In Russia the Revolution of 1917 swept away the tsarist civil service. The Communist Party at first held that a strong administrative organization was bound to damage the revolution by dampening spontaneity and other revolutionary virtues. But it soon became clear that a regime dedicated to social engineering, economic planning, and world revolution needed trained administrators. The party fell back, albeit reluctantly, upon the expertise of the more reliable tsarist civil servants. It did, however, surround the new civil service with elaborate controls in an attempt to ensure that its members remained loyal to party directives.
As the Communist Party itself became bureaucratized and as the more enthusiastic revolutionary leaders were eliminated, special industrial academies were set up for party members who had shown administrative talent. With the First Five-Year Plan (1928–32) the status of civil servants was improved, and their conditions of service were made less rigid, even though the party never relaxed its tight system of control over all branches of the state apparatus. In 1935 the State Commission on the Civil Service was created and attached to the Commissariat of Finance with responsibility for ensuring general control of personnel practice. This commission laid down formal patterns of administrative structure, reformed existing bureaucratic practices, fixed levels of staffing, standardized systems of job classification, and eliminated unnecessary functions and staff. The inspectorate of the Ministry of Finance ensured that the commission’s general policies were carried out in the ministries. The commission itself remained under the close supervision of the Council of People’s Commissars to ensure that it complied with party directives, and the commission’s members were appointed directly by the council.
The Soviet commission, unlike those in such countries as Great Britain and the United States, was given no jurisdiction over the recruitment of civil servants, which remained the function of the ministries and agencies. The highest administrative and technical staff members were recruited by each ministry. Each branch of industry and administration had its own training schools, from which it selected qualified students with satisfactory records. On appointment, the student was bonded for a minimum of three years and liable to criminal proceedings if he refused or subsequently relinquished his assignment. At the lower levels of administration, recruitment and job placement were the responsibility of the Commissariat of Labour Reserves.
The Communist Party made determined attempts to recruit higher civil servants as party members. These drives, which followed periodically after the 1930s, went a long way toward transforming the party itself into an administrative and managerial elite and uniting the party and the state administration. The highest levels of the civil service came to constitute an influential apparatus and power centre in their own right. The internal structure of the civil service, moreover, had been fashioned along classic French and German lines; and titles, ranks, insignia, and uniforms officially appeared in various parts of the public services.
China
The People’s Republic of China also illustrated the conflict between revolutionary suspicion of bureaucracy and the need to construct strong administrative machinery in order to attain revolutionary goals. China’s long tradition of bureaucracy remained important even after the Communist Party came to power in 1949. Within a decade the weight of the administration had already led, according to party dogma, to a gap between the elite and the masses and also to excessive stratification among the ruling bureaucrats, or cadres, themselves. There was not only a distinction between “old cadres” and “new cadres,” depending on nothing more substantial than the date of an official’s entry into the revolutionary movement, but also a complex system of job evaluation that divided the civil service into 24 grades, each with its own rank, salary scales, and distinctions. The number of ratings represented very considerable differences of power, prestige, and prerogatives and produced psychological barriers between the highest and lowest grades at least as great and as conspicuous as between the cadres and the masses. These distinctions and discrepancies were widely attacked during the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and ’70s, but they remained deeply ingrained in the administrative structure.
Japan
Until the 17th century, Japan under the shogunate was administered by a military establishment made up of vassals and enfeoffed nobles. After the 1630s a civil bureaucracy developed and began to assume a more important role than the military. Appointment within the bureaucracy was based upon family rank, and officials were loyal primarily to the feudal lord. It was not until after Matthew C. Perry sailed four U.S. warships into Uraga Harbour in 1853, thus forcibly ending more than two centuries of Japan’s isolation from the rest of the world, that the Japanese bureaucracy moved away from feudal rank as the basis of appointments, establishing in its place loyalty to the emperor rather than to feudal lords. Merit appointments were made on a modest scale immediately after Japan was opened to the West, yet it was not until the 1880s, during the Meiji Restoration, that a modern civil service was created on the basis of job security, career paths, and entry by open competition. Tokyo University law graduates tended to dominate this new civil service. Personal allegiance to the emperor was reflected in the status of Japanese civil servants as “Emperor’s Officials.”
After World War II the Allied occupation authorities directed the passage of a Japanese law guaranteeing that all public officials should be servants of the people rather than of the emperor. The National Public Service Law of 1947 set up an independent National Personnel Authority to administer recruitment, promotion, conditions of employment, standards of performance, and job classification for the new civil service. Technically the emperor himself became a civil servant, and detailed regulations brought within the scope of the new law all civil servants from labourers to the prime minister. Civil servants were classified into two groups, the regular service and a special service. Civil servants in the former category entered the service by competitive examination on a standard contract with tenure. The special service included elected officials and political appointees and covered such officials as members of the Diet (legislature), judges, members of the audit boards, and ambassadors.
Although in theory the sovereign people had an inalienable right to choose and dismiss all public officials—who are constitutionally described as “servants of the whole community”—both tradition and political practice allowed the civil service in Japan to retain and consolidate its old position in government. The idealization of the scholar-bureaucrat (a Confucian tradition borrowed from China) made the civil service an independent power centre. Political struggles in the Diet led to constantly changing ministries, and individual ministers rarely stayed at a post long enough to establish firm control of their administration. As in many democratic countries with volatile political systems, administrative control tended to pass to senior civil servants.
Developing nations
Less-developed countries have had to face the opposite problem with their civil services. After World War II many such countries became independent before they had developed effective administrative structures or bodies of trained civil servants. Few of the colonial powers had trained indigenous administrators sufficiently. The British left a viable administrative structure in India and a partly Indianized civil service, but the newly independent Pakistan had few experienced civil servants. The Belgians left the Congo without any trained administrative or technical staff, and for some years there was near anarchy.
Even when they inherited reasonably efficient administrative organizations, the newly independent countries’ politicians frequently proved incapable of fulfilling their supporters’ expectations. Civil servants from the old colonial powers who remained behind often found radical policies and new masters uncongenial. The resulting exodus of many such civil servants worsened matters, for indigenous civil servants were seldom an adequate substitute.
The lack of qualified personnel sometimes led to not only a reduction in efficiency but also a decline in administrative morality. Nepotism, tribalism, and corruption as well as inefficiency in the civil service were difficulties often added to the other trials of independence. In many countries the incapacity of the civil service was a factor leading to military rule, as were the political failings of the elected leaders. Military regimes were frequently the last resort of a country where the civil power failed to cope with the problems of independence. Consequently, the United Nations (UN), in conjunction with the governments of advanced countries, began to develop training programs for civil servants from underdeveloped countries. The first request came from Latin America, which led to the founding of a school of public administration in Brazil, followed in 1953 by an Advanced School of Public Administration for Central America. Various other international organizations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Bank, supported institutions for the training of administrators in less-developed countries. Such institutions included the Arab Planning Institute in Kuwait, the Arab Organization of Administrative Sciences in Jordan, and the Inter-American School of Public Administration in Brazil. Civil servants from less-developed nations also studied administration at such places as the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, the Institute of Local Government Studies in Birmingham, England, and the International Institute of Public Administration in Paris.
After the 1970s the international agencies gave less help toward training, on the assumption—often unrealized—that the less-developed nations would take on greater responsibility themselves. Training also tended to be generalist and academic, leading to acute shortages of trained administrators in specialized fields such as finance and planning. However, organizations such as the British Council began in the early 1980s to remedy some of these deficiencies.
Brian Chapman Edward C. Page