Transition to majority rule

Mandela was elected president of the ANC in 1991, succeeding Tambo, who was in poor health and died two years later. Mandela and de Klerk, who both wanted to reach a peaceful solution to South Africa’s problems, met with representatives of most of the political organizations in the country, with a mandate to draw up a new constitution. These negotiations took place amid pervasive and escalating violence, especially in the southern Transvaal, the industrial heart of the country, and in Natal. Most of the conflicts in the Transvaal occurred between Zulu migrant workers, who were housed in large hostels, and the residents of the adjacent townships. The conflicts in Natal existed mainly between Zulu supporters of the ANC and members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), a Zulu movement led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who was chief minister of the KwaZulu homeland.

As the bargaining continued, both Mandela and de Klerk made concessions, with the result that both of them ran the risk of losing the support of their respective constituencies. While whites were loath to forfeit their power and privileges, Blacks had hoped to win complete control of the state. A majority of white voters endorsed the negotiating process in a referendum in 1992, but both white and Black extremists tried to sabotage the process through various acts of terror.

Mandela and de Klerk finally reached a peaceful agreement on the future of South Africa at the end of 1993, an achievement for which they jointly received the 1993 Nobel Peace Prize. In addition, leaders of 18 other parties endorsed an interim constitution, which was to take effect immediately after South Africa’s first election by universal suffrage, scheduled for April 1994. A parliament to be elected at that time would oversee the drafting of a permanent constitution for the country. The temporary constitution enfranchised all citizens 18 and older, abolished the homelands, and divided the country into nine new provinces, with provincial governments receiving substantial powers. It also contained a long list of political and social rights and a mechanism through which Blacks could regain ownership of land that had been taken away under apartheid.

The ANC won almost two-thirds of the 1994 vote, the National Party slightly more than one-fifth, and the IFP most of the rest; all three received proportional cabinet representation. The ANC also became the majority party in seven of the provinces, but the IFP won a majority in KwaZulu-Natal, and the National Party—supported by mixed-race (people formerly classified as “Coloured” under apartheid) as well as white voters—won a majority in Western Cape. Mandela was sworn in as president of the new South Africa on May 10 before a vast jubilant crowd that included the secretary-general of the UN, 45 heads of state, and delegations from many other countries. Thabo Mbeki, a top official in the ANC, and de Klerk both became deputy presidents.

The new, multiparty “government of national unity” aimed to provide Africans with improved education, housing, electricity, running water, and sanitation. Recognizing that economic growth was essential for such purposes, the ANC adopted a moderate economic policy, dropping the socialist elements that had characterized its earlier programs. Mandela and his colleagues campaigned vigorously for foreign aid and investment, but capital investment entered the new South Africa slowly.

The government also had to grapple with a host of daunting institutional problems associated with the transition to a postapartheid society. Blacks joined the civil service; antiapartheid guerrillas became members of the police and the army; and new municipal governments that embraced both the old white cities and their Black township satellites sprang into existence. labor disputes, criminal violence, and conflict between Zulu factions, especially in KwaZulu-Natal, continued. The IFP (which supported a new provincial constitution that granted a sweeping autonomy to KwaZulu-Natal but was struck down by the Constitutional Court) refused to participate in the process that resulted in the creation of the new national constitution that Parliament passed in May 1996. Parliament revised the constitution in October after it was reviewed by the Constitutional Court; Mandela signed it into law in December of the same year. Also in 1996, the National Party left the government to form a “dynamic but responsible” opposition.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The most important domestic agency created during Mandela’s presidency was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which was established to review atrocities committed during the apartheid years. It was set up in 1995 under the leadership of Archbishop Tutu and was given the power to grant amnesty to those found to have committed “gross violations of human rights” under extenuating circumstances. The commission released the first five volumes of its final report on October 29, 1998, and the remaining two volumes on March 21, 2003. In all, the TRC received more than 7,000 amnesty applications, held more than 2,500 amnesty hearings, and granted some 1,500 amnesties for thousands of crimes committed during the apartheid years. Applicants not given amnesty were subject to further legal proceedings.

