Rust Belt, geographic region of the United States that was long the country’s manufacturing, steelmaking, and coal-producing heartland but that underwent dramatic industrial decline that resulted in widespread unemployment, increased poverty, decay, and population loss. Because the Rust Belt is defined by similar economic experience rather than by natural borders, its boundaries are debated; however, it is generally viewed as encompassing a large part of the Midwest (Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin) along with Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and portions of New York. Some schemes extend it east to include the former textile-manufacturing cities of Massachusetts, west to eastern Iowa,  and south to the coalfields of Kentucky. The region’s prosperity sprang from its abundance of natural resources, including coal and iron ore reserves, as well as rivers and lakes that abetted transport and travel. From the 1950s to the 1980s it experienced significant economic decline and dislocation largely because of foreign competition, increased labour costs, failure to modernize equipment and infrastructure, and technological advancements that replaced workers.

Origin of the term “Rust Belt”

The term “Rust Belt” is derived from a statement made to a gathering of steelworkers in Cleveland by Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale during the 1984 election campaign. Responding to what he viewed as the myopic optimism of incumbent Republican Pres. Ronald Reagan’s rhetoric, Mondale alluded to the iconic desolation of the Depression-era Dust Bowl and claimed that Reagan’s policies were “turning our industrial Midwest into a rust bowl.” The choice of the word rust evoked the image of the abandoned decaying factories that were becoming increasingly common features of the region’s landscape. Riffing on the trend of using belt to characterize distinctive regions of the country (e.g., Sun Belt and Corn Belt), journalists quickly transformed rust bowl into Rust Belt and began using the term as a mostly pejorative label for the country’s traditional industrial heartland.

Development of the industrial heartland

That industrial heartland—which has analogues in Germany’s Ruhr region, the Donbas of Ukraine, the north of England, and southern Wales—sprouted in the second half of the 19th century and continued expanding in the first half of 20th century. The access to plentiful iron ore and coal reserves provided by the Great Lakes and waterways such as the Ohio River and the Erie Canal were essential to the development of the region’s dominant steelmaking industry. Iron ore from the Mesabi Range of Minnesota, the Marquette range of the Upper Peninsula of Michigan, and the Menominee and Gogebic ranges straddling the Michigan-Wisconsin border was shipped to ports on the southern shore of Lake Michigan, where furnaces in steel plants on the South Side of Chicago and in Gary and Hammond, Indiana, were fired by coal from southern Illinois. Freighters also carried iron ore to Lake Erie port cities such as Cleveland and Buffalo to be used in steel plants there or transported to mills in cities such as Youngstown, Ohio, and Pittsburgh, which was connected by the Ohio, Allegheny, and Monongahela rivers to a network of smaller cities where steel mills and metals-related manufacturing flourished, all benefiting from their access to coal from Pennsylvania and West Virginia.

The growth of the steel industry in turn facilitated the development of the machine and machine part industries, the weapons industry, and the automotive and automotive parts industries. Detroit famously became the “Motor City,” epicentre of the American automotive industry (and the “Arsenal of Democracy” during World War II), but car and truck factories thrived throughout the burgeoning industrial heartland, from Janesville and Kenosha, Wisconsin, to Fort Wayne, Indiana, and Lordstown, Ohio. Akron, Ohio, was crowned the world’s tire and rubber capital. The manufacture of farm equipment and heavy machinery became big business in Chicago and smaller Illinois cities such as Moline and Peoria. Both immigrants and domestic migrants(see Great Migration) looking for work flocked to the towns and cities of the industrial heartland, whose populations grew exponentially. Local economies hummed, and rich diverse urban cultures blossomed. Fortunes were made by a privileged few (e.g., John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie), but the rise of organized labour contributed to the creation of good-paying blue-collar jobs and a growing middle class (though persistent racism limited access and equity for people of colour).

How the Belt rusted

The reversal of the region’s prosperity is most often dated to the 1970s, but some historians and economists find its roots as early as in the 1950s. In either case, most observers emphasize the role of comparative advantages enjoyed by foreign industrial competitors, especially in Asia. Lower labour costs were pivotal to those advantages, and one response by Rust Bowl manufacturers was to relocate their operations to the American South, where labour unions were not as established and wages were lower. Complacency born of the post-World War II economic boom experienced by U.S. industry is also often identified as being responsible for the widespread failure to update industrial machinery and infrastructure, which also contributed to a decline in competitiveness with foreign rivals. Some economists point to currency exchange rates and a strong U.S. dollar that made American products relatively more expensive on the world market in the early 1980s. Still other economists cite the expanding world market, economic globalization, and the removal of trade barriers as important contributing factors to the region’s declining fortunes. In that vein the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is frequently villainized.

Whatever the cause, the result of industrial decline in the Rust Belt was shuttered factories, mills, and mines; devastating unemployment; shrinking tax bases; growing poverty; and dislocation. Workers fled the region in droves in search of economic opportunity elsewhere. Cleveland (the population of which declined from about 876,000 in 1960 to about 505,000 in 1990) was mocked as the “Mistake on the Lake”; Michiganders who flooded Texas in the 1970s in the hope of finding work were disparaged as “black tag” people (after the black Michigan license plates on their cars).

