Honesty and deceit

Senders and receivers may have conflicting interests in the accurate exchange of information. Among humans, it is known that exaggerating and lying can sometimes benefit senders. Animal senders may also gain fitness by cheating under certain circumstances; the strength of the selective pressure to do so depends upon the signaling context and the degree to which the two parties have conflicts of interest. Conflict of interest is greatest when two more or less equal competitors both desire the same nonsharable resource. Each would like the other to back down without a fight, and each would benefit from persuading the other that it is the better fighter by any means possible, including bluffing. In the mate-attraction context, both male and female benefit from mating with the correct species and therefore agree about the accurate transmission of species information. But females may want to mate only with a high-quality male, which puts pressure on low-quality males to hide or exaggerate their quality. An offspring in a multiple brood may exaggerate its need for food to the parent in order to garner a larger share of the food for itself.

The problem of signal honesty is an important issue in studies of animal communication systems. In the early days of ethology, signals were shown to evolve through the ritualization of behaviours that are, or were, functionally appropriate to the contexts in which the signals are given. Signals were believed to be honest indicators of underlying motivations because the signals were derived from physiologically or anatomically linked sources. With the rise of evolutionary game theory in the 1970s, this notion of signal honesty was questioned. British ethologist and author Richard Dawkins and British zoologist John Krebs suggested that senders were best characterized as deceitful manipulators trying to mask their true intentions and trick receivers into actions benefiting senders. Thus, receivers were best viewed as mind readers trying to discount false signals, anticipate the true intent of the sender, and identify their own best countermove. This scenario leads to a never-ending arms race with increasing deceit and concealment of true intentions by senders parried by increased discrimination and exploitation by receivers. Except where sender and receiver have common interests, the resulting signals are largely deceitful and uninformative.

Israeli evolutionary biologist Amotz Zahavi challenged this pessimistic view of signal honesty. He asserted that receivers have the upper hand and should not respond to signals unless they carry some guarantee of honesty. One guarantee is to require that signals impose a cost such that deceitful senders cannot afford to produce an exaggerated signal, or they produce it only in an ineffective way. Signals characterized by such costs are called handicap signals. Although Zahavi’s idea was viewed skeptically at first, subsequent game theory models demonstrated the evolutionary feasibility of handicap signaling, and hence the handicap principle became widely accepted.

A key concept of the handicap principle is that the cost imposed by the signal must be closely related to the sender quality attribute about which the receiver wants information. Although Zahavi proposed that the signal should be designed to “use up” the sender’s quality feature in a display of costly consumption, it is more important that a sender of lower quality with respect to the attribute be less able to afford to produce the signal. Thus, the form of the signal is linked to its information content. One type of cost is energy expenditure. Signals with high production costs can inform receivers about the health, vigour, or foraging abilities of senders. For example, vocal and visual mate-attraction signals must be repeated again and again. Female preference for males that not only produce high-quality displays but also repeat these displays at a high rate will increase the selection pressure on males to perform at the highest possible energetic level they can sustain. Unhealthy or poor-quality males cannot maintain such an expensive display, and this fact will be detectable to females. Choosy females benefit by acquiring vigorous mates that are good genetic fathers and parental providers or possess food-rich territories. Handicap signals also may be given to potential predators. For example, antelopes sometimes perform energetic jumping to approaching predators. Only individuals in good condition can perform these actions well. This provides honest information to the predators that discourages them from chasing the able displayers.

Handicapping is not the only mechanism for generating honest signals. Some signals are constrained by physiology, anatomy, or physical principles to be honest indicators of certain types of sender attributes. Such signals are called unbluffable, or index, signals. Examples of index signals include low-frequency vocal threats that are linked to body size in many vertebrates and tail-beating displays in fish. Likewise, certain forms of ritualized fighting, such as mouth wrestling and antler locking, are index signals of weight and strength. Other signals are associated with aging and health, including song repertoire in birds, which can indicate age, experience, and ability to survive. In addition, pointing displays that indicate the direction of gaze and olfactory signals that are related to reproductive physiology are considered index signals.

