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Also known as: Le Corse, Le Petit Caporal, Napoléon Bonaparte, Napoleone Buonaparte, the Corsican, the Little Corporal
Quick Facts
French in full:
Napoléon Bonaparte
Original Italian:
Napoleone Buonaparte
Byname:
the Corsican or the Little Corporal
French byname:
Le Corse or Le Petit Caporal
Born:
August 15, 1769, Ajaccio, Corsica
Died:
May 5, 1821, St. Helena Island (aged 51)
Also Known As:
Le Petit Caporal
Napoleone Buonaparte
the Little Corporal
the Corsican
Napoléon Bonaparte
Le Corse
Title / Office:
emperor (1815-1815), France
emperor (1804-1814), France
Founder:
Saint-Cyr
Political Affiliation:
Jacobin Club
House / Dynasty:
Bonaparte family

Bonaparte was still in Paris in October 1795 when the National Convention, on the eve of its dispersal, submitted the new constitution of the year III of the First Republic to a referendum, together with decrees according to which two-thirds of the members of the National Convention were to be reelected to the new legislative assemblies. The royalists, hoping that they would soon be able to restore the monarchy, instigated a revolt in Paris to prevent these measures from being put into effect. Paul Barras, who had been entrusted with dictatorial powers by the National Convention, was unwilling to rely on the commander of the troops of the interior; instead, knowing of Bonaparte’s services at Toulon, he appointed him second in command. Thus, it was Napoleon who shot down the columns of rebels marching against the National Convention (13 Vendémiaire year IV; October 5, 1795), thereby saving the National Convention and the republic.

Bonaparte became commander of the Army of the Interior and, consequently, was henceforth aware of every political development in France. He became the respected adviser on military matters to the new government, the Directory. Also at this time, he came to know an attractive Creole, Joséphine Tascher de La Pagerie, who was the widow of General Alexandre de Beauharnais (guillotined during the Reign of Terror), the mother of two children, and a woman of many love affairs.

From every point of view, a new life was opening for Bonaparte. Having proved his loyalty to the Directory, he was appointed commander in chief of the Army of Italy in March 1796. He had been trying to obtain that post for several weeks so that he could personally conduct part of the plan of campaign adopted by the Directory on his advice. He married Joséphine on March 9 and left for the army two days later.

Arriving at his headquarters in Nice, Bonaparte found that his army, which on paper consisted of 43,000 men, numbered scarcely 30,000 ill-fed, ill-paid, and ill-equipped men. On March 28, 1796, he made his first proclamation to his troops:

Soldiers, you are naked, badly fed.…Rich provinces and great towns will be in your power, and in them you will find honour, glory, wealth. Soldiers of Italy, will you be wanting in courage and steadfastness?

He took the offensive on April 12 and successively defeated and separated the Austrian and the Sardinian armies and then marched on Turin. King Victor Amadeus III of Sardinia asked for an armistice; and, at the peace treaty in Paris on May 15, Nice and Savoy, occupied by the French since 1792, were annexed to France. Bonaparte continued the war against the Austrians and occupied Milan but was held up at Mantua. While his army was besieging this great fortress, he signed armistices with the duke of Parma, with the duke of Modena, and finally with Pope Pius VI.

At the same time, he took an interest in the political organization of Italy. A plan for its “republicanization” by a group of Italian “patriots” led by Filippo Buonarroti had to be shelved when Buonarroti was arrested for complicity in François-Noël Babeuf’s conspiracy against the Directory. Thereafter, Bonaparte, without discarding the Italian patriots altogether, restricted their freedom of action. He set up a republican regime in Lombardy but kept a close watch on its leaders, and in October 1796 he created the Cisalpine Republic by merging Modena and Reggio nell’Emilia with the papal states of Bologna and Ferrara occupied by the French army. Then he sent an expedition to recover Corsica, which the British had evacuated.

Austrian armies advanced four times from the Alps to relieve Mantua but were defeated each time by Bonaparte. After the last Austrian defeat, at Rivoli in January 1797, Mantua capitulated. Next he marched on Vienna. He was about 60 miles (100 km) from that capital when the Austrians sued for an armistice. By the preliminaries of peace, Austria ceded the southern Netherlands to France and recognized the Lombard republic but received in exchange some territory belonging to the old Republic of Venice, which was partitioned between Austria, France, and Lombardy. Bonaparte then consolidated and reorganized the northern Italian republics and encouraged Jacobin—radical republican—propaganda in Venetia. Some Italian patriots hoped that these developments would soon lead to the formation of a single and indivisible “Italian Republic” modeled on the French.

