India

Fables appeared early in India, but it is impossible to determine whether they are older or later than the Greek. Undoubtedly there was mutual influence from very early times, for indirect contacts between Greece and India (by trade routes) had existed long before the time of Alexander the Great. In the form in which they are now known, the Greek fables are the older, but this may be an accident of transmission.

The fable was apparently first used in India as a vehicle of Buddhist instruction. Some of the Jatakas, birth stories of the Buddha, which relate some of his experiences in previous animal incarnations, resemble Greek fables and are used to point a moral. They may date from as far back as the 5th century bc, though the written records are much later.

The most important compilation is The Fables of Bidpai, or the Panca-tantra (“Five Chapters”), a Sanskrit collection of beast fables. The original has not survived, but it has been transmitted (via a lost Pahlavi version) as the mid-8th-century Arabic Kalīlah wa Dimnah. Kalīlah and Dimnah are two jackals, counselors to the lion king, and the work is a frame story containing numerous fables designed to teach political wisdom or cunning. From the Arabic this was translated into many languages, including Hebrew, which rendition John of Capua used to make a Latin version in the 13th century. This, the Directorium humanae vitae (“Guide for Human Life”), was the chief means by which Oriental fables became current in Europe. In The Fables of Bidpai, animals act as men in animal form, and little attention is paid to their supposed animal characteristics. It is in this respect that they differ most from the fables of Aesop, in which animals behave as animals.

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China

Chinese philosophers from the Qin dynasty (221–206 bc) onward often used extended metaphors (from which fable is the logical development) to make their points. This is believed to reflect the fact that, as “realistic” thinkers, the Chinese generally did not favour more abstract argument. Thus simple allegory helped to stimulate audience interest and to increase the force of an argument. A century earlier, Mencius, a Confucian philosopher, had used the following little allegory in illustrating his theory that an effort has to be made if man’s natural goodness is to be recovered:

A man will begin searching when his dog or chicken is missing; but he does not go searching for the good character he was born with after it is lost. Is this not regrettable?

The same writer also used a parable to bring home his point that mental training could not be hurried, but was a gradual process:

A man in Sung sowed seeds in a field. The seedlings grew so slowly, however, that one day he took a walk through the field pulling at each one of the seedlings. On returning home he announced that he was exhausted, but that he had helped the seedlings’ growth. His son, hurrying to the field, found the seedlings dead.

Tales such as this were often borrowed from folklore, but others were probably original creations, including a striking story that opens the Zhuangzi, a summa of Daoist thought. It makes the point that ordinary people frequently deplore the actions of a man of genius because they are unable to understand his vision, which is not answerable to the laws of “common sense”:

A giant fish, living at the northern end of the world, transformed itself into a bird so that it could make the arduous flight to the southernmost sea. Smaller birds, measuring his ambition against their own capabilities, laughed at the impossibility of it.

But the full development of fable, as it is understood in the West, was hindered by the fact that Chinese ways of thinking prohibited them from accepting the notion of animals that thought and behaved as humans. Actual events from the past were thought to be more instructive than fictitious stories, and this led to the development of a large body of legendary tales and supernatural stories. Between the 4th and 6th centuries, however, Chinese Buddhists adapted fables from Buddhist India in a work known as Bore jing, and they also began to make use of traditional Chinese stories that could further understanding of Buddhist doctrines.

Naoaki Maeno

Japan

In Japan the Koji-ki (712; “Records of Ancient Matters”) and the Nihon-shoki (8th century; “Chronicles of Japan”), both of them official histories of Japan, were studded with fables, many of them on the theme of a small intelligent animal getting the better of a large stupid one. The same is true of the fudoki (local gazetteers dating from 713 and later). The form reached its height in the Kamakura period (1192–1333). Toward the end of the Muromachi period (1338–1573), Jesuit missionaries introduced the fables of Aesop to Japan, and the influence of these can be traced in stories written between then and the 19th century.

Teiji Ichiko
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ethics, the discipline concerned with what is morally good and bad and morally right and wrong. The term is also applied to any system or theory of moral values or principles.

