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Civil war
Pakistan’s first national election therefore proved to be no panacea. After campaigning on autonomy for East Pakistan, Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League won almost every seat in the National Assembly that had been allotted to the east wing under the LFO. Sheikh Mujib, as he was popularly known, now was the paramount leader in East Pakistan, and, because his party had won a majority of the 300 contested seats in the National Assembly, Mujib was entitled to form the national government. However, Bhutto—whose PPP had won a commanding majority in West Pakistan—and the military establishment refused a government where the country’s future might be unilaterally decided by the East. Arguing that Mujib did not have a single seat in the western provinces and that he, Bhutto, was the only serious representative from the west wing, Bhutto insisted on using another formula to organize the civilian government.
Yahya Khan was called to mediate between Mujib and Bhutto, and in the meantime their respective parties addressed the dilemma and sought still another avenue that might produce a compromise solution. Mujib, having been elected on the promise of pursuing autonomy in East Pakistan, was unwilling to compromise on his six-point program for the East to enjoy increased self-governance. Bhutto and his associates, meanwhile, saw the program as an end to federation altogether. Bhutto convinced Khan to postpone the convening of the National Assembly as the two sides worked to find a solution, and Khan did so on March 1, 1971.
Mujib declared that the people of Bengal had once again been betrayed by the power in West Pakistan. Provoked by the more radical elements in the Awami League and swept along by street demonstrations, strikes, and violent protests, he called for a boycott and general strike throughout East Pakistan. Mayhem ensued, as Bengalis attacked members of the non-Bengali community, particularly the Biharis (refugees from India and their descendants), resulting in considerable loss of life. In mid-March Khan and Bhutto again flew to Dhaka and pursued negotiations once more. At the same time, the army was being prepared for a campaign to neutralize a budding rebellion and save the unity of Pakistan.
The army struck against the Awami League and its supporters on the night of March 25, 1971. Mujib was arrested and flown secretly to a prison in West Pakistan. Other major members of the party were likewise apprehended or went into hiding. Dhaka University was fired upon, and a large number of Bengali students and intellectuals were taken into custody; scores were transported to a remote location outside the city and summarily executed. Bengali armed resistance, which came to be called the Mukhti Bhini (“Freedom Force”), took form from disaffected Bengalis in the Pakistan army and others who were prepared to fight what they now judged to be an alien army. The independent state of Bangladesh was proclaimed, and a government in exile took root in India just across the East Pakistani border.
The escalation of violence provoked a mass movement of people, the majority of whom sought refuge in India. Although this heavy influx of refugees included a good portion of the Hindus who had remained in East Bengal after partition, many were Muslims. In fact, although the Pakistan army argued that Hindus from both portions of Bengal were responsible for the intensity of the struggle, there was no mistaking the great number of Muslim Bengalis who were being assaulted. The Pakistan army was unable to quell the fighting, and Indian forces began to supply the Mukhti Bhini. In December 1971 the Indian army invaded East Pakistan and in a few days forced the surrender of the 93,000-man West Pakistani garrison there.
Unable to supply its forces in the East, Pakistan opted not to expand the war in the West. The United States stood with Pakistan in the debate in the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless, the U.S. government made no serious attempt to intervene and noted that its alliances with Pakistan did not commit Americans to take sides in a civil war, even one internationalized by the Indian invasion of East Pakistan. It was clear that India had effectively and irreversibly dismembered Pakistan and that the Muslim country would now take a different form from the one created by Mohammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Forced to yield his authority by the junta that had earlier sustained him, Yahya Khan resigned the presidency on December 20, 1971; unlike his predecessor, Ayub Khan, he was in no position to pass the office to still another general. The Pakistan army had suffered a severe blow, and for the time the military was content to retire from politics and rebuild its forces and reputation. Bhutto, the leading politician in what remained of Pakistan, assumed the presidency and was called to assemble a new government. Under pressure to restore equilibrium, Bhutto pledged a new Pakistan, a new constitution, and a new public order, and he articulated a vision for Pakistan that rallied diverse elements and seemed to promise a new life for the country. But the joining together of hands did not last long. Bhutto’s manner, posture, and performance were more of the aristocrat than of the “Leader of the People” (Quaid-e Awam), a title he assumed for himself. In 1973 a new constitution, crafted by Bhutto and his colleagues, was adopted that restored parliamentary government. Bhutto stepped down from the presidency, which he deemed ceremonial in the new constitutional system, and assumed the more dynamic premiership.
