The Bourbon reforms
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The Enlightenment, emanating to a large extent from France, penetrated both Spain (aided by the French origin of the Bourbons) and Spanish America in the 18th century. By the late part of the century individuals and organized societies in many of the American territories were producing journals and books in the manner of the work of the French Encyclopédistes, promoting reason, universality, science, modernity, and efficiency. Most Spanish-American writers, while staying in close touch with European currents, were concerned with the development, in practical terms, of their own regions.
Enlightenment philosophy bore importantly on government, which was called on to be more rationally unified, efficient, and free of church influence. Such ideas affected policy makers for the Spanish crown, and a series of activist royal measures of the 18th century were carried out in that spirit. Yet the timing and the nature of these moves had at least as much to do with changing conditions as with ideology. Most reforms came in a bundle in the late 18th century, the creation in 1739 of the Viceroyalty of New Granada based in Santa Fé (Bogotá) being an exception.
A major Bourbon reform, taking place mainly in the 1780s, was the creation of large districts called intendancies (the word and model were French). Each was headed by an official with extensive powers called an intendant, who was directly responsible to the crown in Spain. The measure was meaningful because royal government in the provinces, outside the seats of the viceroy (the province ruler) and the captains general, had hardly existed. It was as though a host of provincial cities received their own viceroy. One result, and indeed the one most intended, was an increase in revenue collection; another, not intended, was decentralization and bickering. The intendancy seats were not arbitrarily created or chosen but were mainly large cities that had once been encomendero centres and were still bishoprics, or long-lasting, large-scale mining centres. The change was realistic in that it recognized the immense growth and consolidation of provincial Hispanic centres that had occurred in the centuries since the first establishment of the viceroyalties, and for that reason it took hold. Less successful was the attempt to introduce similar officials at a lower level in the Indian countryside.
Military affairs were a second target of reform. Spanish America had long been defended by a patchwork of viceregal guards, port garrisons, half-fictional militias, and some forts and paid soldiers on frontiers with hostile Indians, but it had not had a formal military organization. In the late 18th century it acquired one, partly because of an increased foreign threat (Havana was occupied by the British in 1762–63), partly because the Bourbons imagined the army to be the most responsive branch available to them, and partly because professionalization of the military was an international trend of the time. A relatively small number of regular units formed the backbone for a larger, more rigorously organized militia. At first the regulars were brought in from Spain, but before long the lower ranks were mainly locals, and locals found entry even into the officer ranks, though the top commanders were usually Spaniards born. The military was primarily Hispanic, with Indians taking part only under exceptional circumstances, and it reflected local society, with officers drawn from prominent families and many persons of mixed descent and Africans among the enlisted men. Organized in local districts, the units’ loyalties were above all local as well.
Government in Bourbon times was not antireligious, but it was sufficiently affected by the spirit of the times to be quite anticlerical. The most decisive of the measures taken was the expulsion of the Jesuit order from Spanish America and Spain in 1767. Preceded by similar actions in Portugal and France, the move was part of an international wave, but it also made excellent sense in purely Spanish-American terms. Although the Jesuits were the wealthiest of the orders, they had arrived last, had fierce rivals in other branches of the church, and counted few locals among their members. Thus their expulsion was greeted with (usually hidden) approval by many. The crown in general tried to further the secular clergy over the religious orders (imagined to be more independent-minded), but the policy had little effect except in areas where the secular clergy, which grew with the expansion of civil society, was already on the rise. Almost on the eve of independence, the crown attempted to confiscate church property, but the measure proved hard to enforce.
The late Bourbons favoured more active encouragement of the economy and even intervention in it. They provided tax reductions and technical aid for the silver mining industry; they expanded state monopolies beyond the mercury needed for mining to some other commodities, of which tobacco was the most successful. Their largest reform, however, went in the opposite direction, consisting in the declaration of free trade within the Spanish empire, so that any port could trade with any other at will.
In earlier times the bulk of transatlantic trade had been directed at Mexico and Peru, and annual convoys sponsored by the Spanish government were an efficient way not only to organize the traffic but also to protect it from pirates, who were the main threat. By the 18th century the northern European powers had naval superiority and could easily have destroyed any convoy. Moreover, in Spanish America new central areas had arisen, with a consequent diversification of destinations, and in Spain the north had revived at the expense of the south, where Sevilla and Cádiz had monopolized Indies navigation. Under these changed circumstances, the best arrangement was to allow individual ships to travel between any Spanish port and any American port. The fleet system gradually fell apart in the 18th century. Imperial free trade was introduced between 1765 and 1789, first affecting Cuba and spreading to all Spanish possessions. The measure coincided with a marked increase in commercial volume; to what extent free trade caused the increase, as opposed to demographic growth in the Indies and industrial growth in Europe, is not clear. Nor are the effects entirely clear. The deluge of goods made it harder for the largest American merchants to be as dominant as previously, and for the first time local textile producers had real competition for the lower end of the market. Even so, the large firms of Mexico City were not destroyed, and the Puebla textile industry continued to grow.
