history of Uganda

Growth of a peasant economy

Early in the 20th century Sir James Hayes Sadler, who succeeded Johnston as commissioner, concluded that the country was unlikely to prove attractive to European settlers. Sadler’s own successor, Sir Hesketh Bell, announced that he wished to develop Uganda as an African state. In this he was opposed by a number of his more senior officials and in particular by the chief justice, William Morris Carter. Carter was chairman of a land commission whose activities continued until after World War I (1914–18). Again and again the commission urged that provision be made for European planters, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Bell himself had laid the foundations for a peasant economy by encouraging the Africans to cultivate cotton, which had been introduced into the protectorate as a cash crop in 1904. It was mainly because of the wealth derived from cotton that Uganda became independent of a grant-in-aid from the British Treasury in 1914.

In 1914, at the outset of World War I, there were a few skirmishes between the British and Germans on the southwestern frontier, but Uganda was never in danger of invasion. The war, however, did hinder the country’s development. Soon after the war it was decided that the protectorate authorities should concentrate, as Bell had suggested, on expanding African agriculture, and Africans were encouraged to grow coffee in addition to cotton. The British government’s decision to forbid the alienation of land in freehold, and the economic depression of the early 1920s, dealt a further blow to the hopes of European planters. The part to be played by Europeans, as well as Asians, was now mainly on the commercial and processing side of the protectorate’s agricultural industry.

As the output of primary produce increased, it became necessary to extend and improve communications. Just before World War I a railway had been built running northward from Jinja, on Lake Victoria, to Namasagali. In the 1920s a railway from Mombasa, on the Kenyan coast, was extended to Soroti, and in 1931 a rail link was also completed between Kampala, the industrial capital of Uganda, and the coast.

The depression of the early 1930s interrupted Uganda’s economic progress. However, the protectorate’s recovery was more rapid than that of its neighbors, and the later years of the decade were a period of steady expansion.

Political and administrative development of Uganda

In 1921 a Legislative Council was instituted, but its membership was so small (four official and two nonofficial members) that it made little impact on the protectorate. The Indian community, which played an important part in the commercial life of the region, resented the fact that it was not to have equal representation with Europeans on the unofficial side of the council and so refused to participate until 1926. There was no evidence of a desire on the part of the Africans to sit in the council, since the most politically advanced group in the community, the Ganda, regarded its own lukiko as the most important council in the country.

In light of the Africans’ indifference toward the protectorate legislature, it is not surprising that they opposed the suggestion, made in the later 1920s, that there should be some form of closer union between the East African territories. An interest in “tribal” traditions was one source of this opposition, but there was also fear, among Africans as well as Asians, that they would be dominated by Kenya’s European settlers.

An important development was the beginning of government interest in education. The protectorate administration set up an education department in 1925, and, while aid was given to the missionary societies, which had already opened a number of good schools in Buganda, the government also established schools. This led to the gradual replacement of older chiefs (men of strong personality who usually lacked a Western-style education) by younger, Western-educated men who were more capable of carrying out government policy and more amenable to British control. In Buganda, too, the government began to interfere more actively in the kingdom’s affairs in order to increase efficiency. The main result was that the people showed less respect to non-Bugandan chiefs, which caused some of the chiefs to resent the curtailment of their powers.

World War II and its aftermath

During World War II (1939–45) the protectorate faced the task of becoming as self-sufficient as it could. More important for Uganda was the attempt by the governor, Sir Charles Dundas, to reverse his predecessors’ policy and to give more freedom to the factions striving for power in Buganda. The old policy was revived, however, after an outbreak of rioting in 1945. Also in that year the first Africans were nominated to the Legislative Council, and in succeeding years African representation steadily increased. An important step was taken in 1954 when the African council membership increased to 14 out of a total of 28 nonofficial members; the 14 were selected from districts thought to be more natural units of representation than the provinces that had previously existed. In 1955 a ministerial system was introduced, with 5 nonofficial African ministers out of a total of 11. The success of the council was undermined, however, by the erratic participation of Buganda, which viewed a central legislature as a threat to its autonomy. This feeling reinforced the resentment Bugandans harbored after Mutesa II had been deported in 1953 for refusing to cooperate with the protectorate government. He returned two years later as a constitutional ruler, but the rapprochement between Buganda and the protectorate government was lukewarm.

In the immediate postwar years the protectorate administration placed greater emphasis on economic and social development than on political advance. From 1952 the government rapidly expanded secondary education, while legislation was enacted and a loan fund was established to encourage Africans to participate in trade. A relatively ambitious development program was greatly assisted by the high prices realized for cotton and coffee; coffee overtook cotton as Uganda’s most valuable export in 1957. In 1954 a large hydroelectric project was inaugurated at Owen Falls on the Nile near Jinja, and in 1962 a five-year development plan was announced.

