blockade

blockade, an act of war whereby one party blocks entry to or departure from a defined part of an enemy’s territory, most often its coasts. Blockades are regulated by international law and custom and require advance warning to neutral states and impartial application.

International law regarding blockades

In a memorandum prepared for the London Naval Conference of 1908–09, the British government defined a blockade as “an act of war carried out by the warships of a belligerent, detailed to prevent access to or departure from a defined part of the enemy’s coast.” This differs from a so-called pacific blockade inasmuch as the latter is not strictly an operation of war and cannot rightly be enforced against neutrals. The former may be either military or commercial. A military blockade is undertaken to attain some specific military objective, such as the capture of a naval port. A commercial blockade has no immediate military objective but is designed to cause the enemy to surrender or come to terms by cutting off all commercial intercourse by sea. A belligerent may, if it can, blockade the whole of the enemy’s seaboard, but the mere proclamation of a blockade of the whole or any part of the enemy’s coast, without anything more, is of no legal effect. Such proclamations were formerly common and were known as “paper blockades.” A belligerent may not blockade neutral territory unless it is in the actual control or occupation of the enemy, nor may it blockade enemy territory in such a way as to prevent access to neutral territory.

The common law of blockade rests mainly upon principles laid down by Anglo-U.S. prize courts. The more important of these are summarized in the judgments of British jurist Stephen Lushington and Privy Council in an 1854 decision regarding the Franciska, a Danish ship that was seized by the British during the Crimean War.

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In order, therefore, to render a blockade valid under the common law and to impose penalties upon neutral vessels for breach of it, the following facts must be proved:

1. A blockade must be duly established: that is, it must be instituted under the authority of the belligerent government. Usually the officer in command of a naval force institutes the blockade under express instructions, but if this is done without them—an unlikely occurrence—this action must be ratified by the government. In either case, although in the British view an official notification is not necessary, neutral powers are notified in practice through diplomatic channels and the blockade is officially proclaimed. The officer in command must also notify the local authorities and foreign consuls.
2. The blockade must be effective. Paper blockades were declared illegal by the Declarations of the Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800, and it was to suppress their subsequent continuance that Article 4 of the Declaration of Paris (1856; a supplement to the Treaty of Paris) provided that “blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective.” A blockade, therefore, must be maintained by a force sufficient to truly prevent access to the coasts of the enemy.
3. The blockade must be continuously maintained and impartially enforced against all vessels alike. If interrupted—except when temporarily interrupted by adverse weather—it must be duly reestablished. Certain classes of vessels are exempt from the latter part of this rule, such as neutral warships and neutral vessels carrying distressed seamen of their own nationality, as well as neutral vessels compelled by stress of weather or the need of provisions or repairs to put into the blockaded port. Under the Anglo-U.S. practice vessels which have received a special licence from the government of the blockading state or the commander of the blockading force are also exempt.
4. There must be some violation either by egress or ingress by the vessel. At the London Naval Conference of 1909 it was generally agreed that there must be some notice, either actual or presumptive. In respect of egress the fact of blockade is sufficient. In respect of ingress, if the blockade has been officially declared, notice will be presumed if there has been sufficient time for the vessel to receive it. If the blockade is de facto, express notice must be given to the vessel by the blockading force and endorsed on the ship’s papers.
5. There must be actual or constructive knowledge of the blockade by those responsible for the conduct of the vessel.

A blockade terminates (1) if it is expressly raised by the blockading government or by the officer in command of the blockading force, (2) if it ceases to be effectively maintained, or (3) if the blockaded place is actually occupied by the blockading state. The penalty for breach of blockade was the loss of the ship in any event, and of the cargo if at the time of shipment the blockade was known or might have been known by the shipper.

At the London Naval Conference of 1908–09, an attempt was made to codify the law of maritime warfare. For the most part, the provisions in the Declaration of London (1909) relating to blockade are merely declaratory of the common law. Two important amendments, however, were made. By Article 17 neutral vessels may only be captured for breach of blockade “within the area of the warships assigned to render the blockade effective.” Under the customary law they are liable to capture during any part of the outward or return voyage. By Article 19 the doctrine of continuous voyage was declared inapplicable to blockade. Although the declaration had not been ratified by any state, it was, subject to some additions and modifications, adopted by all the belligerents at the commencement of World War I. On February 4, 1915, Germany declared its submarine blockade against Great Britain, and on March 1 the British government announced that it was the intention of the Allied governments as a retaliatory measure “to seize all ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership or origin.” Although in effect blockades, neither of these measures was legally a blockade, since they did not conform to the provisions of the law of blockade. By the withdrawal of the declaration and subsequent orders by the Maritime Rights Order in Council, July 17, 1916, and by reliance upon the law of contraband, the situation was regularized for the Allied governments.

