state of nature

state of nature, in political theory, the real or hypothetical condition of human beings before or without political association. The notion of a state of nature was an essential element of the social-contract theories of the English philosophers Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and John Locke (1632–1704) and the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–78). Visions of the state of nature differed sharply between social-contract theorists, though most associated it with the absence of state sovereignty.

The social-contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau were distinguished by their attempt to justify and delimit political authority on the grounds of individual self-interest and rational consent. By comparing the advantages of organized government with the supposed disadvantages of the state of nature, they showed why and under what conditions government is useful and ought therefore to be accepted by all reasonable people as a voluntary obligation. Those conclusions were then reduced to the form of a social contract, from which it was supposed that all the essential rights and duties of citizens could be logically deduced.

The state of nature in Hobbes

For Hobbes, the state of nature is characterized by the “war of every man against every man,” a constant and violent condition of competition in which each individual has a natural right to everything, regardless of the interests of others. Existence in the state of nature is, as Hobbes famously states, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” The only laws that exist in the state of nature (the laws of nature) are not covenants forged between people but principles based on self-preservation. What Hobbes calls the first law of nature, for instance, is

that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war.

In the absence of a higher authority to adjudicate disputes, everyone fears and mistrusts everyone else, and there can be no justice, commerce, or culture. That unsustainable condition comes to an end when individuals agree in a social contract to relinquish their natural rights to everything and to transfer their self-sovereignty to a higher civil authority, or Leviathan. Each individual in effect says to every other: “I transfer my right of governing myself to X (the sovereign) if you do too.” The transfer is collectively entered into only on the understanding that it makes one less of a target of attack or dispossession than one would be in one’s natural state. Although Hobbes did not assume that there was ever a real historical event in which a mutual promise was made to delegate self-government to a sovereign, he claimed that the best way to understand the state was to conceive of it as having resulted from such an agreement.

For Hobbes, the authority of the sovereign is absolute, in the sense that no authority is above the sovereign and that its will is law. That, however, does not mean that the power of the sovereign is all-encompassing: subjects remain free to act as they please in cases in which the sovereign is silent (in other words, when the law does not address the action concerned). The social contract allows individuals to leave the state of nature and enter civil society, but the former remains a threat and returns as soon as governmental power collapses. Because the power of Leviathan is uncontested, however, its collapse is very unlikely and occurs only when it is no longer able to protect its subjects.