(Read Desmond Tutu’s Britannica entry on the truth commission.)

The TRC was the target of widespread criticism: whites saw it as selectively targeting them, and Blacks viewed its actions as a charade that allowed perpetrators of heinous crimes to go free. Former president P.W. Botha refused to answer a summons to give testimony to the commission and received a fine and a suspended sentence, although the sentence was later appealed and overturned. Nonetheless, the TRC uncovered information that otherwise would have remained hidden or taken longer to surface. For example, details of the murders of numerous ANC members were exposed, as were the operations of the State Counterinsurgency Unit at Vlakplaas; its commander, Colonel Eugene de Kock, was subsequently sentenced to a long prison term. The commission also investigated those opposed to apartheid. One of the most prominent was Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, the former wife of Nelson Mandela; the TRC report indicated that she had been involved in apartheid-era violence. The report also allowed many to finally learn the fate of relatives or friends who had “disappeared” at the hands of the authorities.

Corruption charges against deputy president Zuma

In March 2005 deputy president Jacob Zuma—who was widely held to be Mbeki’s successor as president of the ANC and, eventually, as president of the country—was dismissed by Mbeki amid charges of corruption and fraud; the next year Zuma stood trial for an unrelated charge of rape. He was acquitted of rape in May 2006, and the corruption charges were dropped later that year. Despite the repeated allegations of wrongdoing, which his supporters claimed were politically motivated, Zuma remained a popular figure within the ANC and was selected over Mbeki to be party president at the ANC conference in December 2007, in what was one of the most contentious leadership battles in the party’s history. Later that month Zuma was recharged with corruption and fraud, and additional charges were brought against him. All charges were eventually dismissed in September 2008 on a legal technicality, but prosecutors from the National Prosecuting Agency (NPA) vowed to appeal the ruling.

Mbeki steps down

Ironically, it was perhaps Mbeki rather than Zuma who was most politically harmed by the controversy surrounding Zuma’s corruption charges. Following an allegation by a High Court judge that there had been political interference (allegedly by Mbeki or at his behest) in Zuma’s prosecution on corruption-related charges, on September 20, 2008, Mbeki was asked by the ANC to resign from the South African presidency, which he agreed to do once the relevant constitutional requirements had been fulfilled. On September 25 he was succeeded by Kgalema Motlanthe, who was selected by the National Assembly to serve as interim president until elections could be held in 2009.

The 2009 national election

As the 2009 elections drew near, the spotlight was once again on the corruption-related charges against Zuma and the allegations of political interference, culminating in an announcement by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) on April 6, 2009, that the charges would be withdrawn. Although prosecutors stated that they felt the charges had merit, they noted evidence of misconduct in the handling of Zuma’s case. Opposition parties condemned the announcement, alleging that the NPA bowed to pressure from the ANC to drop the charges before the election, and complained that the NPA’s actions left the question of Zuma’s innocence unresolved. The ANC, however, was unscathed by the pre-election drama. It finished far ahead of the other parties in the April 22 national election, winning almost 66 percent of the vote, and Zuma was poised to become the country’s next president. He was officially elected to the presidency in a National Assembly vote, held on May 6; he was inaugurated on May 9.

