The previous discussion concentrated on only one of the controversies that surround scientific realism, the debate about whether talk of unobservables should have the same status as talk of observables. Contemporary exchanges, however, are often directed at a broader issue: the possibility of judging whether any claim at all is true. Some of these exchanges involve issues that are as old as philosophy—very general questions about the nature and possibility of truth. Others arise from critiques of traditional philosophy of science that are often inspired by the work of Kuhn but are more radical.

Many people, including many philosophers, find it natural to think of truth as correspondence to reality. The picture they endorse takes human language (and thought) to pick out things and properties in a mind-independent world and supposes that what people say (or think) is true just in case the things they pick out have the properties they attribute to them. A deep and ancient conundrum is how words (or thoughts) manage to be connected with determinate parts of nature. It is plainly impossible for human beings ever to occupy a position from which they could observe simultaneously both their language (thought) and the mind-independent world and establish (or ascertain) the connection. That impossibility led many thinkers (including Kuhn, in a rare but influential discussion of truth) to wonder whether the idea of truth as correspondence to mind-independent reality makes sense.

The issues here are complex and reach into technical areas of metaphysics and the philosophy of language. Some philosophers maintain that a correspondence theory of truth can be developed and defended without presupposing any absurd Archimedean point from which correspondences are instituted or detected. Others believe that it is a mistake to pursue any theory of truth at all. To assert that a given statement is true, they argue, is merely another way of asserting the statement itself. Fine elaborated this idea further in the context of the philosophy of science, proposing that one should accept neither realism nor antirealism; rather, one should give up talking about truth in connection with scientific hypotheses and adopt what he calls the “natural ontological attitude.” To adopt that attitude is simply to endorse the claims made by contemporary science without indulging in the unnecessary philosophical flourish of declaring them to be “true.”

These sophisticated proposals and the intricate arguments urged in favour of them contrast with a more widely accessible critique of the idea of “scientific truth” that also starts from Kuhn’s suspicion that the idea of truth as correspondence to mind-independent reality makes no sense. Inspired by Kuhn’s recognition of the social character of scientific knowledge (a paradigm is, after all, something that is shared by a community), a number of scholars proposed a more thoroughly sociological approach to science. Urging that beliefs acclaimed as “true” or “false” be explained in the same ways, they concluded that truth must be relativized to communities: a statement counts as true for a community just in case members of that community accept it. (For an account of this view in the context of ethics, see ethical relativism.)

The proposal for a serious sociology of scientific knowledge should be welcomed. As the sociologists David Bloor and Barry Barnes argued in the early 1970s, it is unsatisfactory to suppose that only beliefs counted as incorrect need social and psychological explanation. For it would be foolish to suggest that human minds have some attraction to the truth and that cases in which people go astray must be accounted for in terms of the operation of social or psychological biases that interfere with this natural aptitude. All human beliefs have psychological causes, and those causes typically involve facts about the societies in which the people in question live. A comprehensive account of how an individual scientist came to some novel conclusion would refer not only to the observations and inferences that he made but to the ways in which he was trained, the range of options available for pursuing inquiries, and the values that guided various choices—all of which would lead, relatively quickly, to aspects of the social practice of the surrounding community. Barnes and Bloor were right to advocate symmetry, to see all beliefs as subject to psychological and sociological explanation.

But nothing momentous follows from this. Consistent with the emphasis on symmetry, as so far understood, one could continue to draw the everyday distinction between those forms of observation, inference, and social coordination that tend to generate correct beliefs and those that typically lead to error. The clear-eyed observer and the staggering drunkard may both come to believe that there is an elephant in the room, and psychological accounts may be offered of the belief-formation process in each case. This does not mean, of course, that one is compelled to treat the two belief-forming processes as on a par, viewing them as equally reliable in detecting aspects of reality. So one can undertake the enterprise of seeking the psychological and social causes of scientific belief without abandoning the distinction between those that are well-grounded and those that are not.

Sociological critiques of “scientific truth” sometimes try to reach their radical conclusions by offering a crude analogue of Laudan’s historical argument against scientific realism. They point out that different contemporary societies hold views that are at variance with Western scientific doctrines; indigenous Polynesian people may have ideas about inheritance, for example, that are at odds with those enshrined in genetics. To insist that Westerners are right and the Polynesians wrong, it is suggested, is to overlook the fact of “natural rationality,” to suppose that there is a difference in psychological constitution that favours Westerners.

But this reasoning is fallacious. Sometimes differences in people’s beliefs can be explained by citing differences in their sensory faculties or intellectual acumen. Such cases, however, are relatively rare. The typical account of why disagreement occurs identifies differences in experiences or interests. Surely this is the right way to approach the divergence of Westerners and Polynesians on issues of heredity. To hold that Western views on this particular topic are more likely to be right than Polynesian views is not to suppose that Westerners are individually brighter (in fact, a compelling case can be made for thinking that, on average, people who live in less-pampered conditions are more intelligent) but rather to point out that Western science has taken a sustained collective interest in questions of heredity and that it has organized considerable resources to acquire experiences that Polynesians do not share. So, when one invokes the “ultimate argument for realism” and uses the success of contemporary molecular genetics to infer the approximate truth of the underlying ideas about heredity, one is not arrogantly denying the natural rationality of the Polynesians. On the contrary, Westerners should be willing to defer to them on topics that they have investigated and Westerners have not.

Yet another attempt to argue that the only serviceable notion of truth reduces to social consensus begins from the strong Quinean thesis of the underdetermination of theories by experience. Some historians and sociologists of science maintained that choices of doctrine and method are always open in the course of scientific practice. Those choices are made not by appealing to evidence but by drawing on antecedently accepted social values or, in some instances, by simultaneously “constructing” both the natural and the social order. The best versions of these arguments attempt to specify in some detail what the relevant alternatives are; in such cases, as with Kuhn’s arguments about the irresolvability of scientific revolutions, philosophical responses must attend to the details.

Unfortunately, such detailed specifications are relatively rare, and the usual strategy is for the sociological critique to proceed by invoking the general thesis of underdetermination and to declare that there are always rival ways of going on. As noted earlier, however, a blanket claim about inevitable underdetermination is highly suspect, and without it sociological confidence in “truth by consensus” is quite unwarranted.

Issues about scientific realism and the proper understanding of truth remain unsettled. It is important, however, to appreciate what the genuine philosophical options are. Despite its popularity in the history and sociology of science, the crude sociological reduction of truth is not among those options. Yet, like history, the sociological study of science can offer valuable insights for philosophers to ponder.