Both ancient and modern historians have often conceived the existence of civilizations and historical periods in terms of the biological stages of human life: birth, development, maturity, and decay. Once the Middle Ages was identified as a distinct historical period, historians in the 15th and 16th centuries began to describe it as enduring in a sequence of stages from youthful vigour to maturity (in the 12th and 13th centuries) and then sinking into old age (in the 14th and 15th centuries). Much of the evidence used to support this view was based on the series of apparently great disasters that struck Europe in the 14th century: the Mongol invasions, the great famine of 1315, the Black Death of 1348 and subsequent years, the financial collapse of the great Italian banking houses in the early 14th century, and the vastly increased costs and devastating effects of larger-scale warfare. For a long time historians considered these disasters dramatic signs of the end of an age, especially because they already believed that the Renaissance had emerged following the collapse of medieval civilization.

Reconsideration of the Europe of the 14th and 15th centuries, however, does not reveal decline or decay but rather a remarkable resilience that enabled it to recover from disaster and reconstitute itself by means of most of the same institutions it had possessed in 1300. Only from a highly selective and partial historical perspective was there ever, as the great Dutch historian Johan Huizinga once termed it, a “waning,” “autumn,” or “end” of the Middle Ages.

The process of rural and urban expansion and development indeed paused in the 14th century as famine, epidemic disease, intensified and prolonged warfare, and financial collapse brought growth to a halt and reduced the population for a time to about half of the 70 million people who had inhabited Europe in 1300. But the resources that had created the Europe of the 12th and 13th centuries survived these crises: first the European countryside and then the cities were rapidly repopulated. It is the resiliency of Europe, not its weakness, that explains the patterns of recovery in the late 14th and 15th centuries. That recovery continued through the 16th and 17th centuries.

The missionary mandate reached out across Mongol-dominated Asia as far east as China, where a Christian bishop took up his seat in 1307. The Mongol opening of Eurasia also relocated Europe in the minds of its inhabitants. No longer were its edges simply its borders with the Islamic world. Improved techniques in both navigation and marine engineering led Europeans from the 13th century to cross and map first their local seas, then the west African coasts, then the Atlantic and Pacific. From the late 15th century Europe began to export itself once more, as it once had to the north and east from the 10th to the 15th century, this time over vast oceans and to continents that had been unknown to the Greeks and Romans.

Neither the crises of the 14th century nor the voyages and discoveries of the 15th suggest the end of a historical period or an exhausted medieval Europe. The resilience and capacity for innovation of 14th- and 15th-century Europe, the hopeful, determined, and often passionate search for salvation on the part of ordinary people leading ordinary lives, even the inability of governments to weigh down their subjects without fierce displays of resistance—all indicate the strength of a European society and culture that men and women had shaped from the 8th century.