Physical security.

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Some of the most effective advances in security technologies during the past few decades have been in the area of physical security—i.e., protection by tangible means. Physical security has two main components: building architecture and appurtenances; equipment and devices.

A building can be designed for security by such means as planning and limiting the number and location of entrances and by careful attention to exits, traffic patterns, and loading docks.

Equipment and devices may be classified in various categories depending on the criteria used. If the criterion is purpose, some of the principal categories are record containers, including safes and files; communications, such as two-way radios and scrambler telephones; identification, including badges and automatic access-control systems requiring the use of a code; investigation and detection (e.g., lie detectors) and intrusion-detection devices, such as photoelectric cells and ultrasonic-wave-propagating equipment; observation and surveillance, including listening and recording devices, cameras, closed-circuit television, and one-way mirrors; countermeasures for observation and surveillance, such as equipment designed to detect electronic surveillance devices; and fire protection. A classification system based on process results in another set of categories. Examples include perimeter barriers (e.g., fences, walls) and locks to prevent or control access, as well as lighting systems to aid surveillance and to deter illegal entry.

Advances in security equipment technology have been numerous. Some of the more noteworthy examples include sensor devices that report unauthorized removal of items; personal-identification and access-control systems that directly “read” unique personal characteristics such as voice quality and hand geometry; surveillance devices that can scan premises at night; and devices that permit surveillance at considerable distances, making entry to the premises unnecessary.

A major part of security programs consists of measures designed to recruit and effectively use trustworthy personnel. “Personnel security” is a term often used to include measures designed to select only those people for whom there is a good prognosis for trustworthiness, on the premise that losses from employee untrustworthiness are more frequent and usually larger than losses from outside the system (e.g., burglary, robbery, shoplifting, espionage) and that one of the best predictors of future behaviour is past behaviour.

Common synonyms are “screening” and “vetting.” The most common technique is the background investigation, which involves obtaining all relevant available data about a person’s past education, employment, and personal behaviour and making judgments concerning the individual’s likely future loyalty and honesty. Thus, the dossier and computerized national data banks exemplify a response by a society in which great geographic mobility necessitates record keeping as a basis for judgments. Another technique is the polygraph, or lie-detector, examination. Research has also been directed to the possible capabilities and limitations of pencil-and-paper psychological tests and stress interviews. In addition to selection techniques there are other measures designed to keep personnel trustworthy after they have been brought into the system—for example, employee indoctrination programs and vulnerability testing.

Systems and procedures constitute another area of the personnel-administration approach to security. It is possible to devise work methods and management controls in such a way that security is one of the values sought along with maximizing productivity and minimizing cost. Examples include the use of automated record-keeping systems, the use of forms and reports periodically checked against physical inventories, and the application of the principle of dual responsibility, whereby work is so subdivided that the work of one employee checks the accuracy of the work of another.

Because control systems are not self-administering, they must be periodically tested and policed. A typical procedure is the vulnerability test, or “created-error” check, in which an error or breach, such as an erroneous invoice, is deliberately planted in the system to see if it is detected and reported. Undercover investigators, such as hired “shoppers” who check on the honesty of sales personnel, also play a role in monitoring the operation of control systems.

Guard-force training, supervision, and motivation are other important aspects of the personnel-administration approach to security. The use of operational personnel to attain security objectives is still another. Examples include engineers, production workers, and clerical staff applying government security regulations for the safeguarding of classified information, and salespeople cooperating with security staff in the detection of shoplifters. The cooperation of operational personnel to attain security objectives along with production objectives demands an interplay between knowledgeable training and communication programs, supervision, employee motivation, and management example.

The personnel-relations approach implicit in much of the above recognizes that the attitudes of rank-and-file employees and the social climate that they create can either be conducive to security or constitute its greatest enemy. Therefore, if security programs are to be successful, they must be carried out in a context of considerable understanding and cooperation of virtually the entire work force. The security program is apt to be only as good as the overall pattern and climate of social relations and loyalties of workers and executives of all ranks.