In the area of foreign policy, it is long past the time when the United States should have developed a strategy designed to win the Cold War. It should be a policy based on our acknowledged strength and directed toward the elimination of Communist power wherever it exists. The free world today, largely because of our own attitudes and actions, is living in a stifling pall of fear—fear of the Soviet Union and its Communist power. The results of this fear can be seen all over the world. They account for the high degree of neutralism among the so-called uncommitted nations. They account for a general preoccupation with the unrealistic concept of peaceful coexistence. They account for the talk of unilateral disarmament, the reluctance concerning resumption of nuclear tests, the affinity for appeasement, and the resurgence of pacifist movements.

Our job is to erase that fear through strong leadership that makes the proper use of American power and dedicates it to a policy of victory in the Cold War. How do we start? I believe our first task is to persuade the enemy beyond all possible doubt that we would rather accompany the world to Kingdom Come than consign it to Hell under communism. Having made that clear, we must seize opportunities as they arise to protect freedom and demonstrate our strengths. Many such opportunities have arisen in the past, a few of which we have used to good advantage. For example, we were told by the weak of heart and the peddlers of despair that unless we yielded Quemoy and Matsu, the islands off the China coast, to the Communists, a terrible war would result. The Eisenhower administration said, in effect, if the Communist world chooses to go to war to occupy these islands, then that is the way it will have to be. But the Communist world did not so choose, and Quemoy and Matsu are free today. And they will be free tomorrow and just as long as our resolution lasts.

This sequence of events was repeated in Lebanon. We sent the marines there against the trembling advice of those who fear any display of determination and strength. And Lebanon is free today. We acted from strength, too, when threatened Berlin was saved by our airlift in 1948, and at least half of Berlin remains free today. In Korea, we responded in June, 1950, with courage and a commitment, but we allowed the fearmongers among us to whittle that initial commitment to victory down to an acceptance of a humiliating stalemate.

On the other hand, our resolve was not strong enough in Cuba to back our intent with the strength required. Instead of a glorious victory for the cause of freedom, the adventure in the Bay of Pigs became a disaster. The result is that Cuba today languishes in chains while a Communist dictator thumbs his nose at the United States and plays the enemy’s game to the hilt. And when my critics worry lest we alienate the rest of Latin America by taking affirmative action in Cuba, I am sure that Castro chortles. Most of Latin America already has been alienated by the timidity and ineffectiveness of our policy. The Latins cannot understand why a world power, such as the United States, permits a bush-league Kremlin stooge to push us around. To them, strength is something to be respected; weakness is something to be ridiculed.

In the case of Cuba, I believe, we need a clear declaration of intention from the President which would serve notice on the world that we reserve the right to interfere in situations where world freedom, our own security, and the welfare of our neighbors are directly concerned, and that we shall not entrust these matters solely to the judgment of others. From this beginning, I believe we should proceed to use our economic and political importance to other American republics to draw their support. Then I think we should levy a complete economic embargo against Cuba and, if necessary, support it with a military blockade. Should these measures fail to do the job, then I believe we must be prepared to take direct military steps, preferably in concert with other American states, to dislodge Castroism from our southern doorstep.

This action is needed, not only for our own security, but also to reestablish respect for the United States throughout Latin America. Unless this is done, the Alliance for Progress program of aid to this area will be largely meaningless. Our posture in Latin America must be that of a strong champion of freedom—as unafraid of Communist dictators as it is concerned for the proper economic development of the countries to our south. In our aid program for Latin America, I believe, priority should be given to socially responsible capitalism and to governments that are most dedicated to progress toward truly representative democracy. The purpose of such a program must be the extension of freedom and not merely a hope that we can buy friendship.

The situation in Cuba and the unstable and highly volatile conditions in areas like Laos, South Vietnam, and Berlin make their own arguments against American disarmament. In our conferences on this subject, we are playing the enemy’s game. We are, in effect, bestowing on the Communists a measure of sincerity by our very presence at the conference table. I believe the United States should make it clear that we are against disarmament at the present time and under existing conditions. We need our armaments, what we have and more, in order to prevent war or, if forced to war, to win it. What is more, I believe we should recognize that the Soviets cannot entertain any idea of disarmament while revolt lies just below the surface of life in the Communist satellite nations. Consequently, Khrushchev’s every move in the matter of disarmament is designed for propaganda purposes which have no relationship to the actualities of the problem of reducing world armaments. We have had ample experience with Communist duplicity on this score in connection with the moratorium on nuclear testing. We were mistaken ever to agree to halt nuclear testing, particularly in light of our extensive knowledge of Communist double-dealing. The Russians not only showed their complete bad faith by resuming testing, but have done everything in their power to make us feel guilty for following suit. And they clearly have scored weaponry gains by pitting a bold and aggressive policy against our timidity and indecision.

