Habré continued to face threats to his regime. In April 1989 the interior minister, Brahim Mahamot Itno, and two key military advisers, Hassan Djamouss and Idriss Déby, were suspected of plotting to overthrow Habré. Itno was arrested and Djamouss was killed, but Déby escaped and began new attacks a year later. By late 1990 his Movement for Chadian National Salvation forces had captured Abéché, and Habré fled the country. Déby and his forces then took N’Djamena, the capital. Déby suspended the constitution and formed a new government with himself as president. Although it was reported that he had received arms from Libya, he denied Libyan involvement and promised to establish a multiparty democracy in Chad.

Déby’s takeover of the government was not without resistance. In 1991 and 1992 there were several attacks and coup attempts by opposition forces, many of whom were still aligned with Habré, but Déby maintained his grip on the government and the country. A national conference was held in 1993 to establish a transitional government, and Déby was officially designated interim president. In 1996 a new constitution was approved and Déby was elected president in the first multiparty presidential elections held in Chad’s history. Peace was still fragile, however, and periodic skirmishes with opposition groups developed into a full rebellion in late 1998 when the Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) began an offensive in the northern part of the country. Other opposition groups later joined forces with the MDJT, and the rebellion continued into the 21st century.

In 2001 Déby was reelected amid allegations of fraud by his opponents; however, international observers found the electoral proceedings largely to be valid. Meanwhile, Déby’s government was still coping with major rebel offensives until peace accords in 2002 and 2003 essentially ended most of the fighting for a few years. Also in 2003, years of planning and construction came to fruition when Chad became an oil-producing country; the revenues generated from that undertaking had the potential to transform the country’s economic situation.

Despite the illusion of progress Déby’s government made by promoting peace and creating an opportunity for economic prosperity, there was the reality of a corrupt and repressive regime. Déby and his administration were known for brutally repressing individual rights and freedoms, with Chadian security forces regularly committing serious human rights abuses. The administration was also beset with allegations of corruption. There were additional coup attempts, including those in 2004 and 2006. Rebel offensives also resumed, most notably in 2006, prior to Déby’s reelection to a third term as president, and in 2008, when rebels reached N’Djamena before retreating; many Chadians were displaced by the fighting. The promise of economic prosperity also dissipated; although there were some noteworthy infrastructure projects, Déby’s administration appeared to use much of the revenue from the oil industry for weapons to combat rebel offensives rather than to support much-needed social and economic programs and development in the country.

Several rebel leaders involved in the 2008 rebel offensive were tried in absentia in August of that year, as was former president Habré, who was suspected of directing rebel activity in Chad while living in exile in Senegal. Habré and the rebel leaders were found guilty of attempting to overthrow Déby’s government and were sentenced to death. Habré also faced charges in Senegal regarding politically motivated killings and acts of torture allegedly committed during his rule in Chad. Senegal pursued those charges at the request of the African Union (AU), but Senegalese officials spent years vacillating on whether they should actually put Habré on trial. The situation came to a head in 2012 when the International Court of Justice ruled that Senegal had to prosecute Habré or extradite him. Senegal then agreed to an AU plan to establish a special court in Dakar to try Habré. He was taken into custody on June 30, 2013, and two days later appeared before the special court, where he was formally charged with having committed crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture during the eight years he ruled Chad. His trial began in July 2015. On May 30, 2016, Habré was convicted of having committed crimes against humanity during his time as ruler of Chad and was sentenced to life in prison.

In addition to internal conflicts, at the beginning of the 21st century Chad had problems along its border with neighbouring countries Niger, the Central African Republic, and most notably Sudan. In early 2003 fighting in the Darfur region of western Sudan sent thousands of Sudanese fleeing to Chad; by early 2005 it was estimated that there were some 200,000 refugees in Chad. Chadian troops were drawn into the conflict periodically, as Sudanese militias crossed over the border into Chad while chasing Sudanese rebels or attacking refugee camps; Chadian rebels were also suspected of operating from bases in Sudan. The governments in both Chad and Sudan accused each other of supporting rebel activity in the other’s country. In January 2008 a European Union peacekeeping force was deployed to protect refugees of Chad, Sudan, and the Central African Republic in conflict zones along the borders; it was replaced by a larger contingent of United Nations peacekeeping forces in March 2009.

Attempts to resolve the issues that caused years of conflict between Chad and Sudan had been made in 2007 and 2008 but met with little success. A resolution appeared to be reached in January 2010 when the governments of both countries signed an agreement that provided for the means to control their common border and assurances that neither country would allow the rebel groups of the other to operate from within its territory.

In 2011 Chad’s presidential election was initially postponed for a few weeks, ostensibly to address complaints from the opposition regarding flaws in the voter-registration process. In spite of the delay, the main opposition figures maintained that their complaints were not resolved, and, citing the impossibility of a credible vote, they boycotted the April 25 election. Unsurprisingly, Déby was reelected, winning almost 89 percent of the vote.

Meanwhile, the region around Chad experienced an increase in Islamic militant violence. With one of the strongest armies in the region, Chad moved to the fore of antiterrorism efforts, sending its troops where needed, such as to Mali in 2013. One Islamic militant group, Nigeria-based Boko Haram, began to move beyond that country’s borders, launching attacks in Chad and other nearby countries. Chad took a leading role in efforts to combat the group, which led to an increase of Boko Haram terrorist attacks inside the country. Chad’s antiterrorism efforts earned Déby much praise on the international stage, but at home his regime remained repressive, detaining political opponents, journalists, and trade unionists.

The run-up to the 2016 presidential election saw an unprecedented amount of protest against Déby’s regime, including demonstrations and a general strike that brought business in many areas to a standstill. Nonetheless, Déby, who faced 13 other candidates, was favoured to win the April 10 election and did, with officials declaring that he received almost 62 percent of the vote. Even before the results were released, some opposition leaders voiced allegations of voting fraud, and there was much criticism of the communications blackout during and after the election.

A new constitution was promulgated in May 2018. Among the changes were those that expanded the presidential powers. The post of prime minister was abolished, and the president’s term was changed from five years, with no term limits, to six years, with a limit of two terms. The changes to the president’s term, however, would not be applied retroactively, meaning that Déby could potentially remain in office until 2033. Parliamentary elections that had been due in 2015 but continually postponed were further delayed, with polls eventually scheduled for late 2021.

In the April 2021 presidential election, held as rebels attacked from the north, Déby was declared the winner. On April 20—less than a day after the election results were announced—the military announced that Déby had been killed in battle with rebels. Rather than following the constitution, which dictated that the president of the National Assembly should be named interim president, the military instead dissolved the government and National Assembly. It established a National Council of Transition to govern the country for 18 months, with new elections to be held at the end of the transition period. Déby’s son, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, was named interim president.