At the time of the Morotai and Palau landings, MacArthur was planning to invade Mindanao, southernmost of the large islands in the Philippines. However, naval strikes against the Philippines in September revealed unexpectedly weak Japanese defenses on both Mindanao and Leyte in the central Philippines. It was then proposed that plans be changed to bypass Mindanao and land directly on Leyte. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, then meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff at the Octagon Conference in Quebec, quickly approved the proposed changes, and MacArthur scheduled the Leyte attack for October 20, 1944.

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The first landings in the Leyte area were made on October 17 and 18 when offshore islands in Leyte Gulf were seized. Precisely on schedule, on October 20, four U.S. Army divisions (1st Cavalry, 7th, 24th, and 96th Infantry) poured ashore on the east coast of Leyte, where strong opposition was met at only one of the four division beaches. A vast armada of battleships, carriers, cruisers, and destroyers pounded the area with shells and bombs before the landing and during its early stages.

The Japanese reacted by activating, on October 18, their plan for Operation Sho: four carriers, with a total strength of just over 100 planes, were to move southward to lure the U.S. carrier task force toward them, while a fleet of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, passing in two groups through the San Bernardino and Surigao straits, was to converge on Leyte Gulf to bombard the enemy landing force. The Army and Navy air forces in the theatre were also ordered to attack the invaders, but their actual strength had been reduced to a mere 212 planes by the time of the landing. Vice Adm. Ōhnishi Takijirō, the newly appointed commander in chief of the 1st Air Fleet, finally decided to employ suicidal kamikaze tactics to deal with the crisis.

A powerful surface group under the command of Vice Adm. Kurita Takeo, steaming through Palawan Passage on October 23, 1944, was intercepted by U.S. submarines. Two heavy cruisers were sunk and another seriously damaged. On the following day, Kurita’s group was repeatedly pounded by carrier-borne planes and the Musashi, one of the two mightiest battleships of the Japanese Navy, was sunk. Meanwhile, the group under the command of Vice Adm. Nishimura Shoji was ambushed in Surigao Strait by a force of the U.S. 7th Fleet under the command of Rear Adm. Jesse B. Oldendorf and was virtually annihilated.

The tactic of luring the main U.S. carrier force to the north did achieve some measure of success. On October 25, when Kurita’s force entered the Pacific through San Bernardino Strait, it unexpectedly sighted a U.S. escort carrier force and inflicted heavy damage. On the same day, Ōhnishi’s air force made the first kamikaze attack upon the same U.S. group. But meanwhile Vice Adm. Ozawa’s force itself was caught by the main U.S. force under Halsey, and in all, four carriers, a light cruiser, and two destroyers were sunk. Kurita abandoned the original intention of forcing his way into Leyte Gulf and withdrew. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was a disaster for the Japanese Navy. Operation Sho not only failed to inflict serious damage on the enemy, but resulted in significant losses, the total coming to three battleships, one large carrier, three light carriers, six heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, and 11 destroyers. The United States lost one light carrier, two escort carriers, and several other vessels.

Despite their huge naval losses, the Japanese were determined to hold Leyte, and after the naval battle they started sending reinforcements to the island while continuing aerial attacks against Allied shipping in Leyte Gulf. During October 1944 too few Japanese reinforcements arrived to have much effect upon operations, and the U.S. X Corps drove rapidly up Leyte Valley to the north coast while the XXIV Corps pushed inland and sent one division overland to the southwest coast. Bad weather and strong Japanese reinforcements—the equivalent of two and a half divisions by late November—slowed the 6th Army’s advances during November and December, while the Japanese defended the Ormoc Valley and the mountainous interior. MacArthur therefore found it necessary to reinforce the 6th Army, and during November the U.S. 11th Airborne Division, the 32nd Infantry Division, and a separate cavalry regimental combat team reached the island. Both the X and XXIV Corps maintained heavy pressure on all fronts to keep the Japanese off balance and to prevent them from organizing strong, coordinated counterattacks.

Japanese reinforcements continued to arrive at Ormoc, on the northwest coast, despite staggering losses of ships and troops through Allied air and naval attacks. The Japanese even tried some abortive airborne assaults which accomplished little. To prevent further reinforcements from reaching the island, MacArthur sent the 77th Infantry Division (which had reached Leyte late in November 1944) on a shore-to-shore movement from the east coast to Ormoc, near which town the division landed on December 7. Ormoc fell three days later and the 77th Division pushed up the Ormoc Valley to establish contact with the X Corps units fighting their way southward. This contact marked the end of the strongest organized resistance on Leyte and the island was declared secured on Christmas Day, 1944.

The 6th Army, in order to prepare for future operations, turned over the task of mopping up to the 8th Army, and the XXIV Corps was relieved by the Americal Division. American and Filipino troops fought against the 20,000 Japanese left on Leyte for the rest of the year. Mopping up operations actually continued into 1945 until almost 75,000 Japanese had been killed or captured. Even before Leyte was cleared of enemy forces, the 6th Army had started to move toward the next objective, the island of Luzon.