Civil war

Pakistan’s first national election therefore proved to be no panacea. After campaigning on autonomy for East Pakistan, Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won almost every seat in the National Assembly that had been allotted to the east wing under the LFO. Sheikh Mujib, as he was popularly known, now was the paramount leader in East Pakistan, and, because his party had won a majority of the 300 contested seats in the National Assembly, Mujib was entitled to form the national government. However, Bhutto—whose PPP had won a commanding majority in West Pakistan—and the military establishment refused a government where the country’s future might be unilaterally decided by the East. Arguing that Mujib did not have a single seat in the western provinces and that he, Bhutto, was the only serious representative from the west wing, Bhutto insisted on using another formula to organize the civilian government.

Yahya Khan was called to mediate between Mujib and Bhutto, and in the meantime their respective parties addressed the dilemma and sought still another avenue that might produce a compromise solution. Mujib, having been elected on the promise of pursuing autonomy in East Pakistan, was unwilling to compromise on his six-point program for the East to enjoy increased self-governance. Bhutto and his associates, meanwhile, saw the program as an end to federation altogether. Bhutto convinced Khan to postpone the convening of the National Assembly as the two sides worked to find a solution, and Khan did so on March 1, 1971.

Mujib declared that the people of Bengal had once again been betrayed by the power in West Pakistan. Provoked by the more radical elements in the Awami League and swept along by street demonstrations, strikes, and violent protests, he called for a boycott and general strike throughout East Pakistan. Mayhem ensued, as Bengalis attacked members of the non-Bengali community, particularly the Biharis (refugees from India and their descendants), resulting in considerable loss of life. In mid-March Khan and Bhutto again flew to Dhaka and pursued negotiations once more. At the same time, the army was being prepared for a campaign to neutralize a budding rebellion and save the unity of Pakistan.

The army struck against the Awami League and its supporters on the night of March 25, 1971. Mujib was arrested and flown secretly to a prison in West Pakistan. Other major members of the party were likewise apprehended or went into hiding. Dhaka University was fired upon, and a large number of Bengali students and intellectuals were taken into custody; scores were transported to a remote location outside the city and summarily executed. Bengali armed resistance, which came to be called the Mukhti Bhini (“Freedom Force”), took form from disaffected Bengalis in the Pakistan army and others who were prepared to fight what they now judged to be an alien army. The independent state of Bangladesh was proclaimed, and a government in exile took root in India just across the East Pakistani border.

The escalation of violence provoked a mass movement of people, the majority of whom sought refuge in India. Although this heavy influx of refugees included a good portion of the Hindus who had remained in East Bengal after partition, many were Muslims. In fact, although the Pakistan army argued that Hindus from both portions of Bengal were responsible for the intensity of the struggle, there was no mistaking the great number of Muslim Bengalis who were being assaulted. The Pakistan army was unable to quell the fighting, and Indian forces began to supply the Mukhti Bhini. In December 1971 the Indian army invaded East Pakistan and in a few days forced the surrender of the 93,000-man West Pakistani garrison there.

Unable to supply its forces in the East, Pakistan opted not to expand the war in the West. The United States stood with Pakistan in the debate in the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless, the U.S. government made no serious attempt to intervene and noted that its alliances with Pakistan did not commit Americans to take sides in a civil war, even one internationalized by the Indian invasion of East Pakistan. It was clear that India had effectively and irreversibly dismembered Pakistan and that the Muslim country would now take a different form from the one created by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

Forced to yield his authority by the junta that had earlier sustained him, Yahya Khan resigned the presidency on December 20, 1971; unlike his predecessor, Ayub Khan, he was in no position to pass the office to still another general. The Pakistan army had suffered a severe blow, and for the time the military was content to retire from politics and rebuild its forces and reputation. Bhutto, the leading politician in what remained of Pakistan, assumed the presidency and was called to assemble a new government. Under pressure to restore equilibrium, Bhutto pledged a new Pakistan, a new constitution, and a new public order, and he articulated a vision for Pakistan that rallied diverse elements and seemed to promise a new life for the country. But the joining together of hands did not last long. Bhutto’s manner, posture, and performance were more of the aristocrat than of the “Leader of the People” (Quaid-e Awam), a title he assumed for himself. In 1973 a new constitution, crafted by Bhutto and his colleagues, was adopted that restored parliamentary government. Bhutto stepped down from the presidency, which he deemed ceremonial in the new constitutional system, and assumed the more dynamic premiership.

As prime minister, Bhutto demanded nothing less than absolute power, and, increasingly suspicious of those around him, he formed the Federal Security Force (FSF), the principal task of which was his personal protection. In time, the FSF emerged as a paramilitary organization, and Bhutto’s demand for ever-increasing personal security raised questions about his governing style. It also opened rifts in the PPP, and it was not long before the suspicious Bhutto ordered the silencing and imprisonment of his closest associates. The younger generation, which had idolized Bhutto during his rise to power, also became the target of police and FSF crackdowns, which often paralyzed operations at the universities. Though Bhutto had presided over the promulgation of the 1973 constitution, too much had transpired—and much more unpleasantness lay ahead—to conclude that the new political order could save Pakistan from repeating past mistakes.

Bhutto scheduled the country’s second national election in 1977. With the PPP being the only successful national party in the country, nine opposition parties formed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and agreed to run as a single bloc. Fearing the possible strength of the PNA, Bhutto and his colleagues plotted an electoral strategy that included unleashing the FSF to terrorize the opposition. However, PNA members refused to be intimidated and centred their attacks on Bhutto and the PPP by running on a particularly religious platform. Arguing that Bhutto had betrayed Islamic practices, the PNA called for a cleansing of the body politic and a return to the basic tenets of Islamic performance.

The PNA, despite their efforts, was soundly defeated in the election, but the polling had not been without incident. Almost immediately complaints arose of electoral fraud, and voter discontent soon degenerated into violent street demonstrations. Bhutto and his party had won by a landslide, but it turned out to be an empty victory. With riots erupting in all the major metropolitan areas, the army, increasingly disenchanted with Bhutto, again intervened in Pakistan’s politics. Ignoring the election results, the army arrested Bhutto and dissolved his government. The prime minister was placed under house arrest, and, on July 5, 1977, Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Bhutto’s personal choice to head the Pakistan army, took the reins of government. Zia declared his intention to hold a new round of elections that would be fairer and more transparent. However, it soon became apparent that the army had no intention of allowing Bhutto to return to power. Bhutto’s subsequent arrest on charges that he ordered the assassination of a political rival, and Zia’s insistence that he be tried for this alleged crime, brought an end to the Bhutto era and ushered in the Zia-ul-Haq regime.