In December 2015 delegates from Libya’s rival factions signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA)—a UN-brokered power-sharing agreement establishing a Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by a prime minister and a nine-member presidency council drawn from constituencies and factions throughout the country. Although the GNA received recognition from the UN Security Council as the legitimate government of Libya, it struggled to consolidate its authority in both the eastern and western halves of the country. In the east the House of Representatives, aligned with Haftar’s forces, refused to endorse the GNA’s proposed ministerial appointments. In the west the NSG stepped down to make way for the GNA, though the GNA met some resistance from NSG-associated factions in late 2016.

In September 2017 the UN Support Mission in Libya announced an effort to amend the LPA, with the goal of creating a workable arrangement for sharing power between the opposing factions. By the end of the year, though, prospects for an agreement looked dim, while Haftar dismissed the legitimacy of the GNA, whose LPA mandate expired in December. Nevertheless, efforts toward unity continued, and in May 2018 the factions endorsed a plan to hold elections in the upcoming winter. The plans were disrupted, however, after a summer of tumultuous events and a failure to meet a September deadline to establish the framework for elections.

Fight for the National Oil Corporation and Central Bank

Meanwhile, the fight over control of the country’s oil revenue intensified. In January 2018 the House of Representatives appointed its own governor to the eastern branch of the Central Bank, further entrenching the division between the bank’s eastern and western branches. In June Jathran’s forces returned and seized control of the oil ports of Ras Lanuf and Es Sider. After recapturing Ras Lanuf and Es Sider from Jathran, the LNA announced that all oil ports under its control, which included Marsa el Hariga and Zueitina, would be run by the eastern NOC backed by the House of Representatives and that its revenues would go to the eastern branch of the Central Bank. Members of the international community, however, quickly affirmed their commitment to trading exclusively with the Tripoli-based NOC. On July 11 the LNA agreed to allow the Tripoli-based company to operate the oil ports of Ras Lanuf, Es Sider, Marsa el Hariga, and Zueitina.

Tobruk government extends its reach south and west

Fayez al-Sarraj, the prime minister of the Tripoli-based GNA, and Haftar met in November at an international conference in Palermo, Sicily, Italy. Though the conference itself was not particularly eventful, it was considered an important step toward finding a unifying solution for the two competing governments. They did, however, reaffirm their commitment to holding an election, and Haftar promised he would not try to oust Sarraj before an election was held.

In December Tripoli’s NOC declared force majeure over Libya’s largest oil field, El Sharara, after it came under the control of an armed militia. The LNA launched an offensive in the southern Fezzan region in January 2019, during which the LNA captured El Sharara in February. Although the LNA was under Haftar’s command and a wing of the Tobruk-based government, it allowed Tripoli’s NOC to resume production at the El Sharara field while it continued to be secured by the LNA.

By the end of the offensive, most of the country and most of its oil fields had come under Tobruk’s control. Tobruk’s control of the oil fields offered it significant leverage, while Tripoli’s leverage depended upon its international legitimacy and its ability to sell the oil abroad. A level of cooperation continued, and Sarraj and Haftar met again in February. In March a national unity conference was set for mid-April.

That conference was postponed, however, after the LNA undertook a campaign in early April that it said was to secure northwestern parts of Libya from militants. But the LNA immediately set its sights on Tripoli in what some believed to be an attempt to topple the GNA. Although the LNA advanced on Tripoli, GNA forces were able to repel them, leading to a stalemate along the outskirts of the city that lasted through the rest of 2019.

Turkish intervention, retreat of Tobruk government, and renewed attempt at unity

International reactions to the campaign, meanwhile, exposed a growing rift within the international community over which government to support. By the end of 2019, it had become evident that Russia had sent mercenaries to support the LNA, and, in response, Turkey deployed troops to support the GNA in January 2020.

Pressure from Russia and Turkey led to a ceasefire on January 12, though not before the LNA had achieved a key victory on January 6 with its capture of Sirte, a vital city that linked Libya’s eastern and western halves. On January 19 a summit was held in Berlin aimed at de-escalating the conflict and creating conditions that would allow peace negotiations to resume. Meanwhile, the LNA took the opportunity to place pressure on the international community by forcing a blockade of Tripoli’s NOC, cutting the majority of the country’s oil production.

No agreement was reached, and the fighting continued. In May and June the GNA, assisted by Turkish-backed foreign forces, successfully dislodged the LNA from the area around Tripoli, ending the 14-month siege on its capital and driving LNA forces eastward.

After the battle lines stabilized just east of Sirte, the two sides entered new negotiations. In September the blockade of the NOC was lifted after an agreement was reached to share its revenue. In October they signed an agreement that called for an immediate lasting cease-fire and for foreign fighters to leave Libya within three months.

In the weeks that followed the cease-fire, the United Nations (UN) organized a set of unity talks with more than 70 power brokers and representatives of Libyan society. The forum agreed in January 2021 to establish a transitional government tasked with the reunification of warring factions and civil institutions and with holding elections in December. In February the representatives elected prominent businessman Abdul Hamid Dbeibah to serve as prime minister. A presidential council was also elected. It was headed by GNA diplomat Mohamed al-Menfi and included a member of Tobruk’s House of Representatives. The proposed government was approved in early March by a joint session of the country’s two rival parliaments. But plans to hold elections fell through after the unity government failed to produce a unified framework for holding them by the December deadline. Although the international community urged the unity government to continue its mandate and set a new date for elections, Tobruk’s House of Representatives considered Dbeibah’s term spent and elected Fathi Bashagha in February 2022 to replace him as prime minister. Dbeibah, however, refused to concede his post before elections could be held.