questions, the historian obviously needs to know in intimate detail the state of scientific thought during the time about which he is writing. But he also needs to be familiar with the nuts and bolts of scientific work—the apparatus, the experimental animals, if any, and the like. The problems for investigation are likely to be generated within the compass of what Kuhn calls “normal science,” which has well-established procedures for verifying results. (Anomalous results can be dismissed as experimental error, though when they accumulate they can lead to an overturning of an established paradigm of normal science.)

The great merit of the internalist approach is also the source of its greatest difficulty. It deals with how science is actually done, which means that not many historians have the necessary knowledge of science to write it. This difficulty becomes particularly acute when modern science (roughly, science since the start of the 19th century) is the subject. The literature in the history of science is disproportionately focused on the so-called scientific revolution of the 17th century. One reason for this is that the scientific revolution was a heroic period, but another is that much less knowledge of modern science is required to understand Galileo, Johannes Kepler, or Isaac Newton than is required to understand Albert Einstein or Werner Heisenberg. Ignorance of scientific practice can be further concealed by concentrating on what scientists say about their method in the prefaces to their works. It may seem strange to make a distinction between scientific method and practice, but it is not. “Method” is not simply distilled practice, and sometimes it is a poor description of what scientists actually do. It seems clear that improvements in scientific method had relatively little to do with the successes of the scientific revolution. Furthermore, some scientific works (those of Francis Bacon, for example) are barely disguised appeals for funding, and the prefaces of others are not free of self-advertisement.

In part because a history of modern science would require knowledge of modern science, some historians who attempt the internalist mode have focused their investigations on what counted as science in the past. An influential early work in this vein, Lynn Thorndike’s A History of Magic and Experimental Science (1923–58), discussed two seemingly distinct approaches that share the belief that human practice can affect the natural world. Distinguishing between the two approaches requires criteria—effectiveness and rationality—that are essentially modern. Sorting out what was scientific work can easily lead to a history that begins with the concepts of modern science and then looks backward to see how those categories were anticipated by earlier scientists. The result is a story of how scientists finally “got it right” after the bungling and delusions of their predecessors were corrected—though such stories inevitably tend to mangle the integrity of past scientific traditions. Another approach is to give a “rational reconstruction” of the history of science—that is, to show how the underlying logic of scientific discovery unfolded, without bothering with the irksome details of how things actually happened.

The externalist approach aims at a retrospective sociology or anthropology of scientific discovery. One of its earliest advocates was Bruno Latour, who with his colleague Steve Woolgar did fieldwork in a biological laboratory, where they discovered that scientific practice was not a pure expression of scientific method and that scientists did not disdain the use of rhetoric in reporting their results. The most aggressive partisans of this approach advocated a “strong program” for contextualizing science. Important work in contextualization has been done by Marxist historians; their masterpiece is Science and Civilization in China (1954), a multivolume history of Chinese science by the English historian and scientist Joseph Needham. The traditional point of intersection between science and society is technology, and Marxist historians made valiant efforts to argue that the practical needs of ballistics influenced Newton’s celestial mechanics. However, this approach is of limited usefulness for any time before the late 19th century, when chemistry revolutionized dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, and photography; before then, science and technology had proceeded on essentially unrelated paths, accompanied by condescension from scientists and resentment from artisans. In modern times, the relationship has been much closer, and even advocates or practitioners of “pure” science often entertain the hope that some useful device will emerge.

Externalists can get by with much less scientific knowledge than internalists, which accounts for some of the appeal of the former school. Externalists have undoubtedly made clearer the process whereby people become accepted as scientists; this is vital, because there is no way to know what science is other than by knowing what the community of scientists say it is. Externalists have also shown why some topics become interesting to scientists while others are ignored. Yet natural science is probably more autonomous than most modes of knowledge production, and there are limits to how much illumination a historian can bring to the history of science without knowing a lot of science himself.

Social and cultural history

Many historians in the past echoed the calls of Jules Michelet or Thomas Carlyle to rescue ordinary people from the silence and condescension of history, but they generally lacked the means to go beyond anecdote, sentimentalism, and left-wing politics. Only since World War II (and here the journal Annales: histoire, sciences sociales was an extraordinary engine for progress) have historians developed the techniques to begin carrying out the program now called “history from the bottom up.”

