Quick Facts
Date:
January 3, 1868 - May 3, 1947
Major Events:
Harris Treaty
Charter Oath
Treaty of Kanagawa
Related Topics:
shogun
genro

An important foundation for a modern Japanese state was the substitution of national for feudal loyalties. The latter had already gone into decline with the abolition of the feudal classes, but true national unity required the propagation of new loyalties among the previously powerless masses. The early restoration government was influenced by the Shintō revival that swept Japan in the latter half of the 19th century. Shintō beliefs were promoted in an effort to replace Buddhism with a strong cult of the national deities. Christianity was legalized in 1873 after the Iwakura mission reported from Europe that doing so would lead the West to look favourably upon the Meiji government. Thereafter, it seemed particularly important to bolster traditional outlooks without creating the appearance that a pro-regime state religion was being forced upon the Japanese. The education system proved to be an ideal vehicle for ideological orientation.

In 1872 the Gakusei (Japanese: “Student”), or Education System Order, was promulgated, creating a nationwide plan for universal education. It began modestly, and for a time its organization and philosophy were Western inspired. During the 1880s, however, government leaders saw their people turning to Western ideas, and they learned of the nationalist orientation of schooling in Europe. The Japanese system was accordingly altered to include emphasis on “ethics.” In 1890 an imperial rescript on education laid out the lines of Confucian and Shintō ideology, which were to constitute the moral content of later Japanese education. By this means, loyalty to the emperor, whose office was elevated through Confucian orthodoxy and Shintō reverence, became the centre of the public ideology. At the same time, the state attempted to stress that this secular cult was not a true “religion” to avoid charges of indoctrination. As a result, the government could permit “religious freedom” while simultaneously requiring a form of worship as the patriotic duty of all Japanese subjects. The uniform system of mass education was also utilized to preserve and project the ideal of samurai loyalty that was a relic of the ruling class.

The constitutional movement

In late Tokugawa days it was widely believed that constitutions provided much of the unity that gave Western countries their strength, and the Japanese leaders were eager to bring themselves abreast of the world in this respect. The government tried to implement a two-chamber house in 1868, but it was deemed unworkable. The emperor’s Charter Oath of April 6, 1868, however, committed the government to seek knowledge and wisdom throughout the world, abandon “evil customs of the past,” allow all subjects to fulfill their proper aspirations, and determine government decisions by reference to a broadly based opinion.

To these statements of intent were added protests from below. The democratic movement grew out of a split in the leadership group over government policy in domestic and foreign matters. Itagaki Taisuke, Gotō Shōjirō, and other leaders of the Tosa faction combined with Etō Shimpei and others of the Saga fief in 1873. Their demands for a punitive expedition against Korea had been refused because domestic reforms were to come first, and they resigned their positions. The same debate had cost the government the services of Saigō Takamori, who retired to Satsuma prior to leading the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877. Instead of championing the old order, however, Itagaki and his friends called for a popular assembly so that future decisions would reflect the will of the people (by which they initially meant their fellow samurai) and thus preserve unity. Some of those who joined the group were more angry than democratic; Etō Shimpei was killed after leading a group of Saga followers in revolt in 1874. Itagaki and his Tosa followers organized themselves into discussion groups and, gradually growing in political confidence and ability, organized themselves on a national basis as the Liberal Party (Jiyūtō) in 1881. It should be noted that the movement had only a narrow social and regional base at this time and that its purposes were to promote effective national unity rather than tolerance of diversity and dissent.

New divisions within the narrowing leadership group brought a second political party into the field. When the remaining Meiji leaders were asked to submit their opinions on constitutional problems in 1881, Ōkuma Shigenobu, a Saga leader who had sided with the peace party in 1873, published a relatively liberal response instead of first submitting it for the scrutiny of his colleagues. Shortly after he did this, he revealed sensational evidence of corruption in the sale of government property in Hokkaido. Ōkuma was forced out of the government, after which he organized the Progressive Party (Kaishintō) in 1882. Itagaki’s Liberal Party had a predominantly rural backing of former samurai and village leaders, many of whom objected to government taxation policies. Ōkuma’s new party had a more urban base and attracted support from the business community and journalists.

