Domestic policies of Frederick II
- Byname:
- Frederick the Great
- German:
- Friedrich der Grosse
- Died:
- August 17, 1786, Potsdam, near Berlin (aged 74)
- Also Known As:
- Frederick the Great
- Friedrich der Grosse
- Title / Office:
- king (1740-1786), Prussia
- House / Dynasty:
- Hohenzollern dynasty
- Notable Family Members:
- father Frederick William I
- sister Wilhelmina
- On the Web:
- BBC Sounds - Frederick the Great of Prussia (Oct. 29, 2024)
In administrative, economic, and social policy Frederick’s attitudes were essentially conservative. Much of what he did in these areas was little more than a development of policies pursued by his father. He justified these policies in terms of the rationalizing rhetoric of “enlightened despotism,” whereas the devoutly Protestant Frederick William I had done so in terms of religious obligation, but many of the objectives, and the means used to attain them, were the same. Frederick, in spite of his appalling personal relationship with his father, admired him as a ruler and freely acknowledged the debt he owed him. “Only his care,” he wrote during the Seven Years’ War, “his untiring work, his scrupulously just policies, his great and admirable thriftiness and the strict discipline he introduced into the army which he himself had created, made possible the achievements I have so far accomplished.”
Like Frederick William I, Frederick thought of kingship as a duty. To him it entailed obligations to be met only by untiring and conscientious work. It was his duty to protect his subjects from foreign attack, to make them prosperous, to give them efficient and honest administration, and to provide them with laws that were simple and adapted to their wants and their particular temperament. In order to achieve these objectives, the ruler must sacrifice his own interests and any purely personal or family feeling. Raison d’état, the needs of the state, took precedence over these and also over the immediate comfort and happiness of his subjects. The ruler could carry out his duties effectively only if he kept the reins of government firmly in his own hands. His rule must be personal. He must not rely on ministers who were likely to be influenced by selfish ambitions or factional feeling and who might well keep important information from their master if they were allowed to. Personal rule alone could produce the unity and consistency essential to any successful policy. In his Anti-Machiavel, a somewhat conventional discussion of the principles of good government published in 1740 just before his accession, Frederick wrote that there were two sorts of princes—those who ruled in person and those who merely relied on subordinates. The former were “like the soul of a state” and “the weight of their government falls on themselves alone, like the world on the back of Atlas,” whereas the second group were mere phantoms. Yet he would have rejected outright, and on the whole with justification, any suggestion that he ruled as a despot. On the contrary, he would have claimed that his power, however great, was exercised only within limits set by law and that the obligations inherent in his position made it impossible for him to govern in an arbitrary way.
Problems of autocracy
The insistence that any effective monarchical rule must be intensely personal had obvious potential dangers. As Frederick grew older, these showed themselves with increasing clarity. His whole psychology was hostile to the development in the Prussian administration or army of any real originality, new ideas, or willingness to take initiatives or accept individual responsibilities. He fostered among those who served him a tendency to play safe and to perform their duties conscientiously but to do no more than that. Under him the Prussian administration was the most honest and hardworking in Europe. Its achievements, however, stemmed from the impetus supplied from above by the king rather than from any creative force inherent in the system itself. The provincial War and Domains Chambers established by Frederick William I in 1722 remained very important, and their number grew from 9 to 12. The General Directory, again created by Frederick William, as the main organ of central government with wide-ranging powers, acquired under Frederick several new departments (for commerce and manufactures in 1740, for mines and metallurgy in 1768, for forestry a few years later) but tended, as the reign went on, to become ossified and to lose a good deal of its former importance. The administration of Silesia after its acquisition in the 1740s was notably efficient, and its resources helped greatly in carrying Frederick through the dark days of the Seven Years’ War. But tradition and continuity rather than innovation were the hallmarks of the Prussian administration under him; many of what new departures there were (for example, an effort in 1770 to introduce a system of state examinations for entry into the civil service) were not very effective. Many of the truly successful innovations were in the judicial system, where the reforming efforts of Samuel von Cocceji resulted in all judges in higher and appellate courts being appointed only after they had passed a rigorous examination. Cocceji also inspired the establishment in 1750 of a new Superior Consistory to supervise church and educational affairs and began the process of legal codification that culminated after Frederick’s death in the issue of the Prussian Common Law (Das Allgemeine Preussische Landrecht) of 1794, one of the most important 18th-century efforts of this kind. Yet Frederick’s unwillingness ever to admit a mistake or change his mind tended, as he grew older, to make the processes of government increasingly rigid and inflexible. The government’s refusal to adapt and adjust, which was already visible during the monarch’s later years, culminated in the Prussian collapse of 1806 before the armies of Napoleon.