The rejection of all of philosophy by positivism had the anomalous effect of evoking an awakening of Kantianism, for many thinkers wished to give to positivism itself a philosophical foundation that, while respecting the phenomenological attitude, would yet be hostile to the metaphysics of positivism, which was usually a tacit, but inconsequential, materialism. It was justifiably held that Kant could provide such a foundation because of his opposition to metaphysics and his limitation of scientific knowledge to the sphere of phenomena. The complexity of the critical philosophy was such that the theoretical criticism could be approached in diverse ways and that, through the facts themselves, diverse interpretations of the Critique of Pure Reason could be obtained. In the order of their origin (though not of their worth or importance), there thus arose currents of Kantianism that were empiricist, logicist, realist, metaphysical, axiological, and psychological—of which the most important survived into the 20th century.
The return to Kant was determined by the historical fresco of the incomparable historian of philosophy Kuno Fischer titled Kants Leben und die Grundlagen seiner Lehre (1860; “Kant’s Life and the Foundations of his Teaching”), which replaced the earlier work of the semi-Kantian Ernst Reinhold, son of the more notable Jena scholar mentioned above (published 1828–30), and especially that of the outstanding historian of philosophy Johann Eduard Erdmann (published 1834–53). In 1865 the imperative “Zurück nach Kant!” (“Back to Kant!”) reverberated through the celebrated work of the young epistemologist Otto Liebmann, Kant und die Epigonen (“Kant and his Followers”), which was destined to extricate their spirits from the positivistic morass and, at the same time, to divert the Germans from Romantic idealism.
Epistemological Neo-Kantianism
The empiricist, logistic, and realistic schools can be classed as epistemological.
Empiricist Neo-Kantianism was represented by the erudite pioneering physicist and physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz and, in part, by Friedrich Albert Lange, author of a famous study of materialism. Helmholtz found support in Kant for his claim, first, that, although perception can represent an external thing, it usually does so in a way far removed from an actual description of its properties; second, that space and time comprise an empirical framework created for thought by the perceiving subject; and, third, that causality is an a priori law allowing the philosopher to infer a reality that is absolutely unknowable. Similarly, Lange reduced science to the phenomenal level and repudiated the thing-in-itself.
Logistic Neo-Kantianism, as represented in the most well-known and flourishing school of Kantianism, that at Marburg, originated with Hermann Cohen, successor of Lange, who, in Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871; “Kant’s Theory of Experience”), argued that the transcendental subject is not to be regarded as a psychic being but as a logical function of thought that constructs both the form and the content of knowledge. Nothing is gegeben (“given”), he urged; all is aufgegeben (“propounded,” like a riddle) to thought—as when, in the infinitesimal calculus, the analyst generates motion by imagining thin slices of space and time and adding up their areas. Hence, experience is a perfect construction of humankind’s logical spirit. Cohen’s example inspired many authors, among them Cohen’s colleague at Marburg Paul Natorp, who, in his work on the logical foundations of the exact sciences, integrated even psychology into the Marburgian transcendentalism; and Ernst Cassirer, best known for stressing the symbolizing capacities of human beings, who, in his memorable work Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit (1906–20; The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel), transposed this same logisticism into a form that illumines the history of modern philosophy.
Realistic Neo-Kantianism, the third manifestation of epistemological Neo-Kantianism, was represented in the realism of the scientific monist Alois Riehl and of his disciple Richard Hönigswald. Riehl held, in direct opposition to the Marburgian logisticism, that the thing-in-itself participates positively in the constitution of knowledge inasmuch as all perception includes a reference to things outside the subject.
Metaphysical Neo-Kantianism
Ten years after the appearance of the aforementioned groundbreaking book Kant und die Epigonen, its author, Otto Liebmann, introduced the new metaphysical approach in his book Zu Analysis der Wirklichkeit (1876; “On the Analysis of Reality”), which came near to the Kantianism of Marburg. The Romanticist Johannes Volkelt, in turn, took up the theme of a critical metaphysics and expressed his persisting aspirations toward the Absolute in the claim that, beyond the certainties of subjective consciousness, there exists a new kind of certainty in a transsubjective realm. Subjectivity is, thus, inevitably transcended, just as the sciences are surmounted when they presuppose a metaphysics. The influential spiritual moralist Friedrich Paulsen defended the claim that Kant had always behaved as a metaphysician, even in the Critique of Pure Reason, in spite of the epistemological restrictions that he imposed upon himself—a claim that made an impact that was felt throughout the following century.
Axiological Neo-Kantianism
Inasmuch as the two principal representatives of the axiological interpretation both taught at the University of Heidelberg, this branch is also known as the Southwest German or Baden school. Its initiator was Wilhelm Windelband, esteemed for his “problems” approach to the history of philosophy. The scholar who systematized this position was his successor Heinrich Rickert, who had come from the tradition of Kuno Fischer. Drawing a parallel between the constraints that logic exerts upon thought and those that the sense of ought exerts upon ethical action, these thinkers argued that, while human action must answer to an absolute value (the Good), human thought must answer to a regulative value (the True), which imposes the duty of conforming to it. The Critique of Pure Reason, they held, elaborates this rule—which is not an entity but an imperative, or absolute, charge to act. Rickert regarded the critical endeavour as having been too narrow, since it was suited merely to physics. Actually, he charged, it should be the foundation for all of the sciences of the spirit. The distinctive characteristic of this school thus consisted in reintegrating German idealism (as in Fichte and Hegel) into a rather personal Kantianism. Consequently, it succeeded in annexing more than one area of semi-Kantian thought: e.g., “the philosophy of the spiritual sciences” of Wilhelm Dilthey, who held that intellectual life cannot be explained by means of naturalistic causality but only through historical understanding (Verstehen); the “life-philosophy” of the social philosopher Georg Simmel, who deviated from an earlier naturalistic relativism to the espousal of objective values; the “philosophy of value” of the experimental psychologist Hugo Münsterberg, author of one of the earliest systems of values; the “semi-Hegelianism” of Richard Kroner, a philosopher of culture and religion; and the general works of Bruno Bauch, Liebmann’s successor at Jena. All of these philosophers were more or less related to axiological Neo-Kantianism.