Talking and fighting, 1951–53

Battling for position

From the time the liaison officers of both coalitions met on July 8, 1951, until the armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, the Korean War continued as a “stalemate.” This characterization is appropriate in only two ways: (1) both sides had given up trying to unify Korea by force; and (2) the movement of armies on the ground never again matched the fluidity of the war’s first year. Otherwise, the word stalemate has no meaning, for the political-geographic stakes in Korea remained high.

As the negotiations at Kaesŏng developed, neither Ridgway nor Van Fleet believed that the talks would produce anything without more UNC offensives beyond the 38th parallel. Ridgway was particularly convinced that UNC forces should take the “Iron Triangle,” a key area between the headwaters of the Imjin River and the highest eastern mountain ranges that was anchored on the cities of Ch’ŏrwŏn (west), P’yŏnggang (north), and Kimhwa (east). Communist planners were equally convinced that control of this terrain offered advantages for defending North Korea or for continuing the war with offensives to the south and east.

Ground actions never actually ceased in 1951, but none matched the ferocity and frustration of the Eighth Army’s Autumn Offensive (August 31–November 12). Van Fleet’s general concept envisioned operations by the I Corps (five divisions) in the west and the X Corps (five divisions) in the central-eastern sector. In the I Corps sector, the ROK 1st Division and the British Commonwealth Division made notable advances beyond the Imjin valley, while other U.S. and ROK divisions advanced past Ch’ŏrwŏn and then stalled in heavy fighting. The X Corps, fighting a crack Chinese army and two North Korean corps, pushed northward through the mountains and succeeded only in making “Bloody Ridge,” “Heartbreak Ridge,” “The Punchbowl,” and Kanmubong Ridge bad memories for thousands of army and marine veterans. The KPA I, III, and VI Corps, holding the eastern mountains, proved especially difficult to dislodge, for Kim Il-sung had issued a “stand or die” order to his much-enlarged and improved armed forces. The most surprising advance occurred in the X Corps sector, where two U.S. and two ROK divisions pushed the Chinese back 15 km (almost 10 miles) from Kimhwa to Kŭmsong, pushing the front line out in a salient that exposed their flanks but also establishing a strong position to advance west to P’yŏnggang. The cost of the campaign troubled Van Fleet and Ridgway: 60,000 casualties, 22,000 of them American.

The campaign did not discourage the Chinese leadership, since in their eyes the strategy of “active defense” had worked. The UNC gave up major offensive operations in November, and the Chinese actually struck back in places with some success. Communist losses of some 100,000–150,000 were significant but not crippling—certainly not enough to drive the Chinese to end the war, only to talk some more about it.

In late October 1951 the communists agreed to move the truce negotiations to a more secure area, a village named P’anmunjŏm. Within two months they accepted the current line of contact between the armies as the military demarcation line; they also accepted related measures for the creation of a demilitarized zone (DMZ). The UNC accepted that there would be no verification activities outside of the DMZ, and both sides agreed to work on a regime for enforcement of the armistice after the shooting stopped. Much work on these items remained to be done, but the outline of an agreement was becoming apparent as the year ended—with one major exception: the handling of prisoners of war.