- India from the Paleolithic Period to the decline of the Indus civilization
- The development of Indian civilization from c. 1500 bce to c. 1200 ce
- The early Muslim period
- The Mughal Empire, 1526–1761
- The reign of Akbar the Great
- India and European expansion, c. 1500–1858
- British imperial power, 1858–1947
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The careers of some of these potentates, especially Mahadaji Sindhia, illustrate the potency of Mughal symbols even in the phase of Mughal decline. For instance, after recapturing Gwalior from the British, Mahadaji took care to have his control of the town sanctioned by the Mughal emperor. Equally, he zealously guarded the privileges and titles granted to him by Shah ʿĀlam, such as amīr al-umarā (“prince of princes,” or commander-in-chief) and nāʾib wakīl-e muṭlaq (deputy regent). In this he was not alone. Instances in the 18th century of states that wholly threw off all pretense of allegiance to the Mughals are rare. Rather, the Mughal system of honours and titles, as well as Mughal-derived administrative terminology and fiscal practices, spread apace despite the deterioration of imperial power.
The case of Mysore
Theoretically, in the 1720s, the Mughals claimed rights over a far larger area than had ever been the case under Akbar, Jahāngīr, or Shah Jahān. This area included large parts of southern India, over which central rule was never actually consolidated. Taking advantage of their somewhat ambiguous relations with the Mughals and claiming to be the agents of Delhi, the Marathas often made partial claims on the revenues of these areas, as cauth and sardeshmukhi. This was the case, for example, in Mysore in the 1720s and ’30s. Mysore had come under the sovereign umbrella of the Mughals in the late 1690s, as the result of an embassy sent to Aurangzeb by Cikka Deva Raja Vadiyar, the ruler of Mysore at the time. In effect, this meant that Mysore was to pay a periodic tribute (peshkash) to Mughal representatives in the south, but there was a problem in doing so. As Mughal authority in the Deccan and the south was itself fragmented, several possible channels of tribute existed. Mysore thus sought to make use of this ambiguity, playing off Chīn Qilich Khan (still known as Niẓām al-Mulk, a title his descendants would inherit), a powerful Mughal noble who in these years founded a dynasty at Hyderabad, against the Mughal representative at Arcot, thereby putting off the tribute payment. A further variable in the fiscal politics of Mysore was the presence of the Marathas; and some clans, such as the Ghorpades, made it a regular practice to raid the Mysore capital of Seringapatam. In this way, overlapping and at times conflicting claims were justified with reference to a Mughal center that was distant and for the most part lacked interest in these affairs.
As such, then, few if any of the states discussed above made a direct attack on Mughal legitimacy or sought to challenge Mughal claims head-on. To the extent that such a frontal challenge (as distinct from a rebellion conducted within a shared understanding of the framework of authority) can be located in the period, it comes from the far northwest of the Mughal domain. Eventually, however, this challenge was to have repercussions that were felt by the Marathas and other groups.
Challenge from the northwest
The northwestern frontier between the Mughals and Ṣafavids had always harboured elements that possessed the potential to destabilize the balance between these states. The area, which falls largely in present-day Afghanistan, also had a tradition of religio-political movements, often intended to provide a direct challenge to the Mughals or Ṣafavids. An important instance is the Roshani movement of Bāyazīd Anṣārī and his successors, which was crushed by the Mughals in the late 16th and early 17th centuries. Again, in the reign of Aurangzeb, a frontal attack on the legitimacy of his rule was made by the Pashtun leader, Khushḥāl Khan Khatak, though in this case from the standpoint of orthodox Islam. Significantly, in Khushḥāl Khan’s poetic and other literary works, there was also an explicit and nostalgic yearning for the time of Sher Shah of Sūr, the Afghan who had expelled the Mughal ruler Humāyūn from Hindustan. The spirit of these writings was translated into action in the early 18th century, when Mīr Vays Khan Hotak, a leader of the Hotaki clan of Ghilzays, succeeded in carving out a Pashtun state based at Kandahār, under the nose of the Ṣafavid governor of the area. Between 1709 and 1715, Mīr Vays ruled Kandahār unofficially, but his successors were not so modest. His son, Mīr Maḥmūd, first attacked Kermān in Iran and then, in 1722, took the Ṣafavid capital Eṣfahān itself and proclaimed himself its ruler. However, the success of the Ghilzays was not to last long, as they were challenged both by their fellow Pashtuns—the Abdālīs (Durrānīs)—and by the plans of Nādr Qolī Beg (later Nādir Shah), a Ṣafavid subordinate who harboured substantial ambitions of his own.