Meanwhile, Bonaparte grew uneasy at the successes of the royalists in the French elections in the spring of 1797 and advised the Directory to oppose them, if necessary, by force. He sent General Pierre Augereau to Paris, along with several officers and men to back the coup d’état of 18 Fructidor, year V (September 4, 1797), which eliminated the royalists’ friends from the government and legislative councils and also enhanced Bonaparte’s prestige. Thus, Bonaparte could conclude the Treaty of Campo Formio with Austria as he thought best. The Directory was displeased, however, because the treaty ceded Venice to the Austrians and did not secure the left bank of the Rhine for France. On the other hand, it raised Bonaparte’s popularity to its peak, for he had gained victory for France after five years of war on the Continent.

Only the war at sea, against the British, continued. The directors, who wanted to launch an invasion of the British Isles, appointed Bonaparte to command the army assembled for this purpose along the English Channel. After a rapid inspection in February 1798, he announced that the operation could not be undertaken until France had command of the sea. Instead, he suggested that France strike at the sources of Great Britain’s wealth by occupying Egypt and threatening the route to India. This proposal, seconded by Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, the foreign minister, was accepted by the directors, who were glad to get rid of their ambitious young general.

The expedition, thanks to some fortunate coincidences, was at first a great success: Malta, the great fortress of the Hospitallers, was occupied on June 10, 1798, Alexandria taken by storm on July 1, and all of the delta of the Nile rapidly overrun. On August 1, however, the French squadron at anchor in Abū Qīr Bay was completely destroyed by Admiral Horatio Nelson’s fleet in the Battle of the Nile, so that Napoleon found himself confined to the land that he had conquered. He proceeded to introduce Western political institutions, administration, and technical skills in Egypt; but Turkey, nominally suzerain over Egypt, declared war on France in September. To prevent a Turkish invasion of Egypt and also perhaps to attempt a return to France by way of Anatolia, Bonaparte marched into Syria in February 1799. His progress northward was halted at Acre, where the British withstood a siege, and in May Bonaparte began a disastrous retreat to Egypt.

The Battle of the Nile showed Europe that Bonaparte was not invincible, and Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Turkey formed a new coalition against France. The French armies in Italy were defeated in the spring of 1799 and had to abandon the greater part of the peninsula. These defeats led to disturbances in France itself. The coup d’état of 30 Prairial, year VII (June 18, 1799), expelled the men of moderate views from the Directory and brought into it men who were considered Jacobins. Yet the situation remained confused, and one of the new directors, Emmanuel Sieyès, was convinced that only military dictatorship could prevent a restoration of the monarchy: “I am looking for a sabre,” he said. Bonaparte did not take long to make up his mind. He would leave his army and return to France—in order to save the republic, of course, but also to take advantage of the new circumstances and to seize power. The Directory had, in fact, ordered his return, but he had not received the order, so that it was actually in disregard of his instructions that he left Egypt with a few companions on August 22, 1799. Their two frigates surprisingly escaped interception by the British, and Bonaparte arrived in Paris on October 14.

By this time French victories in Switzerland and Holland had averted the danger of invasion, and the counterrevolutionary risings within France had more or less failed. A coup d’état could therefore no longer be justified by any need to save the republic. Sieyès, however, had not given up his project, and now he had his “sabre.” From the end of October he and Bonaparte were in league together planning the coup, and on 18–19 Brumaire, year VIII (November 9–10, 1799), it was carried out: the directors were forced to resign, the members of the legislative councils were dispersed, and a new government, the Consulate, was set up. The three consuls were Bonaparte and two of the directors who had resigned, Sieyès and Pierre-Roger Ducos. But it was Bonaparte who was henceforth the master of France.