As prime minister, Bhutto demanded nothing less than absolute power, and, increasingly suspicious of those around him, he formed the Federal Security Force (FSF), the principal task of which was his personal protection. In time, the FSF emerged as a paramilitary organization, and Bhutto’s demand for ever-increasing personal security raised questions about his governing style. It also opened rifts in the PPP, and it was not long before the suspicious Bhutto ordered the silencing and imprisonment of his closest associates. The younger generation, which had idolized Bhutto during his rise to power, also became the target of police and FSF crackdowns, which often paralyzed operations at the universities. Though Bhutto had presided over the promulgation of the 1973 constitution, too much had transpired—and much more unpleasantness lay ahead—to conclude that the new political order could save Pakistan from repeating past mistakes.
Bhutto scheduled the country’s second national election in 1977. With the PPP being the only successful national party in the country, nine opposition parties formed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and agreed to run as a single bloc. Fearing the possible strength of the PNA, Bhutto and his colleagues plotted an electoral strategy that included unleashing the FSF to terrorize the opposition. However, PNA members refused to be intimidated and centered their attacks on Bhutto and the PPP by running on a particularly religious platform. Arguing that Bhutto had betrayed Islamic practices, the PNA called for a cleansing of the body politic and a return to the basic tenets of Islamic performance.
The PNA, despite their efforts, was soundly defeated in the election, but the polling had not been without incident. Almost immediately complaints arose of electoral fraud, and voter discontent soon degenerated into violent street demonstrations. Bhutto and his party had won by a landslide, but it turned out to be an empty victory. With riots erupting in all the major metropolitan areas, the army, increasingly disenchanted with Bhutto, again intervened in Pakistan’s politics. Ignoring the election results, the army arrested Bhutto and dissolved his government. The prime minister was placed under house arrest, and, on July 5, 1977, Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, Bhutto’s personal choice to head the Pakistan army, took the reins of government. Zia declared his intention to hold a new round of elections that would be fairer and more transparent. However, it soon became apparent that the army had no intention of allowing Bhutto to return to power. Bhutto’s subsequent arrest on charges that he ordered the assassination of a political rival, and Zia’s insistence that he be tried for this alleged crime, brought an end to the Bhutto era and ushered in the Zia-ul-Haq regime.
Zia-ul-Haq
Zia-ul-Haq’s initial declaration that he would return government to civilian hands was at variance with his behavior. His subsequent change in direction hinted that there were powers behind the scene that were determined to eliminate Bhutto as an active player. Zia in fact called for a complete change in direction once the decision was made not to conduct new elections, to arrest and try Bhutto, and, ultimately, to ignore the pleadings from the governments of other countries to spare Bhutto’s life. Found guilty and sentenced to death, Bhutto was hanged on April 4, 1979.
After Bhutto’s death, Zia-ul-Haq, president since 1978, settled to the task of redesigning a political system for Pakistan. A devout Muslim, Zia believed that religious tradition should guide Pakistan’s institutions in all aspects of daily life. Moreover, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Muslim Afghanistan in December 1979 reinforced Zia’s belief that only by drawing from Islamic practices could the Muslims inhabiting both Pakistan and Afghanistan find common ground in their struggle to withstand the assault from an alien and aggressive neighbor. Islamization therefore became the guiding principle in Zia’s plan to reform Pakistan, to reassure its unity, and to galvanize the country to meet all threats, both foreign and domestic. Clearly, the program of Islamization was also geared to reinforce the rule of Zia-ul-Haq as well as establish his legitimacy.
Pakistan’s status as a “frontline state” after the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan demanded a military presence, and Zia-ul-Haq played a major role in assisting the Afghan resistance (the mujahideen). The country also opened its doors to an influx of several million Afghan refugees, the majority of whom were housed in camps not far from the border. The main Afghan resistance leaders also established their headquarters in and around the northern city of Peshawar. However, Pakistan had limited resources with which to assist the refugees or the Afghan mujahideen, and assistance was sought from other Muslim states, especially Saudi Arabia. After Ronald Reagan became president of the United States in 1981, Washington also answered the call for help. Pakistan soon became the third largest recipient of U.S. military aid, which by the end of Reagan’s second term had reached several billion dollars. Not insignificantly, Reagan also waived all trade restrictions on aid to Pakistan, even though Islamabad was known to be pursuing an aggressive program to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, despite strains in their relationship, Washington and Islamabad found common ground in the Soviet-Afghan conflict. Moreover, U.S. intelligence services did not discourage their Pakistani counterparts—most notably those in the Inter-Service Intelligence directorate—from working in close harmony with the most radical religious movements in Afghanistan.