Brazil after 1700
In the late 17th century the explorations of the Paulistas finally led to the discovery of major gold deposits in a large district inland from Rio de Janeiro that became known as Minas Gerais. As the news spread, outsiders poured into the area. A time of turbulence, with the frontier Paulistas trying to assert their rights, ended after a few decades with the victory of the newcomers and the entry of royal authority. The south-centre, both the coast and the near interior, now took on the essential characteristics of the northeast—of a land living on European exports and inhabited by a population mainly Portuguese, African, and mulatto, with a large sector of slaves, along with many recently freed persons. The mining district flourished during the time of the boom, generating a network of settlements where none had been before and a local culture that included the now-renowned architectural style of its small churches.
More importantly for Brazil as a whole, Rio de Janeiro began to become an important urban centre in the usual mold, and the institutional component thickened, just as it had earlier on the basis of mineral wealth in the old Spanish-American central areas. By 1763 Rio had become the capital of Brazil, replacing Salvador in the northeast. Although the northeastern sugar industry continued to export more by value than the gold region, the latter had newer wealth and perhaps a higher profitability, and distant regions began to orient themselves to it in important ways. Stock-raising regions both in the northern interior and on the southern plains sent their animals to the mines, thereby both growing and helping unify the country.
The chronology of Brazil does not mesh closely with that of Spanish America in the late period. The gold boom was a type of development that had occurred much earlier in the Spanish territories; moreover, it did not last into the second half of the 18th century, when the most marked economic growth was occurring elsewhere, but began to decline by mid-century. Brazil had already experienced the bulk export revolution in the 17th century with sugar, and in the later 18th century exports were actually declining much of the time. Some growth, however, occurred late in the century in response to the decline of the French sugar industry in the Caribbean after the slave revolt in Haiti and some experimentation with new crops that were beginning to be of interest in Europe. Thus, though the Portuguese were as much affected by the Enlightenment as the Spaniards and had their time of active reform under the marquês de Pombal, prime minister and in effect ruler of Portugal in the period 1750–77, the context was hardly comparable. Outstanding among the actions taken under his ministry was a wave of expulsions of the Jesuits, in 1759. During his long rule Pombal instituted numerous fiscal and administrative reforms and even attempted social legislation. He gave much attention to the far north of Brazil, attempting to develop the region, and a time of considerable local development and change did in fact coincide with his activity.
Preindependence phenomena
The position of the locally born Spaniards, often called Creoles or criollos (though they were slow to call themselves that), had been growing stronger all across the postconquest centuries. From an early time they owned most of the rural estates and dominated most of the cabildos. By the 17th century they were a large majority among the secular clergy and prominent in the orders, and as time went on they received more and more of the bishoprics. In the course of the 17th century they achieved appointments as audiencia judges in various centres, and by the second half of the 18th century they were dominating, sometimes virtually monopolizing, the membership of audiencias all over Spanish America. As the military came into existence, they found prominent places in it. Large mining producers might be either born locally or Spanish-born. Large merchants remained predominantly born in Spain, but they married into local families, whose interests they often served. Each major local Spanish family had members placed strategically across the whole system, creating a strong informal network. Only the viceroys and usually the archbishops were normally recruited from the outside, and even they had local entourages.
As the Bourbon government in Spain became more active late in the 18th century, it wanted a larger place for its own Spanish-born associates and began to view the extent of local American dominance with alarm. The audiencias were gradually filled predominantly with Spanish-born judges; nearly all the intendants were outsiders and so were the highest military officers. Yet the basic situation hardly changed, for the Spanish-born appointees had to function in a local milieu, into which they were rapidly absorbed. As independence approached, the local Spaniards or Creoles had influence and experience at all levels of society, economy, and government, but they had been under challenge for a generation or more and were correspondingly resentful.