Obote’s first presidency and the 1971 coup

By accepting a constitution that conceded what amounted to federal status to Buganda, Obote contrived an unlikely alliance with the Ganda establishment. Together the UPC and KY were able to form a government with Obote as prime minister and with the DP in opposition. Obote agreed to replace the British governor-general by appointing Mutesa II as the country’s first president in an attempt to unify the alliance further, but this move was unsuccessful. Although Obote was able to win over some of the members of the KY and even of the DP so that they joined the UPC, tension grew steadily between the kabaka on the one hand and the UPC on the other. The Ganda leaders particularly resented their inability to dominate a government composed mainly of members of other ethnic groups. There were also divisions within the UPC, because each member of parliament owed his election to local ethnic supporters rather than to his membership in a political party. Those supporters frequently put pressure on their representatives to redress what they saw as an imbalance in the distribution of the material benefits of independence.

Faced with this dissatisfaction among some of his followers and with increasingly overt hostility in Buganda, Obote arrested five of his ministers and suspended the constitution in 1966. Outraged, the Ganda leaders ordered him to remove his government from the kingdom. Obote responded by sending troops under the leadership of Colonel Idi Amin to arrest the kabaka, who escaped to England, where he died in 1969. When Obote imposed a new republican constitution—appointing himself executive president, abolishing all the kingdoms, and dividing Buganda into administrative districts—he also lost the support of the peoples of southwestern Uganda. Internal friction subsequently intensified, fostered by mutual suspicion between the rival groups, by assassination attempts against the president, and by the increasingly oppressive methods employed by the government to silence its critics.

At independence the export economy was flourishing without adversely affecting subsistence agriculture, and the economy continued to improve, largely because of the high demand and high prices for coffee. To answer accusations that the profits from exports did not benefit the producers enough, Obote attempted in 1969 to distribute the benefits from the prospering economy more widely. To this end he published a “common man’s charter,” which focused on removing the last vestiges of feudalism by having the government take a majority holding in the shares of the larger, mainly foreign-owned companies. In order to unite the country more firmly, he also produced a plan for a new electoral system in 1970 that would require successful candidates for parliament to secure votes in constituencies outside their home districts.

These proposals met with a cynical response in some quarters, but the government was overthrown before they could be put into effect. Obote had relied heavily on the loyalty of Amin, but Amin had been building support for himself within the army by recruiting from his own Kakwa ethnic group in the northwest. The army, which had previously been composed of Acholi and their neighbors, Obote’s own Lango people, now became sharply divided. Simultaneously, a rift developed between Obote and Amin, and in January 1971 Amin took advantage of the president’s absence from the country to seize power.

Tyranny under Amin

Amin’s coup was widely welcomed, as there was hope that the country would finally be unified. Several Western countries, including Britain, who feared the spread of communism, were also relieved at Obote’s overthrow: they had become suspicious that his policies were moving to the left. Amin promised a return to civilian government in five years, but problems with his leadership were soon apparent. Amin had little Western-style education and virtually no officer training, so he often resorted to arbitrary violence in order to maintain his position. In one incident, he destroyed the one potential center of effective opposition by a wholesale slaughter of senior army officers loyal to Obote.

To win more general support among the Ugandan population, Amin ordered all Asians who had not taken Ugandan nationality to leave the country in 1972. His move won considerable approval in the country because many Africans believed that they had been exploited by the Asians, who controlled the middle and some of the higher levels of the economy, but the action isolated Uganda from the rest of the world community. Although a few wealthy Ugandans profited from Amin’s actions, the majority of the commercial enterprises formerly owned by Asians were given to senior army officers who rapidly squandered the proceeds and then allowed the businesses to collapse.

Most people in the countryside were able to survive the total breakdown of the economy that followed in the mid- and late 1970s because the fertility of Uganda’s soil allowed them to continue growing food. In the towns an all-pervading black market developed, and dishonesty became the only means of survival. This economic and moral collapse stirred up criticism of the government, and during this period the country experienced several serious coup attempts.

In an attempt to divert attention from Uganda’s internal problems, Amin launched an attack on Tanzania in October 1978. Tanzanian troops, assisted by armed Ugandan exiles, quickly put Amin’s demoralized army to flight and invaded Uganda. With these troops closing in, Amin escaped the capital. A coalition government of former exiles, calling itself the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF), with a former leading figure in the DP, Yusufu Lule, as president, took office in April 1979. Because of disagreement over economic strategy and fear that Lule was promoting the interests of his own Ganda people, he was replaced in June by Godfrey Binaisa, but Binaisa’s term of office was also short-lived. Supporters of Obote plotted Binaisa’s overthrow, and Obote returned to Uganda in May 1980.

