executive privilege

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executive privilege, principle in the United States, derived from common law, that provides immunity from subpoena to executive branch officials in the conduct of their governmental duties.

Evolution of the principle of executive privilege

Although the term executive privilege was coined by the administration of Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1950s, privilege claims in the United States have a long tradition within the executive branch. In 1792 the cabinet of Pres. George Washington debated the U.S. Congress’s request to examine documents related to an ill-fated military expedition led by Gen. Arthur St. Clair against Native American tribes. The cabinet debated whether activities or documents related to administrative activities could be withheld from Congress; notes maintained by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson showed that the cabinet was unanimous in its assertion that the president could do so when the public interest was at stake. The papers in question were eventually transmitted to Congress, but Washington went on to (successfully) assert executive privilege on several other occasions.

There is no specific provision in the U.S. Constitution that provides for executive privilege. However, successive administrations have claimed that the principle of executive privilege is implied by the Constitution through the structure of the separation of powers. In addition, the courts have consistently recognized the existence of such a privilege in decisions dating back to the early 19th century. In United States v. Burr (1807), for example, in which Aaron Burr was being tried for treason, the U.S. Supreme Court did not require the Jefferson administration to turn over requested documents, though it did maintain that the courts had the right to request such documents from the executive branch. Because executive privilege is entirely a construction of the courts, some constitutional scholars, such as Raoul Berger in Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth (1974), have argued that such protection simply does not exist.

Executive privilege in law and practice

In common law, executive privilege derives from the concept of “process privilege,” or the protection of administrative officials in the performance of their official responsibilities. The reasoning underlying process privilege is that were administrative officials acting in their official capacities subject to investigation, such a threat would have a chilling effect on the administrative process. As Chief Justice Warren E. Burger wrote in United States v. Nixon (1974), explaining the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in the case involving audiotapes made by the Richard M. Nixon’s White House that were at the centre of the Watergate scandal:

A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions, and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government, and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.

Despite the Supreme Court’s recognition of the principle of executive privilege, it went on to deny Nixon’s privilege claim, holding that to the extent that the tapes involved neither military nor diplomatic secrets, “the President’s generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.” The Supreme Court thus ordered that the tapes be turned over to Leon Jaworski, the special prosecutor.

Court-ordered exceptions to executive privilege include claims made that obstruct the conduct of a criminal investigation or claims made protecting activities that are not part of an official’s governmental responsibilities. It is also possible (albeit not firmly established) that executive privilege claims pertain only to the president and his staff and not to the activities of the executive branch as a whole.

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As a practical matter, because these exceptions can be interpreted to encompass most executive privilege claims, either by criminalizing malfeasance by the administration or by arguing in court that an administration official exceeded his responsibilities, most executive privilege claims are likely to fail in the face of determined opposition. Nevertheless, an executive privilege claim is one way the president can resist congressional oversight or criminal investigations.

In 1997 Pres. Bill Clinton invoked executive privilege in a civil suit in which Paula Jones, a former state employee in Arkansas while Clinton was that state’s governor, alleged sexual harassment by Clinton. Lawyers representing Clinton argued that the president should be immune to civil suits during his time in service. The Supreme Court unanimously denied Clinton’s request. The following year, in a related case, the court also denied a Clinton claim of privilege regarding conversations he had had in the Oval Office with White House advisers (who received federal compensation) concerning the Jones case. The court relied heavily on the precedent set in the Nixon tapes case.

During the administration of George W. Bush (2001–09), the president and his staff invoked executive privilege several times. For example, in one case Vice Pres. Dick Cheney refused to turn over to a congressional committee documents related to meetings he had with corporate executives concerning the administration’s energy policies. Congress sued Cheney in the federal courts, but the vice president prevailed. The Supreme Court found that the request for documents was overly broad and that the potential infraction did not rise to the level of criminality. In another instance, however, White House attorney Harriet Miers and White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten refused to respond to a congressional subpoena concerning the firing of several federal prosecutors alleged to have been unsupportive of Bush administration policies. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ordered Miers and Bolten to comply. (Miers subsequently was deposed by the House Judiciary Committee in a closed session in June 2009, after the Bush administration had left office. Bolton continued to demur.)

With the judiciary often ruling against executive privilege, the principle is intact in theory but tattered in practice.

Dan Franklin