- Key People:
- John Henry Wigmore
A comparison of the principles of evidence under different legal traditions can best be made by examining the rights and obligations of the plaintiff and the defendant in civil proceedings and of the prosecutor and the accused in criminal proceedings. The position of the judge is also crucial. Historically, two systems developed.
The first, which follows what may be called the inquisitorial principle, had its origins in medieval Roman-canonical proceedings. It is distinguished by the active part played by the judge, who, by virtue of his office, himself searches for the facts, listens to witnesses and experts, examines documents, and orders the taking of evidence. In continental European countries and those other countries that derive their law from them, this system has generally been retained for criminal proceedings. The prosecutor and the accused, of course, give their recital of the facts and indicate their evidence for specific assertions. But, by virtue of his role in the case, the judge must make further investigations if he deems them necessary to obtain the truth. In some western European countries, there is a definite inclination toward employing this inquisitorial system in all legal proceedings that have, or could have, a substantial public legal impact—e.g., matrimonial, status, administrative, social, labour, and financial matters.
The second system, which employs what are usually called accusatorial or adversary principles, is used in the common-law countries for all civil and criminal cases. In this system, the parties and their attorneys are primarily responsible for finding and presenting evidence. The judge does not himself investigate the facts. Only if the efforts of the parties are incomplete must the judge make inquiries with regard to questions that have remained unanswered.
In civil matters, most continental European countries follow a mixed system of both inquisitorial and adversarial principles. In some of these countries, the judge can, for example, hear witnesses who have not been designated by the parties, and in all countries he can, by virtue of his office, hear the parties and experts and order documentary evidence or the actual inspection of evidence. In contrast to criminal cases, the continental European judge is always bound by the motions and assertions of the parties.
Oral proceedings
Under both systems of presenting and obtaining evidence, oral proceedings are generally accepted. The written proceedings favoured during the Middle Ages have been abolished, although the parties prepare their lawsuits through briefs, and parts of the preliminary proceedings can be handled in writing. The interrogation of witnesses, however, is oral. Most civil-law countries do not permit any exceptions, while other countries, such as Germany, permit written statements by witnesses in special cases and with the consent of the parties. In the common-law countries an exception is made to the principle of oral proceedings for certain types of affidavits, and, particularly in civil cases, the practice has steadily gained in importance.
Direct interrogation of witnesses by the deciding court is an aspect of the law of evidence closely connected with oral proceedings. Generally, in continental European countries, witnesses are interrogated by the judges who decide the verdict, but a number of countries have an investigation procedure according to which another judge, or only one member of the judging body, interrogates the witnesses. Under both the inquisitorial and the accusatorial systems, the principle of direct interrogation is of special importance in the free consideration of evidence. In the common-law countries the function performed by the judge in this regard is handled by attorneys for the prosecution or defense, with the judge’s role restricted almost entirely to overseeing the questioning.
One major influence that has shaped the law of evidence has been the jury system. At least one writer has said that the law of evidence is the child of the jury. Oral proceedings, direct interrogation, and the public trial are much less problematic under the Anglo-American system than under the civil-law system to the extent that evidence is heard before the jury. But this system has spawned a large number of regulations for the admissibility of evidence in order to guarantee due process and fair procedure and to protect the jury from being misled. The initiative of the parties determines the handling of these regulations, for they must raise objections if, in their opinion, any of the numerous exclusionary rules is being violated. The judge then rules on the objection. By the complex working of this arrangement, the Anglo-American system has become more formalistic in many respects than the continental European system.
The burden of proof
The burden of proof is a manifold and somewhat ambiguous concept in the law of evidence.
The burden of producing evidence means that in general the party that cites specific facts for the substantiation of its claim also has the burden of producing the evidence to prove these facts. This burden depends on the substantive law governing the claim. Permissible presumptions and legal rules can shift the burden in various situations.
The burden of conviction, on the other hand, comes into play at the end of the hearing of evidence, if doubts remain. This is simply to recognize that the evidence is not sufficient to convince the jury or the judge and that, in general, the party having the burden of pleading and producing facts favourable to itself and of giving evidence also carries the so-called burden of conviction.
Whereas in civil proceedings it is generally the plaintiff who has the burden of proof for facts supporting a claim, unless this burden has been shifted to the defendant through rules or presumptions, in criminal proceedings it is the prosecution that bears the burden of proof for all relevant facts. What this means is that the defendant cannot be found guilty as long as proof has not been supplied or as long as doubts still remain. In continental European law, no distinction is made between civil and criminal cases with regard to the standard of proof. In both, such a high degree of probability is required that, to the degree that this is possible in the ordinary experience of life itself, doubts are excluded and probability approaches certitude. In the common-law countries the degree of probability required in civil cases is lower than that called for in criminal matters.