- Key People:
- Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze
- Theodor Julius Geiger
It has been said that ideology transformed international relations in the 20th century—in appearance at least. Earlier centuries experienced dynastic wars, national, civil, and imperial wars, and diplomacy designed to further national security or national expansion or to promote mutual advantages and general peace. Such factors, indeed, appeared to govern international relations until recent times. International relations during most of the 20th century were seemingly dominated by the exigencies of “-isms”: wars were fought, alliances were made, and treaties were signed because of ideological considerations. The balance of power in the world was a balance weighted by ideological commitment. “The communist bloc” confronted “the free peoples,” and in the “Third World” emergent nations cultivated a nationalist, anticolonialist ideology in their search for identity and their efforts to achieve modernity.
But this is not to assert that ideological wars, or ideological diplomacy, were entirely new. What became the most conspicuous element in 20th-century international relations—so conspicuous that other elements were often entirely ignored—was present, to a lesser degree, in earlier international relations. It is necessary here to distinguish between the actual events of history and the interpretations that are put on history, for some events lend themselves more readily than others to an ideological interpretation. The ideological perspective became increasingly significant as the general public came to play a role in considering questions of war and peace. When questions of defense and diplomacy were settled by kings and their ministers and wars were fought by professional soldiers and sailors, the public was not expected to have any opinion about international relations, and in such a situation there was little place for ideology.
Ideology in the World Wars
In the course of World War I, however, a new element appeared to have been introduced. The war was seen by those who experienced it as being in its early stages a national war of the traditional kind, and as such it was not at first expected to assume any profoundly disturbing form. Each combatant people viewed itself as fighting for king and country in a just war. But by 1916 the Allies were being urged to think of their endeavour as a war “to make the world safe for democracy,” and the Germans, on their side, were correspondingly encouraged to visualize the war as a struggle of “culture” against “barbarism.” On both sides, the casualties were far more terrible than anyone had foreseen, and the need to sustain the will to war by an appeal to ideology was plainly felt by all the nations involved. Whether such “war aims” were really the main objectives of the governments concerned is another question; what is important is that, as the need was increasingly felt for a justification of war, the justification took an ideological form. Whether or not World War I changed its real nature between 1914 and 1918, the prevailing conception of it underwent significant alteration. This became more marked after the Russian Revolution of 1917, when the Bolsheviks submitted to harsh German peace terms for reasons that were not only practical but ideological—namely, the preservation and promotion of communism. Pres. Woodrow Wilson took the United States into the war on the Allied side with an alternative ideological vision—that of ensuring permanent peace through the League of Nations and of establishing democratic governments in all the conquered countries.
The rise of communism clearly marked a corresponding increase in the role of ideology in international relations. Fascism helped to speed the process. The Spanish Civil War of the 1930s was an almost clear-cut confrontation between the ideologies of left and right (not entirely clear-cut because of the ambiguous relationship between communism and anarchism).
The precise extent of ideological commitment in World War II is a matter of some controversy. At one level, the 1939 war is seen as a continuation of the war of 1914. Two of the leading protagonists—Great Britain and the United States—agreed more in their anti-ideological stance and their hostility to Nazism than in promoting an alternative ideology. Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt, suspicious of British and French imperialism and eager to cultivate a progressive ideological outlook, was critical of Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s politics, hostile toward Charles de Gaulle’s, but surprisingly tolerant of Joseph Stalin’s. The revival of Wilson’s idealistic war aims in the Atlantic Charter provided a basis for a kind of general ideological union of the Allies. But such formulations proved to be of small significance compared with the profound ideological commitment of the Soviet Union to communism, and that of the United States to an international position more ideologically anticommunist than pro anything.