Anne Trubek, founder of Belt Magazine, identified September 19, 1977, “Black Monday,” the day on which it was announced that the Campbell Works would be closed (sealing the fate of Youngstown Sheet and Tube, once the largest corporation in Ohio), as the most symbolic date in Rust Belt history, and, in his Rust Belt anthem “Youngstown,” Bruce Springsteen movingly evokes the prideful heartbreak and disillusioned sense of abandonment that resulted from the transformation of that Ohio city and scores like it. Billy Joel paints a similar portrait of industrial upheaval in eastern Pennsylvania in another popular song, “Allentown.”

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In the 21st century many of the towns and cities of the Rust Belt continue to struggle to regain their former prominence, but others have reinvented themselves, embracing service industries and new technologies or capitalizing on the public and private colleges and universities that are a vital legacy of the region’s longtime commitment to excellence in education.

Jeff Wallenfeldt
Related Topics:
city
globalization

global city, an urban centre that enjoys significant competitive advantages and that serves as a hub within a globalized economic system. The term has its origins in research on cities carried out during the 1980s, which examined the common characteristics of the world’s most important cities. However, with increased attention being paid to processes of globalization during subsequent years, these world cities came to be known as global cities. Linked with globalization was the idea of spatial reorganization and the hypothesis that cities were becoming key loci within global networks of production, finance, and telecommunications. In some formulations of the global city thesis, then, such cities are seen as the building blocks of globalization. Simultaneously, these cities were becoming newly privileged sites of local politics within the context of a broader project to reconfigure state institutions.

Early research on global cities concentrated on key urban centres such as London, New York City, and Tokyo. With time, however, research has been completed on emerging global cities outside of this triad, such as Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Houston, Los Angeles, Mexico City, Paris, São Paulo, Sydney, and Zürich. Such cities are said to knit together to form a global city network serving the requirements of transnational capital across broad swathes of territory.

The rise of global cities has been linked with two globalization-related trends: first, the expansion of the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) in global production patterns and, second, the decline of mass production along Fordist lines and the concomitant rise of flexible production centred within urban areas. These two trends explain the emergence of networks of certain cities serving the financial and service requirements of TNCs while other cities suffer the consequences of deindustrialization and fail to become “global.” Global cities are those that therefore become effective command-and-coordination posts for TNCs within a globalizing world economy. Such cities have also assumed a governance role at the local scale and within wider configurations of what some commentators have termed the “glocalization” of state institutions. This refers to processes in which certain national state functions of organization and administration have been devolved to the local scale. An example of this would be London. Since the 1980s London has consolidated its position as a global banking and financial centre, de-linked from the national economy.

The global city thesis poses a challenge to state-centric perspectives on contemporary international political economy because it implies the disembedding of cities from their national territorial base, so that they occupy an extraterritorial space. Global cities, it is suggested, have more interconnectedness with other cities and across a transnational field of action than with the national economy. Global cities are also said to share many of the same characteristics because of their connectedness and shared experiences of globalization. They all exhibit clear signs of deindustrialization. They possess the concentration of financial and service industries within their spatial boundaries, as well as the concentration of large pools of labour. On the downside, many also share experiences of class and ethnic conflict. They often have segmented labour markets in which employees of key industries enjoy well-paid and consumerist lifestyles while a lower stratum of workers staffs less well-paid, more precarious, and less attractive positions within the urban economy. It has been further argued that the promotion of global cities runs the risk of economically marginalizing nonurban populations within the national economy.

Although global cities are interconnected, embedded as they are in global production and financial networks, they are also locked into competition with one another to command increasing resources and to attract capital. To successfully compete, local governments have been keen to promote their cities as global. Such cities have been marketed as “entrepreneurial” centres, sites of innovation in the knowledge economy, and as being rich with cultural capital. A common strategy has been to stress the multiethnic qualities of a city, for example. This is intended to stress its cosmopolitan and global character and to disassociate the city from its actual territorial, ethnic, or cultural setting. Such cities also regularly compete to host world events of considerable prestige that present further economic opportunities, such as the Olympic Games.

There has been some skepticism regarding the global city thesis in its simplest formulation. On a qualitative level, some scholars questioned whether global cities are indeed new phenomena and pointed to the long-standing existence of similar economic centres over time. One can think of Florence during the Renaissance, for example, or Manchester during the Industrial Revolution. Other commentators questioned whether the ascendance of global cities implies state decline along zero-sum lines. These skeptics argued that a more complex and interdependent relationship exists between the state and cities under its national jurisdiction. Indeed, national governments can play a proactive role in the promotion of key urban centres as global cities. Correspondingly, it is possible that global cities occupy the forefront position within a hierarchy of cities and local spaces that together constitute the national economy. Such a perspective would appear to transcend a dichotomizing view of global cities and the national state.

Greig Charnock