Later Italian humanism
- Key People:
- John Calvin
- Erasmus
- Thomas More
- François Rabelais
- Petrarch
The achievements of Alberti, Federico, and the Medici up to Lorenzo may be seen as the effective culmination of Italian humanism—the ultimate realization of its motives and principles. At the same time that these goals were being achieved, however, the movement was beginning to suffer bifurcation and dilution. Even the enthusiastic Platonism of the Florentine academy was, in its idealism and emphasis on contemplation, a significant digression from the crucial humanistic doctrine of active virtue; Pico della Mirandola himself was politely admonished by a friend to forsake the ivory tower and accept his civic responsibilities. The conflicting extremes to which sincere humanistic inquiry could drive scholars are nowhere more apparent than in the fact that the archidealist Pico and the archrealist Machiavelli lived in the same town and at the same time. Castiglione, who had belonged to the court of Federico’s son Guidobaldo, would be saddened by its decline and shocked when another of his patrons, the “model” Renaissance prince Charles V, ordered the sack of Rome. To a large extent, the cause of these and other vicissitudes lay in the nature of the movement itself, for that boundless diversity that nourished its strength was also a well of potential conflict. Humanists’ undifferentiated acceptance of the Classical heritage was also in effect an appropriation of the profound controversy implicit in that heritage. Rifts between monarchists and republicans, positivists and skeptics, idealists and cynics, and historians and poets came to be more and more characteristic of humanistic discourse. Some of these tensions had been clear from the start, Petrarch having been ambiguous in his sentiments regarding action versus contemplation and Salutati having been not wholly clear about whether he preferred republics to monarchies. But the 15th century, bringing with it the irreconcilable heterogeneity of Greek thought, vastly multiplied and deepened these divisions. Of these schisms, the two that perhaps most deeply influenced the course of humanism were the so-called res-verbum (“thing-word”) controversy and the split between Platonic idealism and historical realism.
Things and words
Simply put, the res-verbum controversy was an extended argument between humanists who believed that language constituted the ultimate human reality and those who believed that language, though an important subject for study, was the medium for understanding an even more basic reality that lay beyond it. The origin of the controversy lay in the debate in the 5th–4th century bce between the Socratic school, which held that language was an important means of understanding deeper truths, and the Sophistic-rhetorical school, which held that “truth” was itself a fiction dependent on varying human beliefs and that language therefore had to be considered the ultimate arbiter. Petrarch, who had no direct contact with the works of Plato and little detailed knowledge of his ideas, drew on Cicero and St. Augustine in his development of a Christian-rhetorical position, holding that “it is more satisfying [satius] to will the good than to know the truth” and espousing rhetoric as the effective means of persuading people “to will the good.”
This assertion would critically shape the character of humanism through the Renaissance and beyond. It was never effectively challenged by Renaissance Platonists because, for reasons discussed below (see below Idealism and the Platonic Academy of Florence), Renaissance Platonists, though strong in Platonic idealism, were weak in Platonic analytic method. The enthronement of language as both subject and object of humanistic inquiry is evident in the important work of Lorenzo Valla and Poliziano. Valla spoke of language as a “sacrament” and urged that it be studied scientifically and historically as the synthesis of all human thought. For Valla, the study of language was, in effect, the study of humanity. Similarly, Poliziano held that there were in fact two dialectics: one of ideas and one of words. Rejecting the dialectic of ideas as being too difficult and abstruse, he espoused the dialectic of words (i.e., philology and rhetoric) as the proper human study. This project would bear fruit in the intensive linguistic-philosophical researches of Mario Nizolio. Though anticipated by Petrarch, the radical emphasis on the primacy of the word constituted a break with the teaching of other early humanists, such as Bruni and Vittorino, who had strongly maintained that the word was of value only through its relationship to perceived reality. Nor did the old viewpoint lack later adherents. In an epistolary debate with Ermolao Barbaro, Pico asserted the preeminence of things over words and hence of philosophy over rhetoric:
But if the rightness of names depends on the nature of things, is it the rhetorician we ought to consult about this rightness, or is it the philosopher who alone contemplates and explores the nature of everything?
Appeals of this sort, however, were not to win the day. Philosophical humanism declined because, though rich in conviction, it had failed to establish a systematic relationship between philosophy and rhetoric, between words and things. By the 16th century, Italian humanism was primarily a literary pursuit, and philosophy was left to develop on its own. Despite significant challenges, the division between philosophical and literary studies would solidify in the development of Western culture.
Idealism and the Platonic Academy of Florence
The idealism so prominent in the Florentine academy is called Platonic because of its debt to Plato’s theory of forms (or ideas) and to the epistemological doctrine established in his Symposium and Republic. It did not, however, constitute a complete appreciation or reassertion of Plato’s thought. Conspicuously absent from the Florentine agenda was the analytic method (dialectic), which was Socrates’ greatest contribution to philosophy. This major omission cannot be explained philologically, at least after Ficino’s work had made the complete Platonic corpus available in clear Latin prose. The explanation lies rather in a specific cast of mind and in a dramatically successful forgery. The major Platonists of the mid-15th century—Plethon, Bessarion, and Nicholas of Cusa—had all concentrated their attention on the religious implications of Platonic thought; following them, Ficino sought to reconcile Plato with Christ in a pia philosophia (“pious philosophy”). The transcendental goals of these philosophers left little room for the painstaking dialectical method that sifted through the details of perception and language, even though Plato himself had repeatedly alleged that transcendence itself was impossible without this method. Along with Plato, moreover, Ficino had translated into Latin the Hermetic writings (see above The emergence of the individual and the idea of human dignity). These books, which also emphasized transcendence at the expense of method, laid claim to divine authority and to an antiquity far greater than Plato’s. They were, in fact, forgeries from a much later period and are in many ways typical of the idealized and diluted versions of Plato that are called Neoplatonic. But the academy, and for that matter all the other Platonists of the 15th century, bought them wholesale. The result of these factors was a Platonism sans Platonic method, a philosophy that, straining for absolutes, had little interest in establishing its own basis in reality. Near the end of The Book of the Courtier, Castiglione puts a speech typical of Florentine Platonism in the mouth of his friend, the Platonist Pietro Bembo. As Bembo finishes his oration, a female companion tugs at the hem of his robe and says, “Take care, Master Pietro, that with such thoughts your soul does not forsake your body.”
These limitations notwithstanding, Hermeticism exerted a stabilizing force on culture and paved the way for change. In supplying a quasi-religious endorsement of reason and nature, it provided an alternative for those who had been unable to reconcile Christian doctrine with life as lived. In authorizing the unhindered exercise of the human intellect, Hermeticism also fed into the scientific revolution, earning praise from Francis Bacon. Lines of hermetic influence would extend to later developments, including Rosicrucianism, Freemasonry, and the Enlightenment itself.