Economic problems, social discontent, Nkandla scandal, and the death of Mandela

As president, Zuma had to contend with economic problems and social discontent. There were several long-term strikes, some of which resulted in violence—such as the 2012 incident at a platinum mine at Marikana, where police opened fire on striking miners and more than 34 people were killed and scores more were injured. The unemployment rate hovered around 25 percent. Many South Africans were disgruntled with the pace of progress of the ANC-led government and complained about inadequate service delivery and overall poor living conditions. Zuma and the ANC also faced allegations of corruption. A notable example was the fury over the costly and extensive upgrades to Zuma’s private homestead in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal, which were paid for with public funds and ostensibly made for security reasons but which were later found to have included many additions that were not security-related, such as a swimming pool and an amphitheater. South Africa’s public protector (national ombudsman), Thuli Madonsela, conducted a two-year investigation into the upgrades and then issued a report calling for Zuma to repay the country for some of the upgrades; he refused. Zuma’s publicly funded extravagance rankled when almost half of all South Africans were still living in poverty and struggling to get by. A sign of Zuma’s diminishing popularity was evident at a memorial service for Nelson Mandela, the country’s beloved former president and ANC icon who had passed away on December 5, 2013. When Zuma attempted to deliver his speech at the December 10 memorial, he was repeatedly booed by the audience.

The 2014 national election

As the May 7, 2014, national election approached, some questioned the ANC’s ability to garner a percentage of the votes consistent with its performance in previous elections. The party persevered, though, and won about 62 percent of the vote—a slight decrease from its 2009 national election share but still a strong show of support for the party. Trailing after the ANC was the official opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, which obtained some 22 percent of the vote, and the newly formed party led by former ANC Youth League president Julius Malema, the Economic Freedom Fighters, which won about 6 percent of the vote. On May 21 the ANC-dominated National Assembly voted to return Zuma to the presidency. He was inaugurated on May 24.

University fees protests

The largest student protests since the apartheid era occurred in October 2015, triggered by the news that university fees were going to increase for the upcoming academic year. Poorer, mostly Black students said that they would not be able to afford the increase, which would continue the disparity that dated to the apartheid era concerning which South Africans were able to gain access to higher education. After a week of protests, during which many universities were shut down, Zuma announced that there would not be a fee increase for 2016. Demonstrations continued at some schools, however, with students demanding free education as well as making additional demands, which later included a decolonized education. By fall 2016 the demonstrations had picked up steam again as an increase in university fees for 2017 was anticipated.

Controversy: the Gupta family, Nkandla, and corruption charges revisited

Zuma’s popularity continued to erode because of scandals. In March 2016 his relationship with the Gupta family, already viewed as controversial, was further questioned when allegations surfaced that the family had promised government portfolios to some people. Also in March, the Nkandla issue rose to the fore again when the Constitutional Court ordered Zuma to repay the state for some of the upgrades made to his home. Furthermore, the court admonished him for his disregard of the public protector’s findings, saying it was a failure to “uphold, defend and respect” the Constitution. The next month, Zuma faced an impeachment motion by the National Assembly. Although he survived it, many, including some senior-level ANC members, called for him to step down or be recalled. Later in April, corruption-related charges against Zuma that the NPA had dropped in 2009 were in the news again when a High Court ruling found that the decision to drop the charges was not rational and should be reviewed and set aside. Both Zuma and the NPA petitioned to be allowed to appeal the decision: the NPA petitioned the Constitutional Court, which denied the request, and Zuma petitioned the Supreme Court, which did allow Zuma’s legal team to present arguments as to why they should be allowed to state Zuma’s case. After the denial by the Constitutional Court, the NPA filed an appeal with the Supreme Court as well. In October 2017 the Supreme Court ruled that the corruption charges should not have been dismissed and could be reinstated. After a period of review, the NPA announced in March 2018 that it would reinstate 16 charges against Zuma pertaining to corruption, money laundering, racketeering, and fraud.