Obote’s second presidency

In December 1980 Obote’s party, the UPC, won a majority in highly controversial elections for parliament. The DP leadership reluctantly agreed to act as a constitutional opposition, but Yoweri Museveni, who had played a significant part in the military overthrow of Amin, refused to accept the UPC victory. He and Lule formed an opposition group, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Museveni led the movement’s guerrilla group, the National Resistance Army (NRA), and waged an increasingly effective campaign against the government.

With the support of the International Monetary Fund and other external donors, Obote tried hard to rebuild the economy. Initially his efforts seemed successful, but the extraordinary inflation rate resulting from an entrenched black market system worked against him. It was impossible for urban wage earners to keep pace with rising prices, and salaried civil servants grew frustrated at the government’s inability to increase their pay in line with their needs. In addition, the guerrilla war drew strength from the fact that it was based in Buganda, among people already suspicious of Obote. That strength grew as an ill-paid, ill-disciplined, and vengeful army, consisting largely of Acholi and Lango, ravaged the countryside for loot and took vengeance on their longtime Ganda enemies.

A split within the army itself—in particular, between its Acholi and Lango members—led to Obote’s overthrow and exile in 1985 and to the seizure of power by an Acholi general, Tito Okello. This, however, could not prevent a victory for Museveni’s NRA, and Museveni became president on January 29, 1986. While a new constitution was being drafted, an indirectly elected National Resistance Council, dominated by the NRM, acted as the national legislature.

Museveni in office

Domestic affairs

Faced with the same problems that had confronted the UNLF in 1979 and Obote in 1980, Museveni announced a policy of moral as well as economic reconstruction, although it was not easy to enforce. Sporadic military resistance to the new government continued, particularly in the north and east. Arms were plentiful, and dissatisfied persons were willing to use them to promote their ends. The NRA, despite the president’s injunctions, sometimes proved as heavy-handed in dealing with opponents as Obote’s forces had been.

Security did improve, however, at least in most of central, southern, and western Uganda, and observers claimed that human rights were more widely protected. A constitutional amendment in 1993 led to the restoration of the monarchies, and the Ganda, Toro, Bunyoro, and Soga crowned their traditional rulers. The new constitution was promulgated in 1995, and presidential elections were held in May 1996; Museveni easily won the majority of votes. He was reelected in 2001.

During the 1990s and continuing into the 2000s, Uganda faced an increase in rebel activity, particularly from the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony. Established in the late 1980s, the LRA abducted and enslaved tens of thousands of children to serve as servants or soldiers in its fight against Museveni’s government. Its vicious attacks on civilians in the northern part of the country—including rape, murder, and acts of mutilation, such as cutting off the ears, noses, lips, and limbs of their victims—terrorized and displaced more than one million Ugandans, creating a humanitarian crisis in the early 2000s. After years of refusal, the LRA agreed to meet with government officials for peace talks in late December 2004. However, the talks broke down in early 2005, and the LRA resumed their brutal attacks on civilians. Peace talks resumed in July 2006, and although a cease-fire agreement was reached in late August, talks again broke down, and negotiations to end the decades-old conflict continued intermittently. In late 2008 Uganda began a joint military operation with armed forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and southern Sudan (now South Sudan) to target LRA bases in the DRC. The campaign’s goals were to capture or kill Kony and to destroy the organization’s command structure. The operation was poorly executed, however, and ultimately failed. Kony escaped, and the LRA, which dispersed throughout the northeastern DRC and into Sudan and the Central African Republic, continued its acts of terror in those countries.

Although the country’s continued economic growth was praised by the West, inflation and unemployment continued to be problems in the early 2000s, especially given Uganda’s dependence on fluctuating markets for its agricultural produce. In an effort to enhance economic activity in the region, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya launched the East African Community Customs Union on January 1, 2005; they were joined by Burundi and Rwanda in 2009. Oil discoveries beginning in the first decade of the 2000s also bolstered economic prognostications for Uganda.

Meanwhile, in a referendum in 2005, Ugandan voters overwhelmingly endorsed a return to multiparty politics. Museveni, who had long argued against a multiparty democracy on the premise that it would divide the country along ethnic lines, embraced the referendum and accepted the results in the face of pressure from international donors. The next year the country held its first multiparty elections since 1980. A constitutional amendment that eliminated existing presidential term limits, also passed in 2005, allowed Museveni to stand in the 2006 presidential election. Representing the NRM, he was reelected, although the contest was clouded by allegations that Kizza Besigye, the leader of the opposition group Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), was imprisoned in the months leading up to the presidential election to stop him from participating. Besigye was ultimately released in January 2006 and able to stand for election in February, and, although he lost, he managed to garner almost two-fifths of the vote.