Consciousness of separateness of various kinds had been growing for a long time. In Mexico, starting as early as the mid-17th century, the illustrious indigenous past and the cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe had become a basis for national pride, promoted above all by Creole priests and scholars. Other areas had approximate equivalents, if not as well-defined. Awareness of ethnic distinctions within the Spanish category increased in the 18th century along with the proliferation of ethnic terminology in general. The Creoles were still mainly called Spaniards, but the new arrivals from Spain, now a small minority, were distinguished from the rest as peninsular or European Spaniards, and in Mexico they received the insulting nickname gachupín.
The middle groups, whether humble Spaniards or people in the racially mixed categories, had much reason for discontent. The expansion of the middle left a large segment of the population without employment corresponding to its expectations and capacities. Corporately organized indigenous groups, however, though not in an admirable state economically or in many other respects, were generally little concerned about conditions at a countrywide level. It is not that they were apathetic; all through the intervening centuries they had stood up for themselves, through litigation and sometimes through disturbances and revolts, but they had done so as individual communities. On the nonsedentary fringe, wars and rebellions continued, but this was not different from earlier times. The most volatile element were Spanish-speaking Indians in and around Hispanic communities, who had mobility and broad awareness and whose profile no longer corresponded to the implications and duties of the label “Indian.”
Two large manifestations of the late 18th century can be seen as foreshadowing independence, though it is possible that they did as much to retard it. In 1780–81 the Andean highlands experienced the Túpac Amaru II revolt, which wrested control of much of the region from the ordinary authorities for many months until it was forcibly put down. Although references were made to the Inca heritage and the rebellion was indeed based in the indigenous countryside, its leaders were largely provincial mestizos (as was in fact Túpac Amaru himself), and some were even Creoles from the middle levels of local society. The Comunero Rebellion in Colombia began in 1780 in the provincial town of Socorro, a tobacco and textile producing centre. From there it spread widely before disbanding a year later largely as a result of negotiations.
Both movements were in immediate response to Bourbon fiscal measures, and both proclaimed ultimate loyalty to the Spanish crown. In Peru especially, there was a strong reaction afterward against both dissent and the indigenous population. The impetus for independence in Spanish South America would eventually come from the newly thriving Atlantic seaboard regions—the former fringes, Venezuela and Argentina—which had mobile Hispanized populations and lacked large groups of sedentary Indians. In Mexico too, things would start in the very similar near north of the country.
In Brazil, the local Portuguese population had a position quite comparable to that of the Spanish-American Creoles, but it was not so far advanced, and the situation had not become polarized. Transatlantic mobility still made itself felt, with many leading Brazilian Portuguese having been educated in Portugal. Locally born Portuguese had long participated in the Brazilian high court system, but they had never been a majority as in Spanish America. Two well-known rebellious incidents occurring in the 1780s and ’90s, in Minas Gerais and Bahia, did not have full support even locally.
Latin America approached independence after a thoroughgoing ethnic and cultural transformation across a period of over three centuries. That process did not destroy the indigenous component, which was still very much alive corporately and culturally in the old central areas and some other regions and had also affected and entered into the mixed Iberian societies that had come to dominance. Even where it almost disappeared, the indigenous factor was important, for its weakness or absence was what allowed certain regions to become more European and African. Most of the independent countries that arose in the early 19th century went back to indigenous culture areas that had been re-formed into functional units under Iberian management in the 16th century.
James LockhartThe independence of Latin America
After three centuries of colonial rule, independence came rather suddenly to most of Spanish and Portuguese America. Between 1808 and 1826 all of Latin America except the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico slipped out of the hands of the Iberian powers who had ruled the region since the conquest. The rapidity and timing of that dramatic change were the result of a combination of long-building tensions in colonial rule and a series of external events.
The reforms imposed by the Spanish Bourbons in the 18th century provoked great instability in the relations between the rulers and their colonial subjects in the Americas. Many Creoles (those of Spanish parentage but who were born in America) felt Bourbon policy to be an unfair attack on their wealth, political power, and social status. Others did not suffer during the second half of the 18th century; indeed, the gradual loosening of trade restrictions actually benefited some Creoles in Venezuela and certain areas that had moved from the periphery to the centre during the late colonial era. However, those profits merely whetted those Creoles’ appetites for greater free trade than the Bourbons were willing to grant. More generally, Creoles reacted angrily against the crown’s preference for peninsulars in administrative positions and its declining support of the caste system and the Creoles’ privileged status within it. After hundreds of years of proven service to Spain, the American-born elites felt that the Bourbons were now treating them like a recently conquered nation.
