The New Testament tradition of the covenant

The cup of wine at the Last Supper of Jesus and his disciples before Jesus’ crucifixion is identified in all New Testament sources as the (new) covenant by Jesus himself, but in spite of millennia-long controversy, theological elaboration, and discussion, the nature and meaning of the covenant has never been adequately understood historically, and the variety of interpretations regarding covenant in the New Testament itself indicates that very early in the tradition it had become a problem. Here it is possible only to indicate some significant associations that might explain why it was called a “covenant” and how the ancient Sinaitic tradition was radically renewed but the basic structure retained.

First, it has been noted that a most important aspect of covenant traditions common to most ancient cultures was the ritual identification of the oath taker with the sacrificial victim. The identification of the bread and the wine with the body and blood of Christ at the Last Supper apparently was interpreted in this sense, so that the subsequent death of the victim entails the symbolic death—the ultimate curse for breach of covenant—of all those who were thus identified with the victim. Consequently, the curses of the law were nullified. The death of Jesus thus becomes in the Christian proclamation the centre of the historical narrative—the historical prologue of the covenant—leading up to the covenant enactment, or the sacramentum, to use the Latin term of the early church, which in secular use at that time meant primarily the soldier’s oath of loyalty to the emperor (see above Late Bronze Age developments). The Christian covenant was thus a highly complex historical act that brought about a relationship of the believer to Christ whose (normally) unseen glory was identified with that of God himself, whose Lordship was viewed as operational in history, and whose community (of believers) was identified with the Kingdom (Dominion or Rule) of God. If the Old Testament demonstrated that God could rule without kings, then the New Testament demonstrated that God could rule without the elaborate structure of the accumulated legal traditions. They were regarded as valuable for edification and for warning but no longer as having binding validity. The anathema, or curse, was no longer tied to the definitions of legal violation but rather to rejection of God’s rule in Christ. The community in turn was no longer the lineal descent group with a parochial ritual tradition but the assembly (ekklēsia) of those who had through the covenant accepted a relationship to the dominion of Christ.

The obligations could not, in the New Testament viewpoint, be again defined in legal terms, nor could they be enforced by social power structures, which could deal only with external formal acts, not with the basic springs of behaviour, such as love or hate. The content of obligation was thus not defined; instead, in the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew) and other New Testament literature, it is the criteria (motivations, ethical norms, personality traits) by which the rule of God is recognized upon which the emphasis falls. The presumption is that anyone who is capable of recognizing the rule of God in his experience in society will also be capable of understanding what the nature of his obligation will be in specific circumstances. The curses and blessings alike are then postponed until the final judgment. The motivations of fear of punishment and hope of reward are irrelevant to the daily routine of ethical choice, which is thus not only possible (i.e., not prescribed in advance by legal definition) but unavoidable and also necessary to make responsible ethical decisions in a world that is characterized by cultural diversity and change.

The post-apostolic church

Covenant concepts in early Christian theology apparently centred on the transferrence of the Davidic covenant to the Messianic figure—i.e., Christ. The fundamental theological problem of the early church was to validate the authority of Christ against both paganism and Judaism and to maintain the authority of the new religious community. After the great theologian St. Augustine of Hippo (354–430), little attention was given to covenants until the Reformation in the 16th century. Though Martin Luther (1483–1546) referred to and discussed the biblical covenants, it was never of particular importance to his theology. It is rather in Reformed theology, particularly that of John Calvin (1509–64) and the later Puritans of the 17th century, that its further elaboration took place. One aspect of the use of covenant may be cited in the famed Mayflower Compact of November 11, 1620 (drawn up by the Pilgrims, Separatists from the Church of England) by which a “civil body politic” was formed that would in turn enact laws and offices for the general good.

The theological elaboration of covenant in Puritan and Separatist theology centred on the themes of election, grace, and Baptism. It is curiously ironic that covenant enactment, such as the Mayflower Compact, became historically operative but remained essentially secular, while the religious covenant became predominantly a theological concept associated particularly with Baptism—the ritual means by which a person became a participant in the covenant of grace. The essential elements in the biblical covenant—i.e., that of free, voluntary acceptance of ethical obligation on the basis of and as response to past experience—has virtually always given way to covenant as fixed religious dogma that legitimizes the social structure. Covenant historically has been a means by which new communities are formed, particularly in times of rapid change, social dislocation, or political breakdown. Covenants have rarely been the actual instruments by which societies actually functioned for long, but they are extremely frequent as ideological foundations for sociopolitical legitimacy.