The government, stung by Ōkuma’s defection, countered with a promise by the emperor that a constitution would be instituted in 1889; the populace—by which was meant the parties—were urged to await the imperial decisions quietly. The constitution was prepared behind the scenes by a commission headed by Itō Hirobumi. The period of constitution writing coincided with one of intense economic distress as the government sought to stem the inflation caused by the spending of the 1870s. Finance Minister Matsukata Masayoshi’s policies succeeded in this purpose, but his deflationary measures caused hardship in the countryside and provided a situation in which party agitation could lead to violence. The government responded with repression in the form of police and press controls, and the parties dissolved temporarily in 1884. Itagaki and Gotō traveled to Europe and returned convinced that the West must be addressed with a single national voice.

Itō embarked on a separate mission to Europe to draw on Western models for the new constitution. The German Empire provided what he deemed to be an effective balance of imperial power and constitutional forms. The system that had been crafted by Otto von Bismarck seemed to offer the benefits of modernity without sacrificing effective control, and several German jurists assisted Itō and his commission. As a counterweight to the influence of a popularly elected house, Itō organized a new European-style peerage in 1884. Former daimyo, government officials, and military officers were given noble titles and prepared for membership in a House of Peers. A cabinet system was installed in 1885, and a privy council, designed to judge and safeguard the constitution, was set up in 1888. Itō resigned as premier to head the council and thus saw his document safely through.

The Meiji Constitution was formally promulgated in1889. Elections for the lower house were held to prepare for the initial Diet, which first met in 1890. The constitution was presented as a gift from the emperor, and it could be amended only upon imperial initiative. Rights were granted “except as regulated by law,” and the constitution’s provisions were more general than specific. As in the Prussian system, if the Diet refused to approve a budget, the previous year’s could be followed. The emperor was “sacred and inviolable”; he held the power to make war and peace and could dissolve the lower house at will. Political power effectively rested with the executive, which could claim to represent the imperial will. The Imperial Rescript on Education (Kyōiku Chokugo) of 1890 ensured that future generations would unquestioningly defer to imperial will and authority.

In spite of these and other antidemocratic features, the Meiji Constitution opened a wider avenue for dissent than had previously existed. The lower house had the power to initiate legislation, private property was inviolate, and freedoms that were subject to legislation were greater than no freedoms at all. Budgetary arrangements meant that increased support for the military was dependent on Diet approval. A tax qualification of 15 yen initially limited the electorate to about 500,000. This qualification was lowered in 1900 and again in 1920, and in 1925 universal manhood suffrage was implemented. The difficulty the government leaders had in controlling and manipulating the lower house, despite their power of dissolution and their resources for coercion, illustrated the manner in which the constitution had altered the political picture. In turn, the way the party leaders cooperated with their erstwhile enemies when given a reasonable amount of prestige and patronage illustrated what large areas of agreement they shared with the Meiji oligarchies.

With the promulgation of the constitution, the Meiji Restoration and revolution came to an end. Thereafter, the government leaders, who would soon retire behind the scenes to influence the political world as genrō (“elder statesmen”), acted to maintain and conserve the balance of ideological and political institutions they had worked out.

Imperial Japan

Foreign affairs

With internal reforms completed, the Japanese government set itself to achieving equality with the Western powers. This had been one of the major goals since the beginning of the Meiji period. Key to this was the amendment of treaties imposed upon Japan in the late Tokugawa era. Japanese envoys had attempted to amend the judicial and economic privileges that foreigners had enjoyed by virtue of extraterritoriality as early as the Iwakura mission of 1871. However, the Western powers refused to consider modifying the treaties until Japanese legal institutions had been brought into alignment with those of Europe and the United States. The Japanese made several attempts at compromise arrangements in the 1880s, but these were denounced by the press and opposition groups in Japan; in one case, a nationalist extremist threw a bomb at Foreign Minister Ōkuma, nearly killing him. The treaty provisions for extraterritoriality were formally changed in 1894 upon the completion of the Meiji institutional reforms. Tariff autonomy came into effect in 1911, at the end of the Meiji period.