Museveni and Besigye were the two front-runners in the 2011 presidential election as well, in which Museveni was reelected with 68 percent of the vote. Besigye, who took 26 percent of the vote, rejected the results. The basis of his rejection was supported by observations of international monitors, who cited an increased military presence on voting day as being intimidating and noted that too many voters were disenfranchised. They also noted instances of ruling party members giving money and gifts to election officials and others, actions construed as bribery.

Corruption, long a problem in the country, continued to be an issue. Although much appeared to be done to combat it, in reality very little was accomplished in the fight against graft. A former head of the country’s Anti-Corruption Court complained that only low-level cases were being tried and that high-ranking perpetrators of corrupt practices went unpunished.

In the years before the 2016 elections, there was speculation as to whether Museveni would once again be the NRM’s presidential candidate; there was also speculation that he was grooming his son, Brigadier Muhoozi Kainerugaba, to succeed him. His desire to run again appeared to be confirmed in part in 2014, when he sacked Amama Mbabazi, the prime minister. Mbabazi had been a longtime ally of Museveni but was also seen as the second most powerful political figure in the NRM and a strong contender for the presidential nomination. In early 2015 Mbabazi announced his intent to challenge Museveni for the NRM presidential nomination but later said that he would instead run as an independent candidate, citing what he claimed were attempts by the NRM to block his efforts.

Museveni faced seven challengers for the presidency in the February 18, 2016, elections, the foremost being Besigye and Mbabazi. Museveni was declared the winner, with about 60 percent of the vote. Besigye, his nearest challenger, received about 35 percent, and Mbabazi took less than 1.5 percent of the vote. Museveni’s victory was announced amid complaints of missing materials that delayed voting in opposition strongholds and allegations of voting irregularities. Some international observers criticized the atmosphere surrounding the vote, citing a climate of fear and intimidation; they also condemned the repeated detainment of Besigye by the police and noted problems with the transparency of the vote. Besigye, the FDC, and others declared the results to be fraudulent. In March Mbabazi filed a petition with the Supreme Court, seeking to have the presidential election result declared null because of the alleged widespread irregularities. Later that month the Supreme Court dismissed his petition. The court acknowledged that there was evidence that some irregularities had occurred but stated that it did not believe the issues cited by Mbabazi had substantially affected the result of the election. Meanwhile, in parliamentary elections, also held in February, the NRM retained more than a two-thirds majority of the body’s seats.

In late 2017, after contentious debate, Parliament voted to amend the constitution in order to remove the presidential age limit of 75 years as well as to reinstate the limit of two terms; this would allow Museveni, then 73, to stand in the next two presidential elections. Although the amendment was challenged in the courts, it was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in 2019.

As expected, Museveni was the NRM candidate in the 2021 presidential election. There were 10 other candidates, though perennial opposition leader Besigye was not among them; he opted not to run this time. Museveni’s most formidable challenger was the leader of the National Unity Platform (NUP), 38-year-old lawmaker and entertainer Robert Kyagulanyi, who was popularly referred to as Bobi Wine. The campaign period prior to the election took place when COVID-19 pandemic restrictive measures were in force. It was also clouded by the repressive actions by government security forces, which frequently dispersed opposition rallies or protests—ostensibly to enforce COVID rules on gatherings, though critics noted that NRM rallies were not targeted in a similar manner. Notably, Wine was arrested or detained multiple times for allegedly having violated COVID lockdown measures while campaigning. One such arrest, in November 2020, led to protests by his supporters; security forces killed more than 50 people and injured many others as they broke up the crowds. In addition, government forces restricted media coverage of opposition leaders and their campaigns. There were also reports of opposition supporters being abducted.

The election was held on January 14, 2021. In contrast to previous elections, there were very few international monitors approved to observe proceedings. The Electoral Commission announced that Museveni had won the election, receiving more than 58 percent of the vote; Wine was said to have received about 35 percent. Soon after Wine had voted, he was kept under house arrest, which impacted his ability to meet with other party leaders to appeal the results—especially crucial given the narrow window of time after an election in which an appeal to the results was allowed to be filed. The High Court ordered his release on January 25. A week later Wine filed a petition with the Supreme Court to have the election results overturned; he cited the harassment of his supporters and alleged that there was overwhelming evidence of fraud. Weeks later though, he withdrew his challenge, claiming the court was biased; he noted that the court rejected his attempts to provide additional evidence to support his claims of fraudulent activity. Meanwhile, parliamentary elections, also held in January, saw the NRM once again winning by far the most seats, about two-thirds. Wine’s NUP won about one-tenth of the parliamentary seats, making it the next largest party in Parliament after the NRM.

The campaign and election period of 2020–21, as well as two years prior to that, was in the spotlight in March 2022. That month Human Rights Watch released a report about government forces unlawfully detaining and torturing opposition-party supporters and critics of the government.