Assorted References

• Balkan states
  • In Balkans: Economic collapse and nationalist resurgence
• flag history
  • In flag of North Macedonia
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization
  • In North Atlantic Treaty Organization
• physical geography
  • In North Macedonia: Relief
• population and demography
  • In North Macedonia: Ethnic groups
• United Nations
  • In 20th-century international relations: The Balkans

use of

• Macedonian language
  • In Macedonian language
• Romanian language
  • In Romanian language

Geography

Joseph Obrebski, Ritual and Social Structure in a Macedonian Village, ed. by Barbara Kerewsky Halpern and Joel M. Halpern (1977), is a brief research report of rare quality. The Macedonian Literary Language (1959) is an official account of its development. An official view of ecclesiastical development is Doné Ilievski, The Macedonian Orthodox Church: The Road to Independence (1973). The following are of particular importance in understanding the significance of ethnicity in Macedonia: Jovan Trifunoski, Albansko Stanovništvo u Socijalističkoj Republici Makedoniji (1988); and Vasiliki Neofotistos, The Risk of War: Everyday Sociality in the Republic of Macedonia (2012), on Albanians in Macedonia; C.N.O. Bartlett, The Turkish Minority in Yugoslavia (1980); H.R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia (1951); and Loring M. Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World (1995).

History

The Institute of National History, Skopje, A History of the Macedonian People (1979; originally published in Macedonian, 1972); Andrew Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History (2008); and Keith Brown, The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation (2003), are very useful. The competition for the partition of Macedonia is described in Elisabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (1950, reprinted 1980). A classic study of the Macedonian independence movement is Krste P. Misirkov, On Macedonian Matters (1903, reissued 1974; originally published in Serbo-Croatian, 1903). The World War II period is dealt with in Stephen E. Palmer, Jr., and Robert R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question (1971). The transition from communist rule to a multiparty independent state is illuminated by John B. Allcock, “Macedonia,” in Bogdan Szajkowski (ed.), Political Parties of Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Successor States (1994), pp. 279–291.

The names “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” have long been the subject of controversy and debate. About 700 bce a people who called themselves Macedonians pushed eastward from their home on the Aliákmon River to the plain in the northeastern corner of the Greek peninsula, at the head of the Gulf of Thérmai. The origin and identity of this people are contested and much debated by scholars. They are also a central element of a modern dispute between Greek and Macedonian nationalists over competing claims to national and ethnic continuity.

Historians are divided into two principal camps: those who believe that evidence indicates that the ancient Macedonians were Greek (e.g., N.G.L. Hammond, Robin Lane Fox, and Ian Worthington) and those who believe either that evidence is inconclusive or that it indicates that the ancient Macedonians were not Greek (e.g., Eugene Borza, Ernst Badian, and Winthrop L. Adams).

By the 5th century bce the Macedonian elite had adopted the Greek language and had forged a unified kingdom. In the 4th century bce that kingdom became an extensive empire under the rule of Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander the Great.

Other points are bitterly disputed. Was the ancient Macedonian language (spoken by ancient Macedonians who had not been educated in Greek) a separate, non-Greek language or an early form of Greek? Did the ancient Macedonians identify themselves as Greeks? Did the ancient Greeks consider the ancient Macedonians to be Greeks? In other words, were the ancient Macedonians Greeks? From an anthropological perspective, these questions cannot be answered, because they misunderstand the nature of ethnic and national identities as well as the nature of language variability. Identities are socially constructed, fluid, situational, and contested; they are used for political purposes. As linguists know, a language is a dialect with an army.

These questions would have remained the concern of a small group of ancient historians if they had not also been central themes in an intense 20th- and 21st-century political dispute between Greeks and Macedonians over which group had the right to identify themselves as Macedonians and therefore to lay claim to the territory of Macedonia. Both Greeks and Macedonians argue that they are entitled to the name because they and they alone are the direct descendants of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians. The Greek claim to cultural continuity with ancient Macedonia is certainly stronger than the Macedonian claim, since modern Macedonians are clearly a Slavic-speaking people descended from the 6th-century Slav migrants to the area. In the ongoing political dispute, however, both these assertions have been used to promote nationalist ideologies that base claims to identity and territory on claims of continuity with antiquity. According to the emergent scholarly point of view, these claims are largely irrelevant. Like all nations, the Greek and the Macedonian nations are products of the past several centuries. Some nations were constructed earlier than others, but claims to continuity with the past, however accurate they may be, provide only a tenuous basis for claims to territory or identity. Such claims are settled on the basis of more recent military and political events.