In cities throughout the region, Creole frustrations increasingly found expression in ideas derived from the Enlightenment. Imperial prohibitions proved unable to stop the flow of potentially subversive English, French, and North American works into the colonies of Latin America. Creole participants in conspiracies against Portugal and Spain at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century showed familiarity with such European Enlightenment thinkers as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The Enlightenment clearly informed the aims of dissident Creoles and inspired some of the later, great leaders of the independence movements across Latin America.
Still, these ideas were not, strictly speaking, causes of independence. Creoles selectively adapted rather than simply embraced the thought that had informed revolutions in North America and France. Leaders in Latin America tended to shy away from the more socially radical European doctrines. Moreover, the influence of those ideologies was sharply restricted; with few exceptions only small circles of educated, urban elites had access to Enlightenment thought. At most, foreign ideas helped foster a more questioning attitude toward traditional institutions and authority.
European diplomatic and military events provided the final catalyst that turned Creole discontent into full-fledged movements for Latin American independence. When the Spanish crown entered into an alliance with France in 1795, it set off a series of developments that opened up economic and political distance between the Iberian countries and their American colonies. By siding with France, Spain pitted itself against England, the dominant sea power of the period, which used its naval forces to reduce and eventually cut communications between Spain and the Americas. Unable to preserve any sort of monopoly on trade, the Spanish crown was forced to loosen the restrictions on its colonies’ commerce. Spanish Americans now found themselves able to trade legally with other colonies, as well as with any neutral countries such as the United States. Spain’s wartime liberalization of colonial trade sharpened Creoles’ desires for greater economic self-determination.
Occurrences in Europe in the early 19th century created a deep political divide between Spain and its American colonies. In 1807 the Spanish king, Charles IV, granted passage through Spanish territory to Napoleon’s forces on their way to invade Portugal. The immediate effect of that concession was to send the Portuguese ruler, Prince Regent John, fleeing in British ships to Brazil. Arriving in Rio de Janeiro with some 15,000 officials, nobles, and other members of his court, John transformed the Brazilian colony into the administrative centre of his empire. When Napoleon turned on his Spanish allies in 1808, events took a disastrous turn for Spain and its dominion in the Americas. Shortly after Charles had abdicated in favour of his son Ferdinand, Napoleon had them both imprisoned. With these figures of legitimate authority in his power, the French ruler tried to shatter Spanish independence. In the process he set off a political crisis that swept across both Spain and its possessions. The Spanish political tradition centred on the figure of the monarch, yet, with Charles and Ferdinand removed from the scene, the hub of all political authority was missing.
In 1810 a Cortes (Parliament) emerged in Cádiz to represent both Spain and Spanish America. Two years later it produced a new, liberal constitution that proclaimed Spain’s American possessions to be full members of the kingdom and not mere colonies. Yet the Creoles who participated in the new Cortes were denied equal representation. Moreover, the Cortes would not concede permanent free trade to the Americans and obstinately refused to grant any degree of meaningful autonomy to the overseas dominions. Having had a taste of freedom during their political and economic isolation from the mother country, Spanish Americans did not easily consent to a reduction of their power and autonomy.
Two other European developments further dashed the hopes of Creoles, pushing them more decisively toward independence. The year 1814 saw the restoration of Ferdinand to the throne and with it the energetic attempt to reestablish Spanish imperial power in the Americas. Rejecting compromise and reform, Ferdinand resorted to military force to bring wayward Spanish-American regions back into the empire as colonies. The effort only served to harden the position of Creole rebels. In 1820 troops waiting in Cádiz to be sent as part of the crown’s military campaigns revolted, forcing Ferdinand to agree to a series of liberal measures. That concession divided and weakened loyalist opposition to independence in the Americas. Many supporters of the crown now had doubts about the monarchy for which they were fighting.
The wars of independence, 1808–26
The final victory of Latin American patriots over Spain and the fading loyalist factions began in 1808 with the political crisis in Spain. With the Spanish king and his son Ferdinand taken hostage by Napoleon, Creoles and peninsulars began to jockey for power across Spanish America. During 1808–10 juntas emerged to rule in the name of Ferdinand VII. In Mexico City and Montevideo caretaker governments were the work of loyal peninsular Spaniards eager to head off Creole threats. In Santiago, Caracas, Bogotá, and other cities, by contrast, it was Creoles who controlled the provisional juntas. Not all of these governments lasted very long; loyalist troops quickly put down Creole-dominated juntas in La Paz and Quito. By 1810, however, the trend was clear. Without denouncing Ferdinand, Creoles throughout most of the region were moving toward the establishment of their own autonomous governments. Transforming these early initiatives into a break with Spanish control required tremendous sacrifice. Over the next decade and a half, Spanish Americans had to defend with arms their movement toward independence.
