From late 1942 German strategy, every feature of which was determined by Hitler, was solely aimed at protecting the still very large area under German control—most of Europe and part of North Africa—against a future Soviet onslaught on the Eastern Front and against future Anglo-U.S. offensives on the southern and western fronts. The Germans’ vague hopes that the Allies would shrink from such costly tasks or that the “unnatural” coalition of Western capitalism and Soviet Communism would break up before achieving victory were disappointed, so Hitler, in accordance with his dictum that “Germany shall either be a world power or not be at all,” consciously resolved to preside over the downfall of the German nation. He gave inflexible orders whereby whole armies were made to stand their ground in tactically hopeless positions and were forbidden to surrender under any circumstances. The initial success of this strategy in preventing a German rout during the Soviet winter counteroffensive of 1941–42 had blinded Hitler to its impracticability in the very different military circumstances on the Eastern Front by 1943, by which time the Germans simply lacked sufficient numbers of troops to defend an extremely long front against much more numerous Soviet forces. (By December 1943 the 3,000,000 German troops there were opposed by about 5,500,000 Soviet troops.)

The strategy of keeping his armies stationary was made easier for Hitler by the complete ascendancy he had achieved over his generals, who disputed with Hitler only at the risk of losing their commands or worse. Frequent changes were made in the command of the various army groups and armies, with the result that during 1943–44 most of the talented commanders who had been associated with Germany’s past successes were removed, and everyone who was suspected of a critical attitude at headquarters was silenced.

From late 1943 on, Hitler’s strategy, which from a political standpoint remains inexplicable to most Western historians, was to strengthen the German forces in western Europe at the expense of those on the Eastern Front. In view of the danger of the great Anglo-U.S. invasion of western Europe that seemed imminent by early 1944, the loss of some part of his eastern conquests evidently seemed to Hitler to be less serious. Hitler continued to insist on the primacy of the war in the west after the start of the Allied invasion of northern France in June 1944, and while his armies made strenuous efforts to contain the Allied bridgehead in Normandy for the next two months, Hitler accepted the annihilation of the German Army Group Centre on the Eastern Front by the Soviet summer offensive (from June 1944), which brought the Red Army in a few weeks’ time to the Vistula River and the borders of East Prussia. But the Western Front likewise crumbled in a few weeks, whereupon the Allies advanced to Germany’s western borders. Then, still adhering to his guiding principle, Hitler assembled on the Western Front all that was left of his forces there and tried to drive the British and Americans back in what became known as the Battle of the Bulge. This campaign had some successes but meant that Germany’s last battleworthy units were used on the Western Front while the Red Army, heavily outnumbering the remaining German troops in the east, resumed its drive on the eastern frontiers of Germany and reached the Oder River by the end of January 1945.

The Eastern Front, October 1943–April 1944

By the end of the first week of October 1943, the Red Army had established several bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper River. Then, while General N.F. Vatutin’s drive against Kyiv was engaging the Germans’ attention, General Ivan Stepanovich Konev suddenly pushed so far forward from the Kremenchug bridgehead (more than halfway downstream between Kyiv and Dnepropetrovsk) that the German forces within the great bend of the Dnieper to the south would have been isolated if Manstein had not stemmed the Soviet advance just in time to extricate them. By early November the Red Army had reached the mouth of the Dnieper also, and the Germans in Crimea were isolated. Kyiv, too, fell to Vatutin on November 6, and Zhitomir, 80 miles to the west, and Korosten, north of Zhitomir, fell in the next 12 days. Farther north, however, the Germans, who had already fallen back from Smolensk to a line covering the upper Dnieper, repelled with little difficulty five rather predictable Soviet thrusts toward Minsk in the last quarter of 1943.

Vatutin’s forces from the Zhitomir–Korosten sector advanced westward across the prewar Polish frontier on January 4, 1944, and, though another German flank attack, by troops drawn from adjacent fronts, slowed them down, they had reached Lutsk, 100 miles farther west, a month later. Vatutin’s left wing, meanwhile, wheeled southward to converge with Konev’s right, so that 10 German divisions were encircled near Korsun, on the Dnieper line south of Kyiv. Vainly trying to save those 10 divisions, the Germans had to abandon Nikopol, in the Dnieper bend far to the south, with its valuable manganese mines.

March 1944 saw a triple thrust by the Red Army: Zhukov, succeeding to Vatutin’s command, drove southwest toward Tarnopol, to outflank the Germans on the upper stretches of the southern Bug River. General Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky, in the south, advanced across the mouth of the latter river from that of the Dnieper; and between them Konev, striking over the central stretch of the Bug, reached the Dniester, 70 miles ahead, and succeeded in crossing it. When Zhukov had crossed the upper Prut River and Konev was threatening Iaşi on the Moldavian stretch of the river, the Carpathian Mountains were the only natural barrier remaining between the Red Army and the Hungarian Plain. German troops occupied Hungary on March 20, since Hitler suspected that the Hungarian regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy, might not resist the Red Army to the utmost.

A German counterstroke from the Lwów area of southern Poland against Zhukov’s extended flank early in April not only put an end to the latter’s overhasty pressure on the Tatar (Yablonitsky) Pass through the Carpathians but also made possible the withdrawal of some of the German forces endangered by the Red Army’s March operation. Konev, too, was halted in front of Iaşi; but his left swung southward down the Dniester to converge with Malinovsky’s drive on Odessa. That great port fell to the Red Army on April 10. On May 9 the Germans in Crimea abandoned Sevastopol, caught as they were between Soviet pincers from the mainland north of the isthmus and from the east across the Strait of Kerch.

At the northern end of the Eastern Front, a Soviet offensive in January 1944 had been followed by an orderly German retreat from the fringes of the long-besieged Leningrad area to a shorter line exploiting the great lakes farther to the south. The retreat was beneficial to the Germans but sacrificed their land link with the Finns, who now found themselves no better off than they had been in 1939–40. Finland in February 1944 sought an armistice from the U.S.S.R., but the latter’s terms proved unacceptable.