Examples of blockades in war

A nation fighting for its existence and depending for success on its maritime superiority cannot afford to see one of the main objects for which its naval strength was developed largely discounted by neutrals who, ostensibly taking no part in the struggle, supply its enemy with the sinews of war. The ultimate aim of a sea power is to protect its own sea communications while denying oversea supplies to the enemy. The right of a belligerent to stop contraband of war from going to its enemy has always been admitted, but it is not unnatural that weaker maritime powers and neutrals should prefer that goods carried in neutral ships should be secure from capture. During the hundred years that followed the defeat of Napoleon, Great Britain was almost invariably a neutral and its own commercial interests found profit in this latter view. Thus, by signing the Declaration of Paris in 1856, British diplomats surrendered the right to “paper blockades” in exchange for greater economic opportunities. “I believe,” said Lord Salisbury speaking in the House of Lords on March 6, 1871, “that since the Declaration of Paris, the fleet, valuable as it is for preventing an invasion of these shores, is almost valueless for any other purpose.”

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A further check on the use of Britain’s sea power for preventing supplies from going to the enemy was the Declaration of London (1909). Of the items enumerated in this instrument, the absolute contraband list was small, being confined to articles of exclusive military value such as guns and explosives. These were liable to capture when destined for the enemy in neutral ships either directly or through neutral territory and in this case the doctrine of continuous voyage was recognized. The conditional contraband list was composed of articles necessary to the civil population as well as to the military forces, such as food, fuel, and clothing. Such articles were liable to capture only if shown to be destined for the armed forces or to a government department of the enemy state and if they went directly to an enemy port. They could not be touched if discharged in a neutral port for transmission by rail or inland waterway. The evidence required by the declaration to prove the innocence of a cargo could be evaded so simply as to render this class of goods practically immune from capture, and in this case even the doctrine of continuous voyage was disallowed.

Blockade in the American Civil War

During the American Civil War, the Federal navy concentrated upon blockading the seven principal Southern ports. U.S. Pres. Abraham Lincoln had proclaimed a blockade of the Southern coast on April 19, 1861, but for many months it was little more than nominal for lack of ships to enforce it. Although the United States was not party to the Declaration of Paris, the demise of paper blockades was universally recognized, and an effective blockade of the entire Confederacy would be an enormous undertaking. An attempt to close Charleston (South Carolina) harbour by sinking stone-laden hulks in the entrance proved a failure.

Not until the middle of 1862 could the blockade be regarded as even moderately effective. As demand for Southern cotton increased in the English market, vessels specially adapted for blockade-running were built in both English and Southern shipyards. In spite of the Federal navy’s efforts, blockade-running only ceased to be a profitable activity when the ports were actually in Federal hands. Savannah (Georgia) had been practically closed since the capture of Fort Pulaski (December 12, 1862). The loss of Charleston (February 18, 1865) and Wilmington, North Carolina, (January 15, 1865) left the Confederacy without an Atlantic port; by that point, Union naval strength had expanded from just 42 commissioned vessels at the outbreak of war to more than 600.

Blockade in World War I

During World War I Britain sought to justify its interference with trade between neutrals, when such trade might have an enemy destination, on the ground of changed conditions of warfare. British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey’s note to U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing on July 23, 1915, asserted that Germany’s “territories are covered by a network of railways and waterways, which enable her commerce to pass as conveniently through ports in…[adjacent] neutral countries as through her own.”

The tactical disadvantage thus faced by a belligerent was not a novel geographical situation, historically speaking. In the Napoleonic Wars water transportation by river and canal through the ports of the Baltic was as substantially effective in supplying France as was the “network of railways and waterways” supplying Germany in World War I. Nevertheless, the modes of application of naval blockades and the effectiveness of blockading naval operations had been greatly changed by conditions of warfare. The extended range of shore batteries, the use of torpedo boats and similar craft, the action of submarines and mines, and the employment of aircraft for bombing and machine-gunning surface craft had made any close blockade or any blockade by stationary vessels impossible. The blockading squadron was accordingly now constrained to operate at some distance from the enemy coast. On the other hand, the efficiency of the blockading forces was increased by the ability of the modern naval vessel to be independent of the weather; to communicate by radio with other vessels of the squadron and with the command; to operate at high speed; to utilize radar, naval aircraft, and submarines for scouting purposes; and to employ radar and searchlights for night operations.