Spanish America
The southern movement in South America
The movements that liberated Spanish South America arose from opposite ends of the continent. From the north came the movement led most famously by Simón Bolívar, a dynamic figure known as the Liberator. From the south proceeded another powerful force, this one directed by the more circumspect José de San Martín. After difficult conquests of their home regions, the two movements spread the cause of independence through other territories, finally meeting on the central Pacific coast. From there, troops under northern generals finally stamped out the last vestiges of loyalist resistance in Peru and Bolivia by 1826.
The struggles that produced independence in the south began even before Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal and Spain. In 1806 a British expeditionary force captured Buenos Aires. When the Spanish colonial officials proved ineffective against the invasion, a volunteer militia of Creoles and peninsulars organized resistance and pushed the British out. In May 1810 prominent Creoles in Buenos Aires, having vied with peninsulars for power in the intervening years, forced the last Spanish viceroy there to consent to a cabildo abierto, an extraordinary open meeting of the municipal council and local notables. Although shielding itself with a pretense of loyalty to Ferdinand, the junta produced by that session marked the end of Spanish rule in Buenos Aires and its hinterland. After its revolution of May 1810, the region was the only one to resist reconquest by loyalist troops throughout the period of the independence wars.
Independence in the former Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, however, encountered grave difficulties in the years after 1810. Central authority proved unstable in the capital city of Buenos Aires. An early radical liberal government dominated by Mariano Moreno gave way to a series of triumvirates and supreme directors. More troubling still were the bitter rivalries emerging between Buenos Aires and other provinces. From the start Buenos Aires’ intention of bringing all the former viceregal territories under its control set off waves of discord in the outlying provinces. At stake was not only political autonomy per se but also economic interest; the Creole merchants of Buenos Aires, who initially sought the liberalization of colonial restraints on commerce in the region, subsequently tried to maintain their economic dominance over the interior. A constituent assembly meeting in 1813 adopted a flag, anthem, and other symbols of national identity, but the apparent unity disintegrated soon afterward. This was evident in the assembly that finally proclaimed independence in 1816; that body received no delegates from several provinces, even though it was held outside Buenos Aires, in the interior city of Tucumán (in full, San Miguel de Tucumán).
Distinct interests and long-standing resentment of the viceregal capital led different regions in the south to pursue separate destinies. Across the Río de la Plata from Buenos Aires, Montevideo and its surroundings became the separate Estado Oriental (“Eastern State,” later Uruguay). Caught between the loyalism of Spanish officers and the imperialist intentions of Buenos Aires and Portuguese Brazil, the regional leader José Gervasio Artigas formed an army of thousands of gauchos. By 1815 Artigas and this force dominated Uruguay and had allied with other provinces to oppose Buenos Aires.
Buenos Aires achieved similarly mixed results in other neighbouring regions, losing control of many while spreading independence from Spain. Paraguay resisted Buenos Aires’ military and set out on a path of relative isolation from the outside world. Other expeditions took the cause to Upper Peru, the region that would become Bolivia. After initial victories there, the forces from Buenos Aires retreated, leaving the battle in the hands of local Creole, mestizo, and Indian guerrillas. By the time Bolívar’s armies finally completed the liberation of Upper Peru (then renamed in the Liberator’s honour), the region had long since separated itself from Buenos Aires.
The main thrust of the southern independence forces met much greater success on the Pacific coast. In 1817 San Martín, a Latin American-born former officer in the Spanish military, directed 5,000 men in a dramatic crossing of the Andes and struck at a point in Chile where loyalist forces had not expected an invasion. In alliance with Chilean patriots under the command of Bernardo O’Higgins, San Martín’s army restored independence to a region whose highly factionalized junta had been defeated by royalists in 1814. With Chile as his base, San Martín then faced the task of freeing the Spanish stronghold of Peru. After establishing naval dominance in the region, the southern movement made its way northward. Its task, however, was formidable. Having benefited from colonial monopolies and fearful of the kind of social violence that the late 18th-century revolt had threatened, many Peruvian Creoles were not anxious to break with Spain. Consequently, the forces under San Martín managed only a shaky hold on Lima and the coast. Final destruction of loyalist resistance in the highlands required the entrance of northern armies.