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How should we live? Shall we aim at happiness or at knowledge, virtue, or the creation of beautiful objects? If we choose happiness, will it be our own or the happiness of all? And what of the more particular questions that face us: is it right to be dishonest in a good cause? Can we justify living in opulence while elsewhere in the world people are starving? Is going to war justified in cases where it is likely that innocent people will be killed? Is it wrong to clone a human being or to destroy human embryos in medical research? What are our obligations, if any, to the generations of humans who will come after us and to the nonhuman animals with whom we share the planet?

Ethics deals with such questions at all levels. Its subject consists of the fundamental issues of practical decision making, and its major concerns include the nature of ultimate value and the standards by which human actions can be judged right or wrong.

The terms ethics and morality are closely related. It is now common to refer to ethical judgments or to ethical principles where it once would have been more accurate to speak of moral judgments or moral principles. These applications are an extension of the meaning of ethics. In earlier usage, the term referred not to morality itself but to the field of study, or branch of inquiry, that has morality as its subject matter. In this sense, ethics is equivalent to moral philosophy.

Although ethics has always been viewed as a branch of philosophy, its all-embracing practical nature links it with many other areas of study, including anthropology, biology, economics, history, politics, sociology, and theology. Yet, ethics remains distinct from such disciplines because it is not a matter of factual knowledge in the way that the sciences and other branches of inquiry are. Rather, it has to do with determining the nature of normative theories and applying these sets of principles to practical moral problems.

This article, then, will deal with ethics as a field of philosophy, especially as it has developed in the West. For coverage of religious conceptions of ethics and the ethical systems associated with world religions, see Buddhism; Christianity; Confucianism; Hinduism; Jainism; Judaism; Sikhism.

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The origins of ethics

Mythical accounts

Introduction of moral codes

When did ethics begin and how did it originate? If one has in mind ethics proper—i.e., the systematic study of what is morally right and wrong—it is clear that ethics could have come into existence only when human beings started to reflect on the best way to live. This reflective stage emerged long after human societies had developed some kind of morality, usually in the form of customary standards of right and wrong conduct. The process of reflection tended to arise from such customs, even if in the end it may have found them wanting. Accordingly, ethics began with the introduction of the first moral codes.

Virtually every human society has some form of myth to explain the origin of morality. In the Louvre in Paris there is a black Babylonian column with a relief showing the sun god Shamash presenting the code of laws to Hammurabi (died c. 1750 bce), known as the Code of Hammurabi. The Hebrew Bible (Old Testament) account of God’s giving the Ten Commandments to Moses (flourished 14th–13th century bce) on Mount Sinai might be considered another example. In the dialogue Protagoras by Plato (428/427–348/347 bce), there is an avowedly mythical account of how Zeus took pity on the hapless humans, who were physically no match for the other beasts. To make up for these deficiencies, Zeus gave humans a moral sense and the capacity for law and justice, so that they could live in larger communities and cooperate with one another.

That morality should be invested with all the mystery and power of divine origin is not surprising. Nothing else could provide such strong reasons for accepting the moral law. By attributing a divine origin to morality, the priesthood became its interpreter and guardian and thereby secured for itself a power that it would not readily relinquish. This link between morality and religion has been so firmly forged that it is still sometimes asserted that there can be no morality without religion. According to this view, ethics is not an independent field of study but rather a branch of theology (see moral theology).

There is some difficulty, already known to Plato, with the view that morality was created by a divine power. In his dialogue Euthyphro, Plato considered the suggestion that it is divine approval that makes an action good. Plato pointed out that, if this were the case, one could not say that the gods approve of such actions because they are good. Why then do they approve of them? Is their approval entirely arbitrary? Plato considered this impossible and so held that there must be some standards of right or wrong that are independent of the likes and dislikes of the gods. Modern philosophers have generally accepted Plato’s argument, because the alternative implies that if, for example, the gods had happened to approve of torturing children and to disapprove of helping one’s neighbours, then torture would have been good and neighbourliness bad.