Historical demography, virtually created in the postwar period, was the armature around which much of modern social history was wound. Although the first theorist of population was the English economist Thomas Malthus, modern population studies developed mainly in France, the first country on the continent of Europe to experience declining population in the late 19th century. For the French, the main issue in population study was the cause of their population decline and how it might be reversed; for the English, the issue was why population had exploded from the mid-18th to the mid-19th century. Historical demography has many ramifications beyond the question of population size: migration, social mobility, household size and composition, and marriage patterns. The conventional wisdom in 1945 was that peasants in traditional European societies rarely moved from the parish of their birth; they lived in large multigenerational households and married young. Two generations of research proved that these views were either wholly false or true only of other parts of the world.

While some demographic historical techniques were developed by Louis Henry of the Institut National d’Études Démographiques (National Institute of Demographic Studies) in Paris, the Cambridge-based Group for the History of Population and Social Structure was responsible for helping to extend demographic studies to Japan, China, and most parts of Europe and North America. It served as a clearinghouse for researchers on three continents and directed attention to types of evidence that were previously unknown. The picture of population that emerged from these researches was complex. A northwestern European pattern was visible in which until 1750 first marriages on average were late—mid-20s for women, late 20s for men. Households were small, and three-generation households were uncommon. One surprise was that the custom of kinfolk’s living together was more common in industrialized than in agrarian areas. Another was the discovery that in England the main reason for the large population increase after 1750 was increased fertility, achieved through earlier marriages. On the other hand, south and west of a line from Trieste to St. Petersburg, people married much younger, and celibacy was rare. Households also tended to be larger, reaching remarkable sizes in the zadrugas (corporate family groups) of Yugoslavia and the Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire.

Such findings may seem only of specialized interest, but their ramifications are broad. Studies of family structure in colonial Massachusetts revealed that fathers were reluctant to agree to opening new lands for settlement, wishing to keep their sons within the household. Resentment of this by the sons may have played some role in the mind-set that led to the American Revolution. Migration too is a key to understanding not only the way that industrialization occurred (where did the new workers come from?) but also the settlement patterns of North America (the much higher propensity in the British than in the French or Spanish to leave their native parishes created an overwhelming British North American population). Migration is also a factor in social mobility; a 1964 study of Newburyport, Massachusetts, by Stephan Thernstrom (Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City) tested the reality of the American dream of rising to wealth. It was followed by others proclaiming a new urban history.

Quite different data helped create a history of sexuality. Extramarital or premarital sexual activity was indicated in figures on prenuptial or bridal pregnancy and birth of children to unmarried parents. Here again a surprise was that these seemed to be higher in 18th-century England—especially after 1750—than in France. Considering that in northwestern Europe people reached sexual maturity almost 10 years before they married, the relatively low level of illicit sexual activity suggests a general acquiescence to a repressive sexual morality. Although homosexual relations do not appear directly in these data, it may be significant that homosexual roles appear to have become available in the late 18th century just as the insistence on chastity began to weigh less heavily on heterosexuals. The history of sexuality was treated in depth by the French philosopher Michel Foucault in his final work, the multivolume Histoire de la sexualité (1976–84).

Foucault wrote important works in other areas of social history in which quantitative methods were relatively unimportant. Particularly significant was his treatment of "the great sequestration." In his Surveillir et punir: naissance de la prison (1975; Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison), Foucault argued that prisons and hospitals (and by implication schools) developed as means of social control, and the oppressiveness of these institutions was only enhanced by high-minded rhetoric that declared them to be entirely devoted to their inmates’ good. The image of the panopticon—a prison design by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham that allowed for constant surveillance of the inmates—represented for Foucault the intimate link between power and knowledge and raised disturbing questions about who benefited from the activities of (for example) historians.