In any discussion of foreign policy it is necessary to consider the United Nations and the relationship of that organization to the United States. I believe here we have to begin by not taking the United Nations too seriously. We are making a grave error if we view this organization as an effective instrument for world peace and order and justice. It is at best a questionable forum for debate among the nations of the world. But a sounding board for the views of the various nations is one thing; the formulation of American foreign policy is quite another. The two must be kept separate if the United States is to follow policies in its own best strategic interests. We cannot afford extreme deference to the United Nations in the handling of our international affairs without seriously jeopardizing our own interests. The problem in the Congo is a case in point. Here, we let our regard for UN policy-making lead us into grave dispute with our NATO partners and our important European allies. By endorsing the ill-advised and divisive United Nations’ war against Katanga, we approved what amounts to a double-standard policy by the United Nations and opposed the serious interests of England, France, Portugal, and the Netherlands. However much the State Department attempts to defend it, this was a dangerous and unpopular course of action which has aggravated our relations with the nations of Europe. It has made the job of lining up NATO nations’ support for economic sanctions against Castro much more difficult than it should be.

These are only a few of the specific actions that I would recommend in a conservative approach to American foreign policy. There are, of course, many others, such as: continued opposition to the admission of Red China to the UN and our withdrawal from that organization if such admission is ever voted; the halting of American foreign aid to Communist nations, such as Yugoslavia, and to “neutral” nations that consistently follow a course contrary to the best interests of the West; attempts to get our European allies to bear an ever-increasing share of mutual security and foreign aid costs; and many others.

Over-all, I would say that conservatives desire to strengthen American foreign policy by discarding the liberal illusion that we can somehow coexist with communism in a semblance of peace and honor. We must face resolutely the grim realities of this hour, fully cognizant of the fact that the Communists can be restrained only by firmness and countervailing power. We must understand that, in the long run, either the Communists will conquer us and our allies, or else communism will be defeated; an enduring compromise with fanatics is not possible.

Domestic policy

On the domestic front, our troubles are principally fiscal in nature. They arise from inflation, ill-advised government spending policies, a repressive tax system, and a dangerous imbalance of power between management, labor, and the public. Today, these elements have combined to confront us with a critical adverse balance in our international payments.

There is nothing that drains away our economic strength like the constantly shrinking worth of the American dollar. This is a grave concern right now because it is beginning to affect our fiscal integrity throughout the world. When foreign governments begin to question the soundness of our currency and to wonder at America’s continued monetary capacity, we are in serious trouble. It is the kind of trouble that conservatives have always warned of and which they believe should bring about a complete reappraisal of government spending and tax policies. In this connection, I am not suggesting a cutback in military or defense expenditures. I firmly believe that we can meet fully our present and future needs in this sphere without indulging in ruinous deficit spending—provided we cut back the waste and nonessential spending in other areas. But we certainly cannot go in for all of the old types of government welfare expenditures and a multitude of new ones while trying to meet our military obligations. At least, we cannot do all of this and still protect the integrity of our financial system.

Conservatives claim, and rightly, that there is a new urgency today in the need for reform of our internal economy, away from collectivist-inflationary policies and back to the principles of a genuinely competitive market economy and to fiscal and monetary discipline by government. That new urgency stems from the rise of the European Common Market. This overseas phenomenon is presenting the United States with a greater challenge than even the Kennedy administration is willing to admit. It is a challenge that goes far beyond the alleged need for greatly expanded presidential power to negotiate tariff reductions. It is a challenge which goes to the very roots of our economic system and demands that we, as a nation, begin to adopt sound fiscal policies aimed at halting the steady progress of inflation. It is a challenge that places us smack up against a kind of foreign competition we have never known before. It is a challenge that says: either this country really balances its budget, really begins to lift the great tax burden we have placed on the business community, and really calls a halt to the ever-spiraling rate of wage-price levels, or we will be in great and lasting economic trouble throughout the world—regardless of what is done about our tariff rates.

No matter how you debate it, the fact remains that attaining a balanced federal budget is the starting point on the road back to fiscal reason and a strong national economy. From this start, we could move ahead to other steps of responsibility—to budget surpluses, to payments on the national debt, to tax reforms, and to monetary stability. We could put our fiscal house in order and reinstitute the necessary underpinnings for a vigorous, dynamic economy—an economy which would guarantee to meet all of our needs both now and in the future. It would be no great problem to balance the federal budget—even to guarantee a sizable surplus—because there are literally scores of places where expenditures could be cut.