Blockades may be breached by aircraft and submarines as well as by surface vessels. The Report of The Hague jurists of 1923 stated that “where a blockade has been established and an aircraft attempts to pass through into the blockaded area within the limits of the blockade, it should be liable to capture.” The goods carried in any aircraft so captured, and the aircraft itself, would be subject to condemnation. This power of capture and condemnation was nevertheless subject to the rule, as the U.S. Naval War College pointed out in 1935, that “a blockade maintained by surface vessels only without means of preventing or rendering dangerous the passage of aircraft or submarine would be ‘a paper blockade’ in so far as such craft were concerned even though proclaimed to include these.” The fact that a blockade might be ineffective against aircraft or submarines, and therefore illegal for such purpose, would not preclude the legality of a blockade effectively maintained by surface craft against surface craft.

Retaliation

Shortly after the outbreak of World War I, belligerents began to resort to the practice of mine-laying on the high seas with a view to cutting off access by ships to enemy coasts. On November 3, 1914, Great Britain declared “that the whole of the North Sea must be considered military area” within which “merchant shipping…will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines.” On February 4, 1915, Germany countered by declaring the entire English Channel and the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland to be “an area of war” within which it would “endeavour to destroy every merchant vessel that is found.” This action was sought to be justified as an act of retaliation, “just as England has designated the area between Scotland and Norway an area of war.”

Retaliation was likewise invoked as the basis for the British Order in Council of March 11, 1915, whereby neutral ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin were to be taken into port, the goods there to be discharged and detained for the duration of the war. On January 31, 1917, Germany and Austria-Hungary announced a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in certain zones, which Germany again sought to justify as a means of meeting “the illegal measures of her enemies.” Great Britain retaliated by an Order in Council of February 16, 1917, which declared that any vessel found at sea on its way to or from a port in any neutral country affording a means of access to enemy territory, without having first called at a British or Allied port, should be presumed to be carrying goods with an enemy destination or of enemy origin until the contrary was established.

The British measures lacked the essential characteristics of a blockade, and the Orders in Council carefully avoided the use of this term. Rather, they appeared to be the assertion of an enlarged right of capture, not limited to contraband but dependent on the test of enemy origin or destination. Belligerents did not seek to uphold the legality of their practice independently of retaliation. Neutrals uniformly protested the application of such measures to their shipping and to the goods of their nationals, and they refused to concede the legality of such actions. However, they were unable to thwart their imposition.

Blockade through exercise of sovereign rights

In World War I the United Kingdom found that its strategic control of shipping facilities, including bunker supplies and ships’ stores, furnished a powerful means of subjecting neutral shipowners and traders to conformance with the basic British policy that “no vessels owned, chartered or controlled by them (i.e., neutrals) should carry any cargoes proceeding from, or destined to, an enemy country.” These shipping facilities could be granted or withheld in the exercise of sovereign discretion, or they could be granted subject to compliance with desired conditions.

Bunker control

During World War I nearly all the bunker depots in the world, except those under U.S. control, were in Allied territory or were dependent on supplies from such territory. This fact was made the basis for an effective system of licensing supplies of fuels to neutral vessels in Allied ports. Among other things, such supply was made subject to the condition that the vessel should not trade with any port in an enemy country or carry cargo to blacklisted persons. A blacklist of vessels to be refused bunkers at British ports was established, as was also a white list of ships which were to receive bunkers freely, their owners having agreed to observe the various conditions stipulated by the British.

Embargoes

Embargoes on the export of specified commodities were announced by Germany and France on July 31, 1914, and by Great Britain on August 3, 1914. The practice rapidly expanded both as to commodities affected and territories prohibited. The belligerents evidenced a willingness to relax the embargoes as to specific strategic commodities desired by neutrals—by Germany with respect to chemicals, dyestuffs, and medicines and by Great Britain with respect to rubber, jute, chrome, manganese and tungsten ore—upon guarantees by such neutrals that they would not re-export such commodities to the opposing belligerent. A cooperative system of enforcement was accordingly established by agreements with the neutral importer. Private organizations such as the Netherlands Overseas Trust and the merchants’ guild of Copenhagen assisted the Allied Powers in carrying out their plans.

