just war

just war, notion that the resort to armed force (jus ad bellum) is justified under certain conditions; also, the notion that the use of such force (jus in bello) should be limited in certain ways. Just war is a Western concept and should be distinguished from the Islamic concept of jihad (Arabic: “striving”), or holy war, which in Muslim legal theory is the only type of just war.

Rooted in Classical Roman and biblical Hebraic culture and containing both religious and secular elements, just war first coalesced as a coherent body of thought and practice during the Middle Ages as a by-product of canon law and theology, the ideas of jus naturale (Latin: “natural law”) and jus gentium (Latin: “law of nations”) from Roman law, established practices of statecraft, and the chivalric code. The canonists drew together existing Christian traditions on the justification of war and on noncombatant immunity, ideas later developed by various Christian theologians; and the chivalric code contributed further to the idea of noncombatant immunity and also added restraints on the means of war. Rationales for war based on Christian ethics can be found in the writings of theologians, such as St. Augustine (354–430) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1224/25–1274), whose Summa Theologiae (1265/66–1273) outlined the justifications for war and discussed the acts it is permissible to commit in wartime. Secular theorists include the Roman jurist and philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 bc), who argued that legitimate wars must be openly declared, have a just cause, and be conducted justly. The Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) maintained in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625; On the Law of War and Peace) that war is justifiable only if a country faces imminent danger and the use of force is both necessary and proportionate to the threat.

Most scholars agree that, to be considered just, a war must meet several jus ad bellum requirements. The four most important conditions are: (1) the war must be declared openly by a proper sovereign authority (e.g., the governing authority of the political community in question); (2) the war must have a just cause (e.g., defense of the common good or a response to grave injustice); (3) the warring state must have just intentions (i.e., it must wage the war for justice rather than for self-interest); and (4) the aim of the war must be the establishment of a just peace. Since the end of World War II it has become customary to add three other conditions: (1) there must be a reasonable chance of success; (2) force must be used as a last resort; and (3) the expected benefits of war must outweigh its anticipated costs.

Since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years’ War, there has been a concerted effort in international law to develop binding laws of war and military codes of conduct. Since the 1860s these have increasingly taken the form of written rules governing the conduct of war, including rules of engagement for national military forces, the Geneva Conventions (1864–1949) and their protocols (1977), and various treaties, agreements, and declarations limiting the means allowable in war. Contemporary moral debate often has centred on jus in bello issues—especially the question of whether the use of nuclear weapons is ever just. The Hague Convention (1899 and 1907) and the Geneva Conventions attempted to regulate conflict and the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians by imposing international standards. Three principles established by the conventions generally govern conduct during war: (1) targets should include only combatants and legitimate military and industrial complexes; (2) combatants should not use unjust methods or weapons (e.g., torture and genocide); and (3) the force used should be proportionate to the end sought.

Since the end of the Cold War, several international military interventions were undertaken to put an end to perceived human rights abuses (e.g., in Somalia and in Yugoslavia in the 1990s). As a result of the increased attention paid to human rights abuses and the significant growth in international human rights law, the traditional notion that a head of state enjoys sovereign immunity for human rights abuses committed by the armed forces of his country has been challenged. Correspondingly, since the 1990s many just-war theorists have argued that the need to end and punish such abuses constitutes a just cause for the use of military force and that the intention to do so well expresses the just-war aim of responding to serious injustice and reestablishing peace. As yet, however, there is no consensus among just-war theorists on these matters, and their implications for international law remain to be seen.