True threat signals of intention to attack require very effective honesty guarantees if they are to convince rivals to retreat. Otherwise, an initially honest signal will be invaded by bluffers that give the signal but never follow through with an attack. In this case the sender must demonstrate its sincerity by approaching the rival very closely. Only a threat display performed within close proximity to the rival, where there is the risk of a retaliatory attack, will be taken seriously by the receiver. Threat displays are typically attack-preparatory postures performed close to the rival, giving the sender both a tactical advantage and demonstrating its willingness to take risks.

Some communication signals are not costly to produce, risky to execute, or obligatorily linked with physical properties of senders. The code by which these signals are associated with contexts is an arbitrary convention, and these are therefore called conventional signals. If there is no conflict of interest between sender and receiver, senders will not be tempted to cheat; conventional signals can be honest and stable without further guarantees. However, conventional signals also are seen during conflicts of interest, and in this case there must be a stabilizing cost that maintains honesty. Conspicuous colour patches in some birds and lizards are the classic example of this type of signal. The size or hue of the patch is correlated with the dominance rank of the individual, hence the designation of these patches as badges of status. Large badge size deters aggressive challenges by small-badged individuals. The cost of guaranteeing honesty of a large badge is aggressive retaliation from other large-badged individuals. The evolution of such signals must be accompanied by frequent testing of the honesty of other individuals with a badge size similar to one’s own while avoiding or ignoring individuals with larger or smaller badges. Such a rule makes it very dangerous and costly for a low-status individual to cheat by sporting a large badge.

Most signals are believed to be honest most of the time because conflicts of interest are minimal or because appropriate costs are imposed on cheaters. The best demonstrations of honest signaling have been described for handicap signals of mate quality. One well-documented example is the elongated tail feathers of the barn swallow (Hirundo rustica), studied by Danish zoologist Anders Møller. Females prefer males with longer tails, pairing very quickly with males having artificially enlarged tails compared with males with shortened tails. Long tails are a handicap for males. Barn swallows are aerial foragers that capture flying insects on the wing, and artificial tail elongation increases the drag on the tail and reduces agility and foraging efficiency. Males with naturally long tails are stronger, healthier, and resistant to parasites. These individuals not only grow long tails and cope with the foraging handicap but also transmit parasite resistance to their genetic offspring. Females obtain better-quality offspring by selecting long-tailed males. Other examples of honest mate-quality signals preferred by females include red plumage coloration in the male house finch (Carpodacus mexicanus), which is correlated with a male’s foraging skill and survivorship; long call duration in the gray tree frog (Hyla versicolor), which is energetically costly for males but associated with better survivorship in their offspring; and high display rate in damselfish (Stegastes partitus), which is correlated with the survivorship of the eggs that the male tends.

Dishonest signaling does occur. Deceit is the provision of inaccurate information by the sender such that the sender benefits from the interaction but the receiver pays the cost of a wrong decision. Types of deceit include lies (using the wrong signal among an unordered set of alternatives), exaggeration or bluff (using a signal whose rank among ordered alternatives is different from that for the corresponding condition values), and withholding information (not giving a signal when appropriate). There are numerous examples of predatory species that mimic the mate-attraction signal of their prey, but in interactions between two different species; there is no selection pressure on the predator to be honest, and there is little the prey can do to avoid being exploited. The prey, as receiver, can try to improve its discrimination between true mates and impostors, but this process will simultaneously select for better mimicry by the predator.

Within-species deceit is a different matter, since dishonest signaling can sometimes backfire on the sender. For example, an outright lie has been described in birds foraging in flocks, where one individual may give a false alarm call to scare competitors away from a rich food find. A sender cannot “cry wolf” too often, however, because receivers may learn to ignore the signal, and the signal will thus cease to be effective in true alarm contexts. Bluffing threats sometimes occur in mantis shrimp (Gonodactylus bredini), which defend their burrows from intruders with a claw-spreading display. Recently moulted individuals that are soft and unable to defend themselves effectively may nevertheless sometimes give the threat display in the hope that an intruder will not press an attack. Withholding information has been described in primates that fail to advertise a rich food find. If other group members catch an individual feeding on such a find, the individual is aggressively punished. Thus, low levels of dishonesty may persist in many signaling systems. However, signals must be sufficiently reliable and honest most of the time; otherwise, they will be discounted and ignored by receivers, senders will no longer benefit from giving dishonest signals, and the signals will disappear from the species’ repertoire.