The 1979 revolution in Iran, which ended the Pahlavi monarchy there, dovetailed with developments in Pakistan. Sensing an Islamic renaissance that would sweep the majority of Islamic nations, Zia-ul-Haq had no hesitation in promoting a political system guided by religious principles and traditions. Zia called for criminal punishments in keeping with Islamic law. He also insisted upon banking practices and economic activity that followed Islamic experience. Zia put his Islamization program to a referendum of the people in 1984 and coupled it to a vote of confidence in his presidency, a favorable outcome of which would provide him with an additional five years in office. Zia indeed won overwhelming approval, though only half of the eligible voters participated, and the opposition insisted that the vote was rigged. Zia nevertheless had received his vote of confidence, and his Islamization program continued as the central policy of his administration.
In February 1985 Zia ul-Haq allowed national and provincial assembly elections, though without the participation of political parties. Zia’s opponents accused him of dictatorial tactics and asserted that the general-cum-president was only interested in neutralizing his opposition. Zia’s Islamic system, they argued, was little more than a ploy aimed at acquiring still wider powers. Although the opposition called on voters to boycott the elections, it was largely ignored, and the people turned out in considerable numbers to elect new legislatures and thereby end still another extended period of martial law. Zia-ul-Haq used the occasion of the convening of the national assembly to handpick Muhammad Khan Junejo, a Sindhi politician and landowner, to become the country’s new prime minister.
Martial law was officially lifted in December 1985, and political parties sought to take advantage of the new conditions by reestablishing themselves. In January 1986, Junejo announced that he intended to revive and lead the Pakistan Muslim League—often designated as Muslim League (J) to distinguish it from other factions attempting to access the party’s legacy. Soon afterward Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and head of the PPP, returned from a two-year exile abroad and was greeted by a tumultuous gathering of supporters who were eager to reclaim their party’s reputation. Other political parties also reemerged during this period, but it was clear that in the contest for national political power the key rivals would be the Muslim League (J) and Bhutto’s PPP.
Lifting martial law coincided with intensified conflict between the country’s different ethnic communities, particularly in the commercial port city of Karachi. Tension between native Sindhis and Muslim immigrants from India (muhajirs) was an ever-present dilemma, and the formation of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in the mid-1980s was both a cause and a consequence of the violence that was directed against the immigrant community. The founding of the MQM and its increasingly militant posture aroused the native Sindhis as never before. The Sindhi complaint that the muhajirs enjoyed a monopoly of political and economic power in Karachi did not go unnoticed. Indeed, the violent clashes between Sindhis and muhajirs were an inevitable outcome of the failure to promote civil society, let alone to encourage deeper integration among Pakistan’s ethnic groups. Moreover, violence could not be avoided when Pashtun migrants, notably Afghan Pashtuns, began moving from the frontier region to Karachi, posing still another challenge to the Sindhi as well as muhajir communities.
Still another problem involved the narcotics and weapons trade that had its roots in the North-West Frontier Province. By 1986 intercommunal violence in Karachi had reached a level not seen since partition, nor was the fighting contained to Karachi. Riots also broke out in Quetta and Hyderabad, and the government called on the army to restore law and order.
Confronting major opposition to his rule, challenged by intensified ethnic warfare, and struggling to sustain an economy confounded by mixed signals, in May 1988 Zia-ul-Haq dissolved the national and provincial assemblies and dismissed the Junejo government. The president alleged that Junejo’s administration reeked of corruption, that the prime minister was too weak to control profligate politicians, and that he had encouraged the political opposition to weaken Zia by undermining his administration. Zia promised the country still another national election, which would, he said, restore clean government, and in June he made himself head of a new caretaker government. Although the country was in considerable disarray, Zia pretended that everything was under control. On August 17, 1988, he was killed when his aircraft blew up in flight from Bahawalpur; the cause of the crash, which also took the life of the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan and several top-ranking Pakistani generals, has never been fully determined.