Meanwhile, in August 2016 the ANC experienced its worst performance in an election since the party took power in 1994. In municipal elections held that month, the ANC took less than 60 percent of the vote and lost control of key urban areas. The election results were widely viewed as being indicative that the electorate was frustrated with the performance of the ANC-led governments at all levels, economic decline and high rates of unemployment, and the ongoing scandals and allegations of corruption surrounding Zuma. The issue of corruption was again raised a few months later when another investigative report was released by Madonsela’s office, this time focusing on the allegations that members of the Gupta family had wielded undue influence on Zuma and other officials. The report, which had been due to be released in mid-October, was initially delayed by a legal challenge from Zuma; he withdrew his challenge on November 2, and the report was released later that day. It did not accuse Zuma or anyone else of having committed crimes, but it did mention several instances of possible wrongdoing and requested that the allegations be further investigated by a judicial inquiry team. The report led to a vote of no confidence against Zuma in the National Assembly, but it did not pass.

Zuma’s resignation

The Nkandla controversy made news again, this time in December 2017, when the Constitutional Court ruled that the National Assembly had failed to fulfill its obligation to hold Zuma accountable for his actions as they pertained to the scandal. The court instructed the body to establish procedures for the removal of a president from office that would need to be followed in the future. The case, which had been brought to court by the EFF and other opposition parties, and the ruling added more pressure on the scandal-beleaguered Zuma and ANC, raising the spectre that Zuma would again face impeachment proceedings or that the ANC would try to force him to resign beforehand in order to avoid the political damage such proceedings would generate in the run-up to the 2019 national election. The latter scenario did indeed happen: after several meetings and negotiation sessions, on February 13, 2018, the ANC announced that it had recalled Zuma. He was expected to respond to the party’s recall notice by February 14, the presumption being that he would acquiesce to the party’s request and resign. Although Zuma initially responded to the recall notice by stating that he was being unfairly treated by the ANC and that he had done nothing wrong, he did resign on February 14, 2018. Cyril Ramaphosa, a successful businessman and popular antiapartheid figure who had narrowly been elected president of the ANC in December 2017, was also deputy president of the country, and, as such, he automatically became acting president upon Zuma’s resignation. Ramaphosa was officially elected president by the National Assembly and sworn in the next day.

Accomplishments and challenges

With Ramaphosa’s past business success and his commitment to fighting corruption, his ascendancy to the presidency brought much optimism in South Africa and abroad. He quickly ordered probes of alleged corruption at two government-controlled entities: ESKOM, the electricity utility, and Transnet, a transportation and logistics company. In February 2019 Ramaphosa announced the creation of a special tribunal to expedite the handling of corruption cases and to recover stolen public funds; it began work in October.

Although Ramaphosa and his administration made some positive strides, the scope of the challenges they faced, as well as resistance from others in the ANC aligned with Zuma, limited how much progress could be achieved. He also had to embrace some policy positions that he previously did not hold, such as how to approach the issue of land reform, which was needed to address the persistent racial disparity in land ownership in the country. Whereas Ramaphosa had long held to a more moderate and cautious approach to redistributing land, he now committed to the controversial approach favored by the Zuma faction of the ANC and the EFF of expropriating land, without compensation to the owners, so that it could be redistributed to Black South Africans.

The 2019 national election

The next national election was held on May 8, 2019. The ANC garnered the most votes, but, with an electorate unhappy about the long-running culture of corruption and scandal, economic woes, and the racial inequality that continued to persist more than two decades after the end of apartheid, the party’s win was by the narrowest margin since taking power. The National Assembly voted for Ramaphosa to continue as president on May 22, and he was sworn in three days later. In the following days he announced his new cabinet, in which women were appointed to half of the posts; this was the first gender-balanced cabinet in South African history.

COVID-19

Like most countries in the world, South Africa was affected by the deadly COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Not only did it strain the country’s health-care system, but it also served to accentuate the inequities among South Africa’s different groups that persisted from the apartheid era. In March 2020 Ramaphosa declared a state of disaster, which remained in place until April 2022. Although his handling of the pandemic was initially viewed in a positive light, he later garnered criticism as the pandemic dragged on and frustrations with restrictions meant to stem the spread of the virus and as well as with the country’s faltering economy grew.

