Conservatism elsewhere in western Europe was generally represented by two or more parties, ranging from the liberal centre to the moderate and extreme right. The three types of conservative party were the agrarian (particularly in Scandinavia), the Christian Democratic, and those parties allied closely with big business. These categories are very general and are not mutually exclusive.

The Christian Democratic parties had the longest history, their predecessors having emerged in the 19th century to support the church and the monarchy against liberal and radical elements. After World War I, supporters of business became the predominant element in these parties. In Italy clerical interests remained strongly represented in the Christian Democratic Party (from 1993 the Italian Popular Party), which dominated governments in that country for four decades from 1945. This party never possessed a coherent policy, however, because it was little more than a disparate alliance of moderate and conservative interest groups. The Christian Democrats anchored a long series of governing coalitions with smaller centrist parties and the Italian Socialist Party. These coalitions, while often politically ineffective and increasingly corrupt, served to exclude the large Italian Communist Party (from 1991 the Democratic Party of the Left) from power through the end of the Cold War. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and communism was no longer perceived as a threat to Europe, the Christian Democrats lost much of their support. Their eclipse coincided with the growth of other conservative and nationalist groups formerly outside the mainstream of Italian politics—such as the Northern League, which called for the creation of a federated Italian republic, and the National Alliance (until 1994 the Italian Social Movement), which many regarded as neofascist—and with the founding in 1994 of a new conservative party, Forza Italia (“Go, Italy!”), by the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi.

In Germany, a country divided between Roman Catholics and Protestants, the church played a far less significant role in the main conservative party, the Christian Democratic Union. After 1950, following an internal debate over economic and social questions, the party adopted a program that included support for a market economy and a strong commitment to maintaining and improving social insurance and other social welfare programs. Illustrating the conservative temper of Germany’s political climate since the end of World War II, the opposition Social Democratic Party of Germany progressively eliminated the socialist content of its program, to the point of embracing the profit motive in a party congress at Bad Godesberg in 1959. In power continuously from 1982 to 1998, the Christian Democrats presided over the unification of East Germany with West Germany following the collapse of Soviet-supported communist regimes across eastern Europe in 1989–90. From the 1990s, German conservatives tended to adhere to an ideology of minimal government, deregulation, privatization, and the reining-in of the welfare state. Putting these ideas into political practice, however, proved difficult if not impossible, since many Germans continued to support an extensive safety net of unemployment insurance and other social welfare programs.

In contrast to Italy and Germany, no Christian Democratic party emerged in France to represent moderate conservative opinion. Instead, a large proportion of French conservatives supported parties such as Rally for the Republic (renamed Union for a Popular Movement in 2002 and the Republicans in 2015)—which espoused a highly nationalistic conservatism based on the legacy of Charles de Gaulle, president of France from 1958 to 1969—or anti-immigration groups such as the National Front, led until 2011 by Jean-Marie Le Pen and subsequently by his daughter, Marine Le Pen; the latter party, some argued, was not so much conservative as reactionary or neofascist. Gaullist conservatism emphasized tradition and order and aimed at a politically united Europe under French leadership. Gaullists espoused divergent views on social issues, however. The large number of Gaullist and non-Gaullist conservative parties, their lack of stability, and their tendency to identify themselves with local issues made it difficult to categorize these groups in simple terms. In the early 21st century, French conservatives of several stripes were united by a number of developments. One was the theme of “law and order,” sounded strongly by interior minister (and later president) Nicolas Sarkozy. Unemployed youths in suburban Paris and elsewhere—many of whom were immigrants or the children of immigrants—engaged in periodic rioting to protest their plight and were met with stiff (and popular) police resistance. Another thread uniting French conservatives was the perceived threat to French values from immigrants, especially Muslims. One of the values allegedly in danger was the conviction that public education should be strictly secular. When young Muslim women insisted on wearing veils to school, the French state reacted strongly—a reaction that may have succeeded less in reaffirming French values than in further alienating Muslims from French society.

In general, conservatism in Europe has exerted a pervasive political influence since the start of the 20th century, finding expression in parties of very different character. These parties have espoused traditional middle-class values and opposed unnecessary state involvement in economic affairs and radical attempts at income redistribution. They also have been characterized by an absence of ideology and often by the lack of any well-articulated political philosophy.