Protest and social control had long been a staple of social history. The former was the theme of the most-admired work of the period, The Making of the English Working Class (1963), by E.P. Thompson. Thompson defined the working class not as a statistical aggregate of people who had only their labour power to sell but as a group who between 1790 and 1840 came to consciousness of themselves as “working class.” As the prospect of social revolution faded after 1968, however, historians, especially in the United States, began to investigate the absence of effective working-class protest in previous centuries. Although there was clear evidence of multiple acts of resistance by African American slaves, organized revolts were rare, especially after 1832. Eugene Genovese looked for an explanation in the work of the Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), who responded to the defeat of communist movements in Europe (except for Russia) after World War I by stressing the “hegemony” exercised by the ruling class through its control of education and other institutions that mold public opinion so that their rule appears natural and inevitable.

Historians are promiscuous borrowers from other disciplines, and in the late 20th century most borrowed techniques and concepts came from anthropology—especially the symbolic anthropology espoused by Pierre Bourdieu and Clifford Geertz. Rather than seeking laws that govern social behaviour (the ambition of early sociology) or compiling quantitative data, symbolic anthropologists conceived human social relations as “texts” to be interpreted. The texts were exhibited as language, of course, but also as rituals of various sorts, and they had to be approached without any theoretical preconceptions. In “Deep Play: Notes on a Balinese Cockfight,” for example, Geertz claimed to “read” the event he witnessed. His method, which he called “thick description,” was not far removed from traditional ethnography. It was also congenial, in its aversion to theory, to traditional historical practice, which was never comfortable with the attempt to explain historical events by subsuming them under laws.

Like much social history, cultural history could claim an ancestry from early works by Lucien Febvre (1878–1956) and Marc Bloch (1866–1944), who were early contributors to the social-science journal Revue de Synthèse Historique. In Les Rois Thaumaturges: étude sur le caractère surnaturel attribué à la puissance royale, particulièrement en France et en Angleterre (1924; The Royal Touch: Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France), Bloch investigated the belief that the kings of France and England possessed the quasi-magical power of curing scrofula (a disease affecting the bones and lymphatic glands) by touching sufferers; in La Problème de l’incroyance au XVIe siècle: la religion de Rabelais (1942; The Problem of Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century: The Religion of Rabelais), Febvre showed that the French writer and priest Francois Rabelais lived in a mental world in which atheism was not yet possible. These were studies of mentalités, which naturally often lay at the intersection between superstition and religion. Although the field was pioneered by French historians, Anglo-American scholars also studied mentalités; their works were concerned with the history of witchcraft and witch persecutions as well as with the decline in belief in magic.

The 1980s were marked by the emergence of a different kind of cultural history, “microhistory,” which consists essentially of a story about a person or persons. Two famous examples are Carlo Ginzburg’s The Cheese and the Worms (1980), about the unorthodox cosmological and theological beliefs of a 16th-century Italian miller, and Natalie Zemon Davis’s The Return of Martin Guerre (1983), a scholarly treatment of a famous true story about an imposter who took over the farm (and bed) of a substantial peasant in 16th-century France. Typically, microhistories featured central characters who were socially marginalized—exactly the sort likely to be overlooked by social history no less than by orthodox political history. Nevertheless, the marginal can be defined only relative to the typical, and the latter is something that only social history can provide.

Cultural history can be applied to nearly anything, and it has enriched understanding of a wide variety of phenomena. A good illustration is the French Revolution, one of the most intensively studied events in European history. For at least a century after it took place it was treated as a political breakdown of the ancien régime, facilitated by the spread of the Enlightenment. Later, the economic and social organization of 18th-century France was studied—first by Marxists who saw it as a classic “bourgeois revolution” in which a feudal order was overthrown by a more progressive capitalist one and then by more-nuanced investigators who analyzed the various social and interest groups within the bourgeoisie and nobility. A cultural-historical approach emphasized the important role of cultural symbols—the Great Fear (prompted by rumours of an aristocratic conspiracy to overthrow the Third Estate), the Phrygian cap (an emblem of liberty during the revolution), the planting of “liberty trees,” the great revolutionary festivals (such as the Festival of Federation, held in Paris in 1790 on the first anniversary of the storming of the Bastille)—and denied that they could be reduced to underlying inequalities and social tensions.