Economy of Iraq
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Overview
Iraq’s economy was based almost exclusively on agriculture until the 1950s, but after the 1958 revolution economic development was considerable. By 1980 Iraq had the second largest economy in the Arab world, after Saudi Arabia, and the third largest in the Middle East and had developed a complex, centrally planned economy dominated by the state. Although the economy, particularly petroleum exports, suffered during the Iran-Iraq War—gross domestic product (GDP) actually fell in some years—the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq’s subsequent defeat in the Persian Gulf War, and the UN embargo beginning in 1990 dealt a far greater blow to the financial system. Little hard evidence is available on Iraq’s economy after 1990, but the best estimates available indicate that, in the year following the Persian Gulf War, GDP dropped to less than one-fourth of its previous level. Under the UN embargo the Iraqi economy languished for the next five years, and it was not until the Iraqi government implemented the UN’s oil-for-food program in 1997 that Iraq’s GDP again began to experience positive annual growth.
Following the initial phase (2003) of the Iraq War, the oil-for-food program was ended, sanctions were lifted, and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), made up of civil administrators appointed by the United States, took over Iraq’s public sector. International donors pledged billions of dollars in aid for Iraq’s reconstruction at a donor conference in Madrid in October 2003. Iraq’s huge foreign debt, largely accumulated through heavy war expenditures under Saddam Hussein, was reduced in 2004 when the Paris Club, a group of 19 wealthy creditor nations, agreed to cancel 80 percent of Iraq’s $40 billion debt to 19 members.
Oil production and economic development both declined after the start of the Iraq War, and the economy faced serious problems, including the negative impact of continuing violence; a high rate of inflation; an oil sector hampered by a shortage of replacement parts, antiquated production methods, and outdated technology; a high rate of unemployment; a seriously deteriorated infrastructure; and a private sector inexperienced in modern market practices. The CPA was largely unprepared to cope with these challenges, and its handling of the Iraqi economy was marred by mismanagement, poor planning, and waste. American administrators’ efforts to quickly implement liberal reforms did little to improve conditions for Iraqis or calm a growing insurgency against U.S. forces.
Under the Iraqi administrations that governed after the dissolution of the CPA in June 2004, reconstruction proceeded unevenly. Relatively secure areas such as the Kurdish region saw quick progress, while most of the country continued to suffer from high unemployment, soaring prices for basic goods, and inadequate access to services. Modest signs of improvement began to appear in 2007 as violence began to decrease. Inflation returned to manageable levels in that year, and in 2009 oil export revenues returned to prewar levels. However, crumbling infrastructure, violence, and corruption continued to weigh down Iraq’s recovery.
Economic development
Oil revenues almost quadrupled between 1973 and 1975, and, until the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, this enabled the Baʿath regime to set ambitious development goals, including building industry, reducing the quantity of imported manufactured goods, expanding agriculture (though Iraq has not attained self-sufficiency), and increasing significantly its non-oil exports. Investment in infrastructure was high, notably for projects involving irrigation and water supply, roads and railways, and rural electrification. Health services were also greatly improved. War with Iran in the 1980s, however, delayed many projects and heavily damaged the country’s physical infrastructure, especially in the southeast, where most of the fighting occurred. There was little reprieve after the war was over, as the Persian Gulf War further devastated Iraq’s infrastructure and undid many of the advances of earlier decades. Attacks by the U.S.-led coalition did extensive damage to the communication and energy systems. When electricity failed, other systems were seriously affected, and a lack of spare parts led to further deterioration. In many parts of the country, these conditions persisted into the 21st century and were worsened by the Iraq War.
State control
Under the socialist Baʿath Party, the economy was dominated by the state, with strict bureaucratic controls and centralized planning. Between 1987 and 1990 the economy liberalized somewhat in an attempt to encourage private investment, particularly in small industrial and commercial enterprises, and to privatize unprofitable public assets. Entrepreneurs were encouraged to draw on funds that they had managed to transfer abroad, without threat of government reprisal or interference, and the government was able to divest itself of a number of enterprises. Yet, generally speaking, the privatization policy did not do well, mainly because elements within the bureaucracy and the security service—fearing that this course of action imperiled their interests and obviated socialist policy—objected to it but also because potential investors feared that the government might arbitrarily reverse the plan. In addition, many of the public assets offered for sale were unprofitable. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, the privatization policy died out, though private enterprise continued in the form of small- and medium-sized businesses and light industries.