“Farmgate” controversy and investigations

Ramaphosa’s reputation as being tough on corruption took a hit in June 2022, when he was accused of criminal conduct. Arthur Fraser, an ally of Zuma and previous head of the country’s State Security Agency, filed a complaint alleging that Ramaphosa had covered up a theft in 2020 of at least $4 million in foreign money that had been kept in a couch at Ramaphosa’s Phala Phala game farm. Fraser also alleged that Ramaphosa had been involved with the kidnapping and bribing of suspects in the robbery. The allegations raised several questions, including where such a large amount of foreign currency came from and if it had been properly declared by Ramaphosa.

Ramaphosa attempted to refute the claims of misconduct, explaining that a smaller amount of money had been stolen from Phala Phala in February 2020 at a time when he was not there and that he reported the theft once he had been made aware of it. He claimed that the stolen money was from the sale of animals from his game farm in late 2019. However, the appearance of misconduct persisted when the details provided by Ramaphosa and his staff surrounding the incident were sometimes vague and on occasion appeared contradictory. Notably, it did not appear that the purchased animals had actually left the farm in the years after the alleged sale.

The controversy over the matter, which had become known as “Farmgate,” led some to call for Ramaphosa’s resignation. The National Assembly opened a Section 89 investigation in September 2022 to determine whether impeachment proceedings against the president were warranted. On November 30 the Section 89 Panel Report was submitted to the National Assembly. It found that Ramaphosa’s actions surrounding the “Farmgate” scandal might have violated the country’s constitution, though he rejected the report’s conclusions and continued to declare his innocence. The National Assembly met on December 13 to discuss the report’s findings and decide whether impeachment proceedings should be initiated against him. However, the ANC—which had the highest number of members in the body—had instructed its members to reject the call for an impeachment inquiry, so it was not unexpected when the majority of the National Assembly voted against it.

Various government agencies, including the Office of the Public Protector (national ombudsman) and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), also opened investigations into the matter. The preliminary findings of the public protector’s investigation, leaked in March 2023, indicated that no evidence of wrongdoing by Ramaphosa had been found; this was confirmed by the official investigation report, released in June. SARB’s investigation focused on whether he had violated Exchange Control Regulation 6(1), which stipulated, “Every person resident in the Republic who becomes entitled to sell or to procure the sale of any foreign currency, shall within thirty days after becoming so entitled, make or cause to be made, a declaration in writing of such foreign currency to the Treasury or to an authorised dealer.” SARB’s report, dated August 2023, included a statement from the identified buyer of the animals, who referred to the money as a security deposit and said the delivery of the animals had been delayed for reasons that included the COVID-19 pandemic. SARB found that Ramaphosa had not violated Exchange Control Regulation 6(1) because the money was stolen before the sale was finalized. The investigation and report were heavily criticized by many, including members of the Democratic Alliance (DA) and other political parties.

The 2024 national election

Preparations for the 2024 national election, scheduled for May 29, differed from previous elections. This was largely due to the Electoral Amendment Act of 2023, which among its reforms included a provision for independent candidates to contest seats in the National Assembly and in provincial legislatures; previously, one had to be affiliated with a political party in order to do so. The allowance for independent candidates meant that instead of voters having to cast one ballot to fill the seats of the National Assembly, they would now cast two: half of the legislative body’s seats would be filled from a national ballot, which would be identical across the country and list political parties that had qualified to contest the election, and the other half would be filled from a regional ballot, the contents of which would be dependent upon the province in which a voter resided and would include independent candidates as well as political parties. (A third ballot would be used for provincial legislature elections, which were also being held that day.)