The Consulate

Consolidation of power

Bonaparte, now 30 years old, was thin and short and wore his hair cut close—le petit tondu, the “little crop-head,” as he was called. Not much was known about his personality, but people had confidence in a man who had always been victorious (the Nile and Acre were forgotten) and who had managed to negotiate the brilliant Treaty of Campo Formio. He was expected to bring back peace, to end disorder, and to consolidate the political and social “conquests” of the Revolution. He was indeed exceptionally intelligent, prompt to make decisions, and indefatigably hardworking but also insatiably ambitious. He seemed to be the man of the Revolution because it was due to the Revolution that he had climbed at so early an age to the highest place in the state. He was not to forget it; but, more than a man of the Revolution, he was a man of the 18th century, the most enlightened of the enlightened despots, a true son of Voltaire. He did not believe in the sovereignty of the people, in the popular will, or in parliamentary debate. Yet he put his confidence more in reasoning than in reason and may be said to have preferred “men of talent”—mathematicians, jurists, and statesmen, for instance, however cynical or mercenary they might be—to “technicians” in the true sense of the word. He believed that an enlightened and firm will could do anything if it had the support of bayonets; he despised and feared the masses; and, as for public opinion, he considered that he could mold and direct it as he pleased. He has been called the most “civilian” of generals, but essentially he never ceased to be a soldier.

Bonaparte imposed a dictatorship on France, but its true character was at first disguised by the constitution of the year VIII (4 Nivôse, year VIII; December 25, 1799), drawn up by Sieyès. This constitution did not guarantee the “rights of man” or make any mention of “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” but it did reassure the partisans of the Revolution by proclaiming the irrevocability of the sale of national property and by upholding the legislation against the émigrés. It gave immense powers to the first consul, leaving only a nominal role to his two colleagues. The first consul—namely, Bonaparte—was to appoint ministers, generals, civil servants, magistrates, and the members of the Council of State and even was to have an overwhelming influence in the choice of members for the three legislative assemblies, though their members were theoretically to be chosen by universal suffrage. Submitted to a plebiscite, the constitution won by an overwhelming majority in February 1800.

Program of reforms

The Consulate’s work of administrative reform, undertaken at Bonaparte’s instigation, was to be more lasting than the constitution and so more important for France. At the head of the government was the Council of State, created by the first consul and often effectively presided over by him; it was to play an important part both as the source of the new legislation and as an administrative tribunal. At the head of the administration of the départements were the prefects, who carried on the tradition of the intendants of the ancien régime, supervising the application of the laws and acting as the instruments of centralization. The judicial system was profoundly changed: whereas from the beginning of the Revolution judges had been elected, henceforth they were to be nominated by the government, their independence assured by their irremovability from office. The police organization was greatly strengthened. The financial administration was considerably improved: instead of the municipalities, special officials were entrusted with the collecting of direct taxes; the franc was stabilized; and the Banque de France, owned partly by shareholders and partly by the state, was created. Education was transformed into a major public service; secondary education was given a semimilitary organization, and the university faculties were reestablished. Primary education, however, was still neglected.

Bonaparte shared Voltaire’s belief that the people needed a religion. Personally, he was indifferent to religion: in Egypt he had said that he wanted to become a Muslim. Yet he considered that religious peace had to be restored to France. As early as 1796, when he was concluding the armistice in Italy with Pope Pius VI, he had tried to persuade the pope to retract his briefs against the French priests who had accepted the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which in practice nationalized the church. Pius VII, who succeeded Pius VI in March 1800, was more accommodating than his predecessor, and, 10 months after negotiations were opened with him, the Concordat of 1801 was signed reconciling the church and the Revolution. The pope recognized the French republic and called for the resignation of all former bishops; new prelates were to be designated by the first consul and instituted by the pope; and the sale of the property of the clergy was officially recognized by Rome. The concordat, in fact, admitted freedom of worship and the lay character of the state.

The codification of the civil law, first undertaken in 1790, was at last completed under the Consulate. The code, promulgated on March 21, 1804, and later known as the Napoleonic Code, gave permanent form to the great gains of the Revolution: individual liberty, freedom of work, freedom of conscience, the lay character of the state, and equality before the law; but, at the same time, it protected landed property, gave greater liberty to employers, and showed little concern for employees. It maintained divorce but granted only limited legal rights to women.

The army received the most careful attention. The first consul retained in outline the system instituted by the Revolution: recruitment by forced conscription but with the possibility of replacement by substitutes; the mixing of the conscripts with old soldiers; and the eligibility of all for promotion to the highest ranks. Nevertheless, the creation of the Academy of Saint-Cyr to produce infantry officers made it easier for the sons of bourgeois families to pursue a military career. Moreover, the École Polytechnique, founded by the National Convention, was militarized in order to provide officers for the artillery and engineers. Yet Bonaparte was not concerned about introducing new technical inventions into his army. He put his trust in the “legs of his soldiers”: his basic strategic idea was a fast-moving army.