sphere of influence, in international politics, the claim by a state to exclusive or predominant control over a foreign area or territory. The term may refer to a political claim to exclusive control, which other nations may or may not recognize as a matter of fact, or it may refer to a legal agreement by which another state or states pledge themselves to refrain from interference within the sphere of influence.

It is in the latter, legal significance that the term first gained currency in the 1880s when the colonial expansion of the European powers in Africa and Asia was nearing its completion. The last stage of that expansion was characterized by the endeavour of all major colonial powers to carry on the mutual competition for colonies peacefully through agreed-upon procedures. Agreements on spheres of influence served this purpose. Thus, the agreement between Great Britain and Germany in May 1885, the first to make use of the term, provided for “a separation and definition of their respective spheres of influence in the territories on the Gulf of Guinea.” This agreement was followed by many of a similar nature, of which article VII of the agreement between Great Britain and Germany of July 1, 1890, concerning East Africa, may be regarded as typical. Its text is as follows:

The two Powers engage that neither will interfere with any sphere of influence assigned to the other by Articles I to IV. One Power will not in the sphere of the other make acquisitions, conclude Treaties, accept sovereign rights or Protectorates, nor hinder the extension of influence of the other. It is understood that no Companies nor individuals subject to one Power can exercise sovereign rights in a sphere assigned to the other, except with the assent of the latter.

When colonial expansion came to a close after World War I, spheres of influence in the legal sense lost much of their importance.

Spheres of influence in the loose or nonlegal sense of the term date to the beginning of recorded history. As a tool of great power or imperial control, the assertion of spheres of influence can bring order to peripheral areas but can contribute to conflicts when rival powers seek exclusive influence in the same area or when secondary or client states resist subordination. In antiquity, conflicts between Rome and Carthage for exclusive influence in peripheral areas of the western Mediterranean led to the Punic Wars, beginning in the 3rd century bce. More recently, the Monroe Doctrine (1823) effectively asserted a U.S. sphere of influence in the “New World” by excluding further European colonization in the Americas, presaging later U.S. interventions in the internal affairs of smaller neighbours. In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union created a sphere of influence as a political fact in the territories of the nations of eastern Europe.

Daniel H. Deudney

geopolitics, analysis of the geographic influences on power relationships in international relations. The word geopolitics was originally coined by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén about the turn of the 20th century, and its use spread throughout Europe in the period between World Wars I and II (1918–39) and came into worldwide use during the latter. In contemporary discourse, geopolitics has been widely employed as a loose synonym for international politics.

Arguments about the political effects of geography—particularly climate, topography, arable land, and access to the sea—have appeared in Western political thought since at least the ancient Greek era and were prominent in the writings of philosophers as diverse as Aristotle (384–322 bc) and Montesquieu (1689–1745). The best-known body of geopolitical writings is the extensive literature of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, much of which focused on the impact on world politics of the new technologies of the Industrial Revolution. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder, John Seeley, Karl Haushofer, Friedrich Ratzel, H.G. Wells, Nicholas Spykman, Homer Lea, Frederick Teggart, Frederick Jackson Turner, James Burnham, E.H. Carr, Paul Vidal de la Blache, and others applied materialist approaches to contemporary problems. These and other writers tended to mix analysis with policy advocacy, and some exhibited many of the most pernicious racial and class prejudices of the era.

Geopoliticians sought to understand how the new industrial capabilities of transportation, communication, and destruction—most notably railroads, steamships, airplanes, telegraphy, and explosives—interacting with the largest-scale geographic features of the Earth would shape the character, number, and location of viable security units in the emerging global international system. Most believed that the new era of world politics would be characterized by the closure of the frontier, territorial units of increased size, and intense interstate competition; most also thought that a great upheaval was imminent, that the balance-of-power system that helped to maintain order in Europe during most of the 19th century was obsolete, that the British Empire (the superpower of the 19th century) was ill-suited to the new material environment and would probably be dismembered, and that the United States and Russia were the two states best situated in size and location to survive in the new era. Geopoliticians vigorously disagreed, however, about the character, number, and location of the entities that would prove most viable.

Mahan’s historical analysis of the rise of the British Empire was the starting point for the geopolitical debate. Arguing that the control of sea routes was decisive because of the superior mobility of the oceanic sailing vessel over animal-powered land transport, Mahan claimed that there was a tendency for maritime trade and colonial possessions to be controlled by one well-positioned maritime state.With the advent of the railroad, Mackinder posited that land power would trump sea power. Through his “heartland” theory, which focused on the vast interior regions of Eurasia made accessible by railroads, Mackinder argued that any state that was able to control the heartland would control world politics and thus pose the threat of a worldwide empire. In contrast, Spykman argued that the “rimland” region of Eurasia, which stretches in a crescent from Europe to East Asia, had a tendency to unite in the hands of one state and that the country that controlled it would likely dominate the world. Alternatively, Haushofer and other German geopoliticians who supported German international dominance developed the theory of the “pan-region,” a continent-sized block encompassing an industrial metropol (or major power) and a resource periphery, and posited that four regions—pan-Europe (which included Africa) dominated by Germany, pan-Asia by Japan, pan-America by the United States, and pan-Russia by the Soviet Union—were likely to emerge as an intermediate stage before global German dominance. The emergence of the airplane led some geopoliticians (e.g., Giulio Douhet) to downplay the role of both naval and land power in favour of air superiority. During World War II some even predicted that technological developments would render naval power obsolete.

The popularity of geopolitical theory declined after World War II, both because of its association with Nazi German and imperial Japanese aggression and because the emergence of nuclear explosives and ballistic missiles reduced the significance of geographical factors in the global strategic balance of power. However, geopolitics continued to influence international politics, serving as the basis for the United States’ Cold War strategy of containment, which was developed by George Kennan as a geopolitical strategy to limit the expansion of the Soviet Union. Political geographers also began to expand geopolitics to include economic as well as military factors.

Daniel H. Deudney