It is a basic fact that no effective battle can be waged against inflation and unemployment and foreign competition unless we hold the line against unearned wage increases for large segments of the working force. The key to this is, of course, productivity, and there is nothing new about the axiom that a worker is either worthy of his hire or he isn’t; that he is either worthy of a wage increase on the basis of what he produces, or he is not. This has been the formula for employment and advancement in every workable economic system the world has ever devised. Yet the great power which industry-wide labor unions are permitted to exercise today virtually enables them to dictate wage rates and fringe benefits without regard to gains in productivity or economic conditions. Any resistance to the exercise of union power is answered by long, costly, and exhausting strikes.

The upshot of this situation is that more and more employers are being caught in a tight squeeze between unearned wage increases, on the one hand, and market resistance to higher prices on the other. And the union wage structure is a rigid cost factor in the economy, moving always in just one direction—up. When market conditions won’t permit prices to climb in relation to these wage costs, profits dwindle, risk capital disappears, and job-creating business expansion grinds to a halt. I suggest that this is the biggest single reason for unemployment today.

These economic facts of life seem to be lost on many of the leaders of organized labor in this country. In a time of great stress and greater danger, they go right on pressuring for more and more wage increases, a shorter work week, and restrictive measures aimed at business. They show no tendency to recognize that the weight of economic events and changed world conditions places a responsibility on their shoulders as well as on the shoulders of the public, the government, and management. These are facts which we will have to face, and face squarely, if this nation is to maintain an economic progress that will keep pace with demands at home and abroad. I believe the present situation cries out for legislation to equalize the power now held by labor with that of the public, the government, and management.

For reasons of principle as well as those dictated by the requirements of fiscal responsibility, conservatives are convinced that welfare expenditures by the government should be restricted to cases of proved need, and administered, so far as possible, at the local and state levels. They recognize that government spending for “welfare” is the biggest cause of modern inflation and, therefore, the greatest menace to private saving and personal and family independence and security. In this light, the humanitarian aspect of “welfare” programs being offered today takes on a different meaning. Take medical care for the aged, for example. All of us are dedicated to the idea that aged people should not suffer, but we differ as to the means to be used to prevent that suffering. I do not happen to believe that the way to provide medical care for the aged is with a federally controlled program financed through social security. If the administration can show that a real need exists for this kind of assistance to American families, then I suggest that a better plan would be to provide that relief through expansion of medical deductions in the federal income tax or through some kind of special tax credit for certain types of medical expenditures. This would meet any need that might exist and still leave the question of caring for the aged up to the individual. But it is patently ridiculous to provide medical aid for people over sixty-five years, whether they need it or not, at the price of further inflation that would strike cruelly at aging Americans who live on fixed incomes and savings.

The same principle of meeting need—if it exists—through application of a tax credit can, I believe, be applied in the area of education. Much preferable to a massive program of federal aid to elementary and secondary schools for buildings and teachers’ salaries would be a federal income tax credit for the individual for part of the amount he pays in local school taxes. In fact, I have proposed such a plan in legislative form. Under existing federal income tax law, state and local school taxes are deductible from gross income, but the amount actually saved by the tax-payer depends on his federal income tax bracket. Thus, a taxpayer who has paid $200 in school taxes as part of the local real property tax on his home, and is in the 20 percent income tax bracket, realizes a saving of $40. My proposal would retain this present practice, but in addition would permit the taxpayer to take $100 credit against what he owes Uncle Sam, i.e., against his net federal income tax. Hence, instead of a saving of $40, the homeowner under my proposal would save $140 of the $200 he paid in school taxes on his home. Of course, if the taxpayer’s school tax is less than $100, he would be permitted to save no more than the actual amount of his local levy.

In these and other welfare areas, conservatives advocate genuine and voluntary community, as opposed to collectivism. They argue that human beings are happier in forming their own associations and managing their own private and local concerns than in being supervised by an immense and impersonal central governmental power, no matter how beneficent the intentions of those holding that power. They fear that American democracy might drift into a huge, monotonous paternalism in which human beings would never be allowed to grow up and assume their natural responsibilities, but would be treated always as children—and so would be always frustrated and bored.

I have not here drawn up a complete catalogue of conservative proposals to meet our present difficulties; instead, I have merely indicated the way conservatives view some of our outstanding challenges in the foreign and domestic fields. I have shown that conservatives have very definite ideas and proposals to offer in the areas of gravest concern for the American people. And I believe I have shown why the American people should turn—and are turning—to these conservative ideas and proposals in this present era of deadly conflict.

Barry Goldwater