Between Mīr Maḥmūd’s death (1725) and 1731, Nādr Qoli Beg rapidly consolidated his hold over eastern Iran and placed a severe check on the rise of Pashtun power. Subsequently he marched into Afghanistan and later the Mughal territories, sacking Delhi in 1739. Nādir Shah’s success in welding together a disparate set of territories while operating outside the system of Mughal sovereignty provided a model for the Pashtuns after his assassination in 1747. Many from the Abdālīs and Ghilzays had been employed by him, and they had had an opportunity to learn at close quarters. Among those who had been subordinate in this way to Nādir Shah was Aḥmad Khan, a member of the relatively small Sadozai lineage of Abdālī (Durrānī). In the wake of the Persian conqueror’s death, a congregation of Pashtun khans at a shrine near Kandahār elected Aḥmad Khan to be their leader. His trajectory took him into conflict with the Mughals and then the Marathas, and finally he acted as a crucial catalyst in the formation of the Sikh state in north India.
The Afghan factor in northern India, 1747–72
Unlike Nādir Shah, Aḥmad Shah Durrānī (or Aḥmad Shah Abdālī)—as Aḥmad Khan came to be known after 1747—had little interest in the area west of Afghanistan. Rather, his principal endeavour was to create a state that would lie astride the major overland trade routes that passed from northern India to central and western Asia. Kandahār naturally had an important place in this scheme, but a great deal of attention also had to be paid to centers in north India, such as Multan and Lahore. It is no coincidence that Aḥmad Shah mounted 9 and possibly 10 expeditions to the Punjab, beginning with the first year of his reign, after he had taken Kabul. His campaigns bear an obvious similarity to the seasonal migration of the powindah (pastoral nomads) from Afghanistan to India, which normally took place in the agricultural off-season. It was always in autumn and winter that the Durrānī-led armies set out to the east; when summer’s heat approached, they beat a tactical retreat to the hills from which they had come.
The ability of the Pashtuns to form a lasting state in this process was severely curtailed by the opposition that Aḥmad Shah faced within his own home territories. In the 1750s, when the first concerted challenge to his authority in the Punjab was posed by an alliance of Mughals, Sikhs, and Marathas, Aḥmad Shāh was too preoccupied with the rebellion of Nāsir Khan Balūch, to the west, to devote attention to the threat in the east. Thus, in 1757 Aḥmad Shah’s son Tīmūr, appointed governor of the Punjab, was forced to retreat from Lahore to Peshawar under the force of attacks from Sikhs and Marathas. It was only in 1760 that Aḥmad Shah returned to fight a campaign in northern India, which culminated in his defeat of the Marathas at Panipat in January 1761. However, even this did not turn the tide in his favor. The large-scale attacks that were unleashed on the villages of Sikh peasantry led only to intensified resistance, and Aḥmad Shah found his area of control in the 1760s constantly under threat. His campaigns of 1768 and ’69 were accompanied by widespread desertions on the part of his allies and levies, who thought the Punjab project to be an unviable one. His death in 1772 thus left his son and successor, Tīmūr Shah, with many problems to resolve.
The Afghan presence in northern India during this period was of course not simply restricted to Aḥmad Shah’s campaigns. In the course of the middle decades of the 18th century, several Afghan lineages had carved a place for themselves in northern India in the area known as Rohilkhand, to the east and northeast of Delhi and Agra. They diverted trade from these older imperial cities to their own centers and also helped create a new set of routes to Lahore and the northwest. In so doing, they helped weaken further the economic power of the Mughal center and accelerated the consolidation of regional states on the Gangetic plain itself. But a vacuum still existed in the Punjab, which neither the Mughals nor the Durrānī were able to fill. It was in this context that a Sikh kingdom came to be consolidated in the late 18th century.