Asian matters took second place to internal problems during most of the Meiji period, as the government leaders held to a policy of caution. Even those calling for a more assertive military posture justified their arguments by pointing out that foreign adventures would provide an outlet for samurai energies and a focus for national unity. The government withstood pressure for such a course during the debate about Korea in 1873, although it lost the services of some of its most popular leaders. The following year an expedition was launched against Formosa (Taiwan) to punish the indigenous people for murdering Ryukyuan fishermen. This lent support to the Japanese claim to the Ryukyu Islands, which had been under Satsuma influence in Tokugawa times. The islands were incorporated into Japan in 1879 despite Chinese protests.

The First Sino-Japanese War

Military adventurism in Korea—although espoused by nationalists and, on occasion, liberals who sought to advance their cause in conjunction with Korean reformers—continued to be opposed by the government. Japan had secured trading rights in the Korean ports of Pusan (Busan), Wŏnsan, and Inch’ŏn (Incheon), and China responded by forcing Korea to submit to a trade agreement that heavily favoured Chinese merchants. As Japan became increasingly assertive in Korea, China demonstrated a readiness to resist interference in the affairs of what China viewed as its most important tributary state. After 1883, Chinese interests in Korea were represented by Yuan Shikai, who was alert to the danger posed by Japanese gains. Incidents in 1882 and 1884, which might have led to war with China and Korea, were instead settled by compromise. Itō met with the Chinese statesman Li Hongzhang at Tianjin in 1885 to work out an agreement in which neither China nor Japan would send troops to Korea without first informing the other.

By the early 1890s it was increasingly clear that Chinese influence in Korea was becoming predominant. At the same time, the Meiji leaders found themselves hard pressed to maintain control over the Diet. In 1894 Korean officials attempted to suppress Ch’ŏndogyo, a syncretic indigenous Korean religion, and its followers united with the peasantry in a rebellion that came to be known as the Tonghak Uprising. The Korean king requested military assistance from China to subdue the unrest. When the Chinese informed Tokyo of this, Japan quickly rushed troops to Korea and, after the rebellion was crushed, showed no inclination to withdraw. Hostilities between Chinese and Japanese forces broke out first at sea and then in Korea in July–August 1894. Throughout the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan’s modernized forces were victorious everywhere. The Japanese navy sank or captured much of the northern Chinese fleet, which had been dogged by bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption in the supply services. A peace treaty was negotiated at Shimonoseki between Itō Hirobumi for Japan and Li Hongzhang for China on April 17, 1895.

By the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, both powers recognized the independence of Korea, and China ceded Formosa, the Pescadores (P’eng-hu Islands), and the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan. In addition, Japan was granted all the rights enjoyed by European powers, and it received significant new economic concessions; new treaty ports were opened, and Japan received an indemnity of 200 million taels in gold in two installments. A subsidiary treaty of commerce signed in 1896 gave Japan freedom to engage in trade, manufacture, and industry in China’s treaty ports. It also provided for a tax exemption within China for all goods so manufactured. Having just freed itself from unequal treaties imposed by the West, Japan imposed even harsher terms on its neighbour.

The European powers were not yet prepared to welcome Japan as a full equal in the imperialist scramble in China. Germany, France, and Russia forced Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula to China as soon as the Shimonoseki terms became known, and the additional indemnity compensation that Japan received from China did little to lessen this blow. In 1898 Russia forced China to grant it the lease of that peninsula, where it developed an important naval base at Port Arthur (Lüshun; now in Dalian, China). The war thus demonstrated that even though Japanese arms sufficed to win Asian victories, Japan could not maintain them without Western endorsement. The war nevertheless proved a tremendous source of prestige for Japan, and it brought the Tokyo government much internal support. It also strengthened the hand of militarists such as Yamagata Aritomo. Over subsequent years, Yamagata would do much to free the military from civilian control.