Another significant difference with the upcoming election is that it was the first since the ANC took power in 1994 that the party was in danger of not winning an outright majority in the National Assembly. The party had seen its support erode over the years because of reasons such as the parade of corruption scandals, a lack of economic progress, and persisting inequalities among the country’s peoples. After 30 years many South Africans were frustrated with the status quo under the ANC-led government. The country’s high unemployment rate—in the first quarter of 2024 it stood at 32.9 percent and was even higher for younger South Africans (ages 15–34), at 45.5 percent—as well as service delivery problems, such as ESKOM’s ongoing struggles to consistently deliver electricity, influenced voters’ opinions. The ANC’s diminishing support meant that a governing coalition might need to be formed for the first time in the postapartheid era. Though such a coalition would likely consist of the ANC and another party (or parties), DA leader John Steenhuisen formed the Multi-Party Charter (MPC), an alliance of opposition parties that hoped to unseat the ANC.

Further complicating the ANC’s efforts to retain a majority was the emergence of a new party, uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MK Party). Former president Zuma, although not leaving the ANC, associated himself with the MK Party, saying he could not campaign for the ANC under Ramaphosa in the upcoming elections. Zuma was later named president of the new party. The MK Party had already proved its ability to take a stake of the ANC’s traditional vote in by-elections held in early 2024, a trend that seemed likely to carry over to the national as well as the provincial elections. Although Zuma had been at the top of the MK Party’s National Assembly candidate list, a challenge to his eligibility to serve in the legislative body (stemming from his 2021 prison sentence) saw him knocked off the list when the Constitutional Court deemed him ineligible just nine days before the election.

The national and provincial elections took place on May 29, 2024. As predicted, the ANC’s diminished support led to the party’s worst-ever performance in a national election. The party won only about 40 percent of the vote; it was followed by the DA, with almost 22 percent, and the MK Party, with about 14 percent. As the ANC was not able to win a majority of National Assembly seats, the country awaited the outcome of discussions to form a governing coalition. Though a partnership between the ANC and DA made sense from the standpoint of having the greatest numbers in the National Assembly, some ANC members were strongly resistant to the idea of working with the DA, which they viewed as serving the interests of the wealthy and the minority white population. Such a partnership also risked upsetting the ANC’s traditional allies, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the trade union federation COSATU, for similar reasons.

On June 6 Ramaphosa announced that the ANC would work toward the formation of a government of national unity (GNU), rather than a governing coalition with just one or more partners, and invited the other political parties to enter into talks with the ANC to join; pursuing a GNU that might include the DA as well as other parties would presumably be more palatable to ANC members and allies than a governing coalition comprising only the ANC and DA. Negotiations continued over several days, with clear lines being drawn between the DA and the EFF, both of which refused to work with the other, among others, in part because of their diametrically opposed objectives: the EFF and MK Party advocated for land appropriation without compensation (see land reform) and the nationalization of key industries, which the DA opposed, instead supporting a free-market approach for the economy.

The negotiations to form a GNU went down to the wire, with a statement of intent signed just hours before the newly elected National Assembly was scheduled to sit for the first time on June 14 and elect the president. While the GNU statement initially held only the signatures of officials from the ANC and DA, it was left open for other parties to join. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which had previously confirmed that it would be a part of GNU, later signed, as did the Patriotic Alliance (PA). The EFF and several other smaller parties formed what they called the Progressive Caucus, which planned to serve as the opposition in the new parliament. Late in the night on June 14, the National Assembly reelected Ramaphosa as the country’s president; he handily defeated the EFF’s Malema, who was the only other nominee. In the coming days, the GOOD political party also joined the GNU, which now held just more than two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly. Ramaphosa was inaugurated for his second term as president on June 19.

Meanwhile, Zuma and the MK Party claimed, without providing any evidence, that the election had been rigged and that the party had actually won a much greater percentage of the vote. The party had tried to get the Constitutional Court to block the first seating of the new parliament on June 14, as well as to overturn the election results, but the party’s application was dismissed as being without merit. The MK Party boycotted the June 14 parliament session, so its 58 newly elected members of the National Assembly were not sworn in with the rest of the body’s members that day. Two days later, however, the MK Party announced that its parliamentarians would be sworn in at a later date and that the party would join the Progressive Caucus.