In the 20th century alone, international borders within the geographical area of Macedonia were contested on many occasions. After the Balkan Wars (1912–13), the geographical region of Macedonia was divided among the Balkan powers. Southern Macedonia (sometimes called Aegean Macedonia) became part of Greece, northeastern Macedonia (Pirin Macedonia) became part of Bulgaria, and northern Macedonia (Vardar Macedonia) became part of Serbia and then of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and still later the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). During World Wars I and II, parts of northern Greece were occupied by Bulgaria, and during the Greek Civil War (1946–49) the territorial integrity of northern Greece was challenged by the Greek Communist Party with the support of the communist parties of Greece’s northern neighbours.

Following the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, the Republic of Macedonia became an independent country. Although Greece attempted to prevent Macedonia from gaining international recognition under its constitutional name, the Republic of Macedonia, Greece acceded to its joining the United Nations under the provisional designation “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (FYROM), a carefully negotiated name that recognized the ongoing contention over the provenance and legacy of the name Macedonia and the legitimacy of Macedonian nationality. Greece also prevented Macedonia from joining the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—part of its attempts to monopolize the name Macedonia. UN-sponsored negotiations between Greece and Macedonia were long unable to reach an agreement on a mutually acceptable name by which the republic should be internationally recognized. Among Greece’s proposals that were rejected by Macedonia were: “Dardania,” “Paeonia,” and “Illyria” (names used in antiquity to designate regions north of ancient Macedonia); “the Central Balkan Republic,” “South Slavia,” or “South Serbia” (names with more general geographical associations); and “Upper Macedonia,” “Northern Macedonia,” “Vardar Macedonia,” or “New Macedonia” (names that include an adjectival qualifier or modifier).

For years, UN-sponsored bilateral negotiations over the name continued without achieving significant progress. In 2018, however, the defeat of the nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (Vnatrešno-Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija–Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edinstvo; VMRO-DPMNE) and the ascent of the more moderate Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (Socijaldemostratski Sojuz na Makedonija; SDSM) under the leadership of Prime Minister Zoran Zaev altered the political environment in Macedonia, which became considerably more amenable to resolving the name dispute. Zaev’s government ended the Skopje 2014 program and the policy of “antiquization,” under which major highways and airports had been named after ancient Macedonian heroes and squares in central Skopje had been filled with neoclassical buildings and monumental statues of Alexander the Great and Philip of Macedon. This Macedonian nationalist assertion of continuity with ancient Macedonia had offended Greek historical sensibilities and harmed relations between the two countries.

On June 12, 2018, Zaev met Alexis Tsipras, the prime minister of Greece, in a small village on the shore of Lake Prespa, near the point where the borders of Albania, Greece, and Macedonia meet. There the foreign ministers of the two countries signed what came to be known as the Prespa Agreement. The agreement’s most important provision stipulated that the official, constitutional name of the “Second Party,” for both domestic and international use, would be the “Republic of North Macedonia” (Macedonian: Republika Severna Makedonija) or “North Macedonia” for short. In return, the “First Party,” Greece, agreed not only to not object to North Macedonia’s application to join international organizations but also to support its accession invitations to both NATO and the EU. Under other provisions of the agreement, North Macedonia’s official language would be “the Macedonian language” and the nationality of the majority of its citizens would be “Macedonian/citizen of the Republic of North Macedonia.”

Additional provisions indicated the extreme sensitivity of every aspect of the name issue and the necessity of specifying exactly how the terms “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” would be used. The agreement specified that all adjectival references to “the State, its official organs, and other public entities” should be consistent with the new constitutional name “the Republic of North Macedonia,” whereas all other uses of the terms “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” would involve the acknowledgment that the two parties understood them to refer to different histories, cultures, and heritages. In other words, each country would use the terms with different meanings. More specifically, the two parties noted that “the official language and other attributes of the Second Party are not related to the ancient Hellenic civilization history, culture, and heritage of the northern region of the First Party.” In this way, Greece firmly rejected any claims Macedonians might make to the glories of Alexander the Great and the ancient Macedonians that Greece has always maintained as its exclusive national heritage. The Prespa Agreement also included articles promising cooperation in the use of national symbols and geographical names as well as in the fields of education, economics, diplomacy, and defense.

In January 2019 the parliaments of both Greece and Macedonia ratified the Prespa Agreement. Domestic reaction in both countries was largely hostile. Macedonian nationalists described the agreement as a disaster, while some Greek nationalists called for the politicians responsible for it to be executed for treason. Violent protests against the agreement broke out in both countries. On February 12, 2019, North Macedonia’s name change was officially promulgated. In this way, it seemed, the Macedonian Question, the global cultural war that had been waged by the two countries since the breakup of Yugoslavia and the declaration of independence by the Republic of Macedonia in 1991, may have come to an end.

This brief history of the contest over who has the right to the name “Macedonia” can only suggest the many nuanced issues and interpretations that lie at the heart of the controversy. Whatever the ancient evidence suggests, the modern national conflict could never be settled by archaeologists and ancient historians. Ultimately, a resolution could only come through contemporary political and legal negotiations like those that led to the Prespa Agreement, an arrangement that held the promise of great benefits to come for both sides.