Blacklists and the financial blockade

In the exercise of its sovereign power over British subjects, the United Kingdom prohibited all transactions by them with neutral merchants “known or suspected to be furnishing supplies to the Central Powers.” Various firms in neutral countries, including the United States, were so blacklisted. The consequences of such a loss of trade constrained many neutral firms to a policy of cooperation with the Allied Powers and further cut off Germany from access to neutral sources of supply and trade. A so-called financial blockade accompanied this practice under which British subjects were prohibited from having financial as well as commercial relations with blacklisted persons.

Rationing

Since neutral coasts were not subject to blockade, neutrals facing the sea and also having land boundaries adjacent to belligerent territory could be made a source of supply for such belligerents in avoidance of a blockade. A system of rationing such neutrals was accordingly worked out by the British war cabinet in World War I whereby “rationing schedules showing the normal requirements of all the European neutrals in respect of all the more important commodities which they obtain from overseas” were implemented by agreements with neutral shipowners and traders containing rationing clauses under which the British government could automatically terminate many of the excessive shipments. The rationing system sought to limit neutral imports only to such stocks as would be needed for home consumption.

Later blockades

The law of blockade, in common with other laws of war, has evolved historically to meet the needs of major powers. The development of submarines and aircraft, in particular, made it impossible to station blockading warships in constant positions off an enemy’s coasts to maintain close blockades, and it has subsequently been accepted that long-range blockades (maintained by naval forces out of sight of the enemy’s coast) are legal if they effectively prevent ingress and egress.

One of the most significant blockades of the post-World War II era was not on water but on land. The city of Berlin, divided into East and West zones, was blockaded by the Soviet Union from June 1948 until May 1949. All communication by rail, road, and waterway was cut off from the Western sectors of the city. For 11 months the United Kingdom and the United States carried out a massive airlift operation that brought millions of tons of food and supplies into Berlin. This extraordinary effort overcame the blockade and saved the city.

During the Cuban missile crisis (October 22–November 20, 1962) U.S. Pres. John F. Kennedy declared a “quarantine” of Cuba after the discovery of Soviet nuclear-armed missiles there. Kennedy’s administration was careful to avoid the use of the word “blockade” throughout the standoff, although that was, for all practical purposes, exactly what the “quarantine” entailed. On March 30, 1972, as the United States was winding down its involvement in the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese launched an invasion of South. With South Vietnamese forces collapsing in the face of the so-called “Easter Offensive,” the U.S. responded by launching Operation Linebacker, a massive strategic bombing campaign, and Operation Pocket Money, the mining of North Vietnamese ports. The latter operation chiefly targeted the harbour at Haiphong, and it effectively functioned as a naval blockade of the North. Deprived of much-needed war matériel from their Chinese and Soviet allies, the North Vietnamese offensive stalled in June 1972.

The Falkland Islands War between Great Britain and Argentina in 1982 highlighted the influence that submarines and military aircraft would have on future wartime blockades. The British fleet struggled to contain a single Argentine diesel submarine, and the Royal Navy lost several vessels to Argentine aircraft; Exocet antiship missiles exacted an especially heavy toll. Like Kennedy, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher eschewed the term “blockade,” instead referring to the military net cast around the Falklands as an “exclusion zone.” The government of Iraq invoked identical language during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), declaring the Persian Gulf to be an “exclusion zone” where neutral shipping was liable to be attacked by both belligerents.

Perhaps the most noteworthy blockade of the 21st century began in June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain cut diplomatic ties with Qatar. The four regional powers then cut air, sea, and land links to Qatar, alleging that the emirate was a state sponsor of terrorism and submitting to it a list of more than a dozen demands. Qatar’s per capita income ranked among the world’s highest, and the country’s leaders used that wealth to absorb the economic damage caused by the blockade. Qatar soon shifted its pattern of trade away from its neighbours and toward Turkey and Iran as well as countries in Southeast Asia. It also withdrew from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and sought the involvement of the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations in an effort to question the legality of the blockade. As was the case in Berlin, the attempted blockade of a relatively small territory was frustrated with tenacity, the efforts of outside allies, and an enormous expenditure of capital.