Arabic:
“to approve” or “to sanction”
Related Topics:
uṣūl al-fiqh

istiḥsān, in Islamic law, juristic discretion—i.e., the use of a jurist’s own judgment to determine the best solution to a religious problem that cannot be solved by simply citing sacred texts. Istiḥsān found special application as Islam spread to new lands and encountered new environments. Proponents of istiḥsān believe that Muhammad sanctioned this procedure when he said: “Whatever true Muslims prefer, is preferable in the eyes of God.” Most religious authorities restrict the use of istiḥsān to cases that cannot be satisfactorily solved by applying such other well-established norms as analogy (qiyās) and consensus (ijmāʿ). Certain prominent theologians, however, among them Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Shāfiʿī (died 820), forbade the use of istiḥsān altogether, fearful that true knowledge and correct interpretation of religious obligations would suffer from arbitrary judgments infused with error. The followers of Abū Ḥanīfah (died 767) held the modified view that istiḥsān is in fact a form of analogy because any judgment about what is best necessarily follows careful consideration of all alternative solutions.

This article was most recently revised and updated by Noah Tesch.
Arabic:
“effort”

ijtihād, in Islamic law, the independent or original interpretation of problems not precisely covered by the Qurʾān, Hadith (traditions concerning the Prophet Muhammad’s life and utterances), and ijmāʿ (scholarly consensus). In the early Muslim community every adequately qualified jurist had the right to exercise such original thinking, mainly in the form of raʾy (personal judgment) and qiyās (analogical reasoning), and those who did so were termed mujtahids. But with the crystallization of legal schools (madhhabs) under the ʿAbbāsids (reigned 750–1258), jurists of the majority Sunni branch of Islam came to be associated with one or another of the schools of law and formulated their legal thought within the framework of their school’s interpretive principles and against the backdrop of its doctrinal precedent. Over time, individuals’ qualifications to exercise ijtihād were organized into levels, ranging from the absolute mujtahid, who was bound by no precedent and free to develop his own interpretive principles, to the absolute muqallid (“follower,” “layperson”), who was required to follow authoritative jurists unquestioningly.

By the 16th century, Sunni jurists had widely come to the conclusion that ijtihād was no longer an option in any but truly novel legal cases. But since the 19th century, reformers have used the call for renewed ijtihād as a rallying cry to campaign for legal reforms and to critique the schools of law.

A broadly similar understanding of ijtihād and its antithesis taqlīd (unquestioning conformity to precedent and tradition) exists in contemporary Shīʿism, although Shīʿites generally consider ijtihād to be an ongoing process. Lay individuals are required to follow a living practitioner of ijtihād who is certified as a mujtahid through study in a seminary.

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica This article was most